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Thesis directed by Professor James L. Busey
Latin Americans, and more particularly those Latin Americans 
who are influential in the making of foreign policy, are torn between 
their fear of United States intervention and their new realization 
that dangerous threats to their security also emanate from other 
quarters. Though the principle of non-intervention is a key concept 
in the inter-American system, it has proved difficult to define, 
essentially unenforceable and inappropriate for the prevention of 
covert interventions by foreign powers which employ the newer and 
more covert devices for attacking the hemisphere. A factor which 
further complicates this pressing problem is the growing demand for 
protection of human rights within the various hemispheric countries.
Examination of definitions and analysis of actual experience 
reveal that the principle of non-intervention takes on many aspects 
— as law, as principle, as political tool, and as moral force. In 
this context, Mexico's advocacy of absolute non-intervention, as well 
as her frequent conflicts with the United States on the subject, 
provide important illustrative data. The case of Mexico, although 
extreme, also illuminates the whole hemispheric point of view on 
non-intervention.
Currently, stress on the principle of non-intervention is 
utilized by some parties as a means for weakening the hegemony of
iv
the United States in the hemisphere. At the same time, insistence 
on non-intervention does little or nothing to curtail the less visible 
efforts of outside powers to increase their roles in the hemisphere.
It is questionable, therefore, whether either the principle 
or the practice of non-intervention is sufficient or effective in the 
struggle to preserve the security of the hemisphere; and there is 
even some possibility that the principle may be a positive bar to the 
achievement of such security. In the light of these new concerns, 
continintal interests may require a search for a new outlook regard­
ing the question of non-intervention.
This abstract of 308 words is approved as to form and content.
Signed ,
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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
Non-intervention is an enigmatic word which means 
more or less the same thing as intervention.
— Talleyrand
Three developments in the last two and a half decades reflect 
the forces that are putting new stresses and strains upon the prin­
ciple of non-intervention in the Western Hemisphere. One is the con­
tinual effort toward achieving a greater exactitude and scope for the 
non-intervention principle itself. A second is the growing concern 
for the political, social, and economic rights of man, which has led 
to the issuance of many resolutions that are inevitably concerned 
with the domestic affairs of states and which, therefore, seem to 
constitute a form of intervention. Even stronger measures have been 
proposed and often carried out for the '’protection of human rights.1 
A third development is the refinement of the technique of subversion 
as a device to effect the overthrow of other governments without in­
viting the stigma of intervention.
The contradiction between the first two may be inevitable.
The intrusion of subversion further aggravates this contradiction by 
undermining efforts undertaken by legitimate governments to bring 
about greater freedoms in their countries and by sowing distrust 
wherever it can be perpetuated. Laws which would allow for some inter­
vention, taken in good faith to protect democracy and human rights, 
also tend to allow'intrusion by subversive elements which seek to 
undermine self-determination in the hemisphere and to prepare for
2ultimate control of the country by foreign powers.
The problem is very difficult to resolve. Must one principle 
give way to another? Are subversion and propaganda means for accom­
plishing in an undercover way what the non-intervention principle 
would otherwise prevent?
In Part I of this paper, the question of intervention is first 
studied in general as to its definition and permissibility under tra­
ditional, general contemporary, and American international law* Next, 
the position of the principle in the inter-American system is analysed 
to determine in what special regard the non-intervention principle is 
held in the Americas and how the American republics have developed 
their conception of it. The Tricontinental Conference which was held 
in Havana in 1966 is a special case study of the problems facing the 
Hemisphere regarding subversion.
Chapter III deals with the question of intervention for the 
protection of democracy in both general and particular American inter­
national law and practice. The case study of the United States and 
O.AoS. intervention in the Dominican liepublic in 1965 is used as an 
illustration of the status of intervention for democracy in the 
Americas. Chapter IV covers the same things with regard to human 
rights.
Part II is a case study which deals with the interpretation 
and application by one country— Mexico— of the principle of non­
intervention. Mexico was selected for this study because of her firm 
attitude regarding non-intervention. The historical precedents to 
her present position are outlined, as well as the principles which
3have emerged as parts of her foreign policy as a result of her history. 
These principles are correlated to her position regarding non-inter- 
vention, bringing one to date through the regime of President Adolfo 
Lopez Mateos which terminated in December of 1964.
The special case of Mexico’s position at the Ninth Meeting of 
Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the 0.A#So is used as a case 
study. At this meeting the actions of Cuba against Venezuela were 
dealt with, and Mexico’s stand was illustrative of her general atti­
tude in such cases.
Another chapter deals with Mexico’s attitude regarding inter­
national organizations.
Part III concludes the paper, giving a synopsis of the position 
of the principle of non-intervention in the Western Hemisphere. The 
nature of the problems surrounding the principle and the possibili­
ties for resolving them are then evaluated.
PART I
PROBLEMS IN INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION 
OF THE HEMISPHERIC PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION
CHAPTER I
THE CONCEPT OF INTERVENTION
There are few subjects which have given rise to 
more controversies than that of the duty of non­
intervention or the alleged right of intervention. All 
jurists are agreed upon the seriousness of the act and 
its consequences. But in their estimates of the juridi­
cal issue, one can only find trouble and confusion.
— Henry Bonfils^
Most publicists refer to the juridical or political doctrine 
of "intervention” rather than to the negative form, or "non-inter- 
vention.1’ They admit, however, that states should generally conduct
themselves by the rule of non-intervention. Intervention is the
2frequent exception to the actual rule of law. In defining inter­
vention in this study, we must look at it from two points of view, 
the juridical and the political. First, however, we will note the 
several types of intervention that exist. Richard A. Falk, professor 
of international law at the Woodrow V/ilson School of Public and 
International Affairs, describes several prominent kinds of inter­
vention relating to how many states intervene and why.
First, there is the classical form of unilateral intervention 
by which one nation intervenes in the internal affairs of another 
Second, there is counter-intervention, as when State A intervenes 
in the affairs of B to prevent or offset interference by State C.
^Henry Bonfils, Manuel de droit international public (i, 7th ed 
Paris: Libraire Rousseau, 1914"), p. 156.
oAnn Van Wynan Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Intervention: The Lav 
and its Import in the Americas (Dallas: Southern Methodist University 
Press, 1956), p. 67.
5Third, there is collective intervention, as when a number of 
states join to coerce the will of the target state. Fourth, 
there is regional intervention, as when a group of states forms 
a juridical entity which then imposes the regional will upon a 
dissenting member of the group. And fifth, there i| universal 
intervention under the aegis of the United Nations.
Types of intervention can be military, economic, cultural, 
diplomatic, and political. Subversion is likely to be included under 
the political type.
The practices of states on the matter of intervention are con­
fused and lead to no customary definition or rule of conduct which 
is accepted as valid by all parties. Furthermore, jurists throughout 
the world are themselves not in agreement on a definition of the term. 
They differ as to the scope which the term embodies, and as to what 
types of interference or involvement, if any, are exempt from being 
included in a juridical definition of intervention. Intervention 
from the juridical and political points of view will be studied and 
compared on the following pages.
JURIDICAL CONCEPT OF INTERVENTION
Jurists usually contend that the term intervention is to be 
used in its technical meaning, signifying interference in the sense
"^Examples of the above are, respectively: (l) the Soviet
intervention in Hungary in 1956 and much of the U.S. intervention 
under the Monroe Doctrine; (2) the United States interventions in 
South Vietnam; (3) the intervention in 1827 by France, England, and 
Russia on behalf of the Greek insurgency against Turkish rule; (4) 
the actions of the O.A.S. against Cuba in 1962 and 1964; and (5) the 
Congo operations which are the clearest instance to date of universal 
intervention. Cited in Richard A. Falk, "The Legitimacy of Legisla­
tive Intervention by the United Nations," Essays on Intervention, 
Roland J. Stanger (ed.), (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 
1964), pp. 40-41.
6of an action amounting to a denial of the independence of a state. 
According to Rosalyn Higgins, it would be a "peremptory demand accom­
panied by enforcement or threat of enforcement in case of non—compli—
.,4 ance.1
In December of 1965, the General Assembly passed a strong and 
comprehensive resolution on non-intervention. It stated that no state 
should intervene in the internal or external affairs of another. It 
prohibited, among other things, indirect intervention, intervention
5
in civil strife, and subversion. As a consequence, the attention 
of the world was directed to a new, universal concept of absolute 
non-intervention, except in certain collective areas.
The effect which this resolution will have on the actual 
legality of intervention is uncertain. It depends upon the legal 
character of resolutions, and this is a matter upon which jurists are 
not all in agreement.^
Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law through 
the Political Organs of the United Nations (London; Oxford University 
Press, 1963), p. 68.
^See Appendix, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX).
^Charles G. Fenwick has stated, " . . .  Jurists are not yet in 
accord as to the legal force of declarations and resolutions. Inas­
much as they do not call for ratification by regular constitutional 
procedures, they may seem to create purely moral obligations. . . .
On the other hand, they have in many cases been regarded de facto as 
creating binding obligations, so that a state neglecting to comply 
with them will be called to account by the other parties. . . .  In 
1945 the American states assembled at the Conference on the Problems 
of War and Peace spoke of having been incorporating certain princi­
ples into their international law since 1890 'by means of conventions, 
resolutions, and declarations.'" (Charles G. Fenwick, International 
Law [4th ed., New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965j * P* 96) James 
L. Brierly disagrees with the idea that resolutions could be legally
7As a consequence of this resolution, the scope of the universal 
concept of juridical intervention has broadened in one way or another 
in the past year. Nevertheless, there is scant machinery, except the 
good will of signatory states and public opinion, to enforce these 
measures. All forms of intervention remain forbidden ^except collec­
tive intervention in specific cases), but as the British Ambassador 
to the United Nations, Sir Roger Jackling, pointed out, even this
7comprehensive resolution is subject to interpretation.
Evolution of the .juridical concept. The meaning of "inter- 
vention11 under international law has never been static; some histori­
cal background must be examined. There has been a long evolution of
the term from the time the concept of "intervening11 was first con—
8sidered in the seventeenth century.
binding, saying, ,!A declaration adopted by resolution is not a treaty 
and is therefore not intended to be a legal document binding on its 
members. (James L. Brierly, The Lav of Nations ((6tt ed., Nev York: 
Oxford University Press, 1963)), P- 294.) It must be acknovledged 
that most authorities vho list the sources of international lav do not 
list resolutions among them. (See: William W. Bishop, Jr., Interna­
tional Lav: Cases and Materials ((Boston: Little, Brovn & Co., 1962)), 
pp. 19-38; Brierly, p. 56; H. B. Jacobini, International Lav ((Homevood, 
Illinois: Dorsey, 1962)), p. 3; et. al.) Most vriters list the follow­
ing as sources of international lav: (l) custom, (2) treaties or con­
ventions, (3) national and international court decisions, ( k ) vritings 
of authorities, and (5) general principles of law. Brierly adds a 
sixth source——reason. Consequently, it may be that Resolution 2131 
(XX) merely serves as a guide to vhat intervention does and does not 
constitute, and to vhat nations vho sign it have a moral obligation 
to do and not to do.
'Nev York Times (December 21, 1965)> P- 5.
^The idea of non-intervention was born in international lav 
vith Hugo Grotius in the seventeenth century upon the publication of 
his book, Le droit de la guerre et de la paix (The Law of War and
8Today we have reached an extreme point in international law in
the Americas, where the interpretation of intervention is very broad
indeed, encompassing interference in a nation's internal and external
affairs and allowing few, if any, legal exceptions. This evolution
has been neither steady nor easy to determine, nor a matter of agree-
9ment for all interested parties.
Dr. Isidro Fabela, former Mexican ambassador, jurist, profes­
sor, and intellectual, believed that the progress of civilization 
caused slow, profound changes in the principle of non-intervention.
He said that people, after living with constant wars, entered into a 
life of peaceful international relations, giving birth to interna­
tional law. He then concluded that the transformation was due to the 
"ever-growing respect which states should have, and which the majority 
do have, for the internal autonomy and the external independence of 
the rest."
Peace), (New York: Oceana, 1925); or cited in Henry Wheaton, History 
of the Progress of the Law of Nations in Europe and America (London: 
Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 1865), p . 55.
^See: Isidro Fabela, Intervencion (Mexico, D.F.: Universidad 
Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 1959)> PP* 1—73; Aureliano Rodriguez 
Larreta, Orientacion de la politica internacional en America Latina 
(Montevideo, Uraguay: Pena y Cia., 1938), p. 26; Charles G. Breame, 
Intervention Short of Armed Force in Latin America (Chicago: Univer­
sity of Chicago Press, 1945), pp. 22-38; Henry Wheaton, International 
Law (London: Stevens and Sons, 1904), pp. 79—102; and Thomas and Thomas, 
pp. 67-78. In these and many other books, one can find excellent 
synopses of the evolution of the idea of intervention (and correspond­
ingly of non-intervention) and the opinions of many authors on the 
subject. It is not within the scope of this paper to list all the 
historical opinions on the subject.
1 nIsidro Fabela, p. 8.
9His optimistic opinions as to the peaceful motives of people 
as they have ’’progressed11 through the years, and their growing re­
spect for the domestic jurisdiction of other nations, is debatable. 
Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that in thought if not in 
deed, nations have progressed from the day when the ancient Greeks 
held the belief that to give to "barbarian” states the same rights 
and respect as that given to Greek States was to devalue one’s own
In James L. Brierly’s opinion, in modern times,
. . . the Covenant of the League of Nations radically changed 
the whole foundation of the law, (l) by creating express obliga­
tions to employ pacific means of settling disputes, and (2) by 
establishing a central organization of states empowered to pass 
judgment on the observance of these obligations by individual 
states and to eijigloy sanctions in the event of the obligations 
being violated.
Fenwick speaks of the ’’new law” as follows:
If at times we speak of the ’’new law*1 dating from 194^ . . . 
it is important to keep the distinction confined to certain 
limited areas of the law. Much of the substantive body of the 
old law is equally valid in principle under the new, although the 
application of a particular principle may have changed to meet 
new circumstances.
In other words, according to Fenwick, there does seem to be 
continuity as new laws evolve and as the international community 
evolves with them. It is, therefore, important to study the opinions 
of jurists on the definition and application of the principle of
Henry Wheaton, A History of the Progress . . ., p. 2.
^Brierly, p. 408. See Articles 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 of the 
Covenant.
Fenwick, p. 32.13
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non-intervention in general international law.
Opinions of jurists. Fenwick states that "The principle of
non-intervention, like that of sovereignty, requires interpretation.
14Stated as absolutes, both terms run counter to the rule of law.1
And according to Brierly,
Intervention is a word which is often used quite generally to 
denote almost any act of interference by one state in the affairs 
of another; but in a more special sense it means dictatorial in­
terference in the domestic or foreign af|^irs of another state 
which impairs that statefs independence.
Quincy Wright adheres to the narrower definition of interven­
tion. He says,
International law defines intervention as dictatorial inter­
ference for political purposes in the internal affairs of a state 
or in its relations with other states. Diplomatic representations 
requesting information or suggesting negotiations, diplomatic 
protests alleging violations of international law and demanding 
reparation, and tenders of good offices or mediation not in a 
peremptory tone, have not been considered "intervention.11 Only 
if force is applied or threatened for purposes other than the 
protection of a Jggh'k under international law is the term inter­
vention applied.
Note that Wright does not recognize an absolute principle of non­
intervention under general international law.
William W. Bishop, Jr. agrees with the idea that intervention 
signifies forcible action. He says, " . . .  Intervention is generally 
taken to mean forcible1 action . . . taken in the interference with
1 ) Charles G. Fenwick, "Intervention and the Inter-American 
Rule of Law," 53* American Journal of International Law (1959) > !? • 873*
1^Brierly, p. 402.
1 hQuincy Wright, "Is discussion Intervention?" American Jour­
nal of International Lav, L, p. 106.
11
the affairs of a state by another state, by several states, or by a
I?collectivity of states.”
Other noted authorities, however, disagree with Wright’s re­
strictive idea of intervention implying the use of force. Thomas and 
Thomas consider it dangerous to restrict the definition in this man­
ner because it excuses various types of interference that have often 
occurred, especially in recent years. They say, instead,
. . . that intervention occurs when a state or group of states 
interferes, in order to impose its will, in the internal or ex­
ternal affairs of another state . . . with which peaceful rela­
tions exist and without its consent, for^ jjjhe purpose of maintain­
ing or altering the condition of things.
This seems to be a sensible definition, one which is relevant
to modern world affairs. Another useful definition is given by
Professor Richard A. Falk, who says, ’’Intervention refers to conduct
with an external animus that intends to achieve a fundamental altera-
19tion of the state of affairs in the target nation.”
Thomas and Thomas further explain that intervention contains 
two elements, the first being an interference by one state upon the 
sovereignty of another. Since interference is not the same thing as 
intervention in all cases, the second element is also necessary, that 
is, the intent to compel some action or inaction through which the 
intervening state imposes or tries to impose its will. This would,
17Bishop, p. 965.
18Thomas and Thomas, p. 71.
19Richard A. Falk, Chapter II in Stanger, p. 42. Dr. Falk is 
professor of international law at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public 
and International Affairs at Princeton.
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of course, alter or maintain the condition of things relating to the
20state intervened upon, depending on the case.
Since intent is not always evident or discernible, there arises 
a problem of enforcement. A state can proclaim innocent intent or 
self-defense in a great number of cases. Consequently, the decisions 
of those responsible for deciding upon the intent of the interference 
will often be political. Nevertheless, there must be in the inter­
ference a factor attempting to force or achieve compliance with the 
will of the interfering state, and this can often be discerned.
According to Ellery C. Stowell in his book on intervention,
The essential object of investigation in any instance . . . 
ought to be to discover whether an undue influence has been exert­
ed upon the government to induce it to adopt a desired course in 
such a manner as really to affect its freedom of action . . . The 
mere fact that a particular course is adopted by a small state 
from fear that otherwise the great neighbor will make it suffer 
does not constitute an act of interference unless the great state 
has given an intimation or warning which thereby attacks to the 
act a greater certainty of a disagreeable consequence.
For a state to have intervened, its coercive or disruptive in­
tent does not have to have succeeded. Furthermore, if a state acts 
and the act does, in fact, alter the conditions within a foreign 
state against its will, that, too, is intervention, since a state is 
responsible for its acts. Finally, it is to be noted that interven­
tion must occur under conditions of peace. It is not to be confused
22with war, although intervention does sometimes end in war.
20Thomas and Thomas, pp. 71-72.
21Ellery C. Stowell, Intervention in International Law (Wash­
ington D.C.: John Byrne and Co., 1921), p. 318.
22Thomas and Thomas, pp. 72-73*
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Another problem regarding intervention, whatever the definition,
is that of deciding exactly when intervention is legal. According
to Professor Samuel Flagg Bemis, traditional, general international
law has recognized the right to interfere in the affairs of another
21state under the following conditions: for self-preservation;^as an
empowered mandatory for collective civilization acting under multi­
lateral treaties; after all justice has been denied to nationals of 
the intei*vening country who are being mistreated in a foreign country, 
including refusal of an offer of arbitration; in case of the dis­
appearance or effective breakdown of all government, law, and order,
so that there is no organ of protection to which a foreign government
24can appeal on behalf of its nationals; at the invitation of a state;
25and upon the stipulation of treaties between parties.
Bishop and Moore see it somewhat differently.
. . . Grounds for intervention are said to be fself-preserva- 
tion, intervention in restraint of wrong-doing, intervention 
under a treaty of guarantee, intervention by invitation of a 
party to a civil war, intervention under the authority of the 
body of states, and jyatervention to preserve the rights of suc­
cession to thrones. 1
23Isidro Fabela has said, "Shouldn’t the active vigilence of 
the United Nations erase the right of intervention for self-defense?
¥e think so. . , Members should avoid taking justice into their own 
hands. . . . 11 (Fabela, p. 30 ) However, few authorities, even the 
O.A.S. Charter, are quite so adamant on the subject, recognizing that 
the United Nations is often powerless to act in the Cold War situation.
24See section on the Dominican Republic revolt, p. 93.
25Samuel Flagg Bemis, Latin American Policy of the United States 
(New York: Harcourt., Brace and Co. , 1943), p. 226.
26Here Bishop cites J. B. Moore, Digest of International Law 
(Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1906),"p. 62.
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The latter point is definitely no longer valid, H. B. Jacobini says,
. . . The right of intervention is, from a legal standpoint, 
merely an extension of the right of self-defense. The right of 
self-defense has long enjoyed legal status, and is recognized by 
the U.N. Charter in Article 51. . . .  Under some circumstances
a state is justified in interfering in the affairs of another 
state, but when this occurs, it is a mere extension of the right 
of self-defense. . . . There is a legal obligation not to inter­
vene when a state has bound itself by a treaty not to do so.
James 0. Murdock in an article in the A m erican Journa1 of 
International Law, distinguishes between intervention and collective 
security action as follows:
The central idea of intervention is coercion— a dictatorial 
interference by one state in the affairs of another. A govern­
ment takes the law into its own hands as party, judge, and en­
forcing agency. . . .
Collective action, on the other hand, is the antithesis of 
intervention. It is a process whereby the international community 
acts to enforce the law. . . . The central idea is that the of­
fending state is to be persuaded to observe its international 
obligations peacefully. . . .
He concludes that "intervention” in the U.N. Charter (Article 2, para­
graph 7) is used in a loose popular sense and is an example of bad 
drafting.^
Several other modern jurists recognize broad exceptions to the
principle of non-intervention and state that intervention in these
29exceptional cases becomes legally right or at least justifiable.
27Jacobini, p. 53.
28James 0. Murdock, "Collective Security Distinguished from 
Intervention," 56, American Journal of International Law (1962), pp. 
500- 501.
^ S e e : T.J.Lawrence, The Principles of International Law (7th 
ed ., rev., Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1923), P- 123; W.E. Hall, 
Treatise on International Law, (8tt ed., London: Oxford University Press 
1925), p. 494; Lassa Oppenheim, International Law (II, 7th ed., New 
York: David McKay, Co., 1952), p. 272.
15
Many writers who condemn intervention admit that in certain
cases it is justified. Thus, A. S. Hershey states that while not a
legal right in the ordinary juridical sense, in international practice
there are certain exceptions to the non-intervention rule.^ This is
because of the confused state of interpretation of the non-intervention
principle, due to loopholes and to the contradictions between general
51international law and particular international law. As a consequence 
of these many conflicting factors, the way is open for political inter­
pretations based on national interest.
Most of the more noted Latin American publicists are of non­
interventionist persuasion. They condemn intervention in almost all 
forms, especially in modern times and since 1936, In their opinion, 
intervention is never a legal right, but it is a political fact. In 
the words of Isidro Fabela,
Authors like Bustamante, who condemn all intervention except 
collective intervention by a juridical organization of states, 
see non-intervention as a corollary of the doctrine of the inde­
pendence sovereign states. As such, it becomes a duty to re­
spect it.
30A. S. Hershey, Essentials of International Public Law and 
Organization (New York: Macmillan Co., 1927)> p. 244.
31General international law is subject to interpretations, as 
is particular (or regional) international law. At the same time, some­
times they deal differently with similar matters. Until December of 
1965, intervention was prohibited more absolutely in the Western Hemis­
phere under the O.A.S. Charter, than it was universally. Then the 
United Nations passed Resolution 2131, which was extremely comprehen­
sive. Nevertheless, in interpretation of the prohibitions under either 
the U.N. Charter, the O.A.S. Charter, or Resolution 2131, should gen­
eral, traditional international law be relied upon, the results could 
vary, since traditional law is not agreed upon by all authorities. 
Before the U.N. resolution, it could be said that general international 
law permitted intervention in cases where American law did not. How 
they correlated was often uncertain.
12Cited in Isidro Fabela, p. 101.
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Others, however, have justified intervention where the inter­
vening state can show that its action is sanctioned by some principle 
that takes precedence over the right of independence. After all, 
international law is based on the protection of the good of the inter­
national community.
Thomas and Thomas are of the opinion that there are no absolute 
rights, but that all rights are to be asserted with due regard to the 
preservation of the independence, security, and prosperity of neigh­
boring states. "Rights which have been given for the common good of 
all the states may not be perverted to menace international security." 
They continue with the statement that under international law, no state 
can expect to retain the right of sovereign decision called indepen­
dence when, by its conduct, it makes clear that it cannot or will not 
fulfill the international legal obligations of an independent and 
sovereign state; for "it is obvious that state sovereignty is subject 
to limitations and that states are not above the law of nations but 
are subjected to it." They say, therefore, that the right of indepen­
dence is subject to the restrictions imposed by international law.
To recognize an absolute right of self-preservation would be to re­
verse a fundamental base of international law, and emphasize the pres­
ervation of the individual state rather than the preservation of the 
family of nations.
They grant that a state, like an individual, when faced by a 
situation which has been created by another and which it believes to
Thomas and Thomas, p. 77.33
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be against its best interests, will probably act instinctively to pre­
serve itself, even to the extent of violating its international legal 
obligations to its neighbors. This cannot be denied and has occurred 
repeatedly over the centuries. But the Thomases contend that because 
a state acts in such a manner does not mean that its act is legitimate 
It may be morally excusable, but it is not legal. They state that it 
becomes plain that there is no broad right of self-preservation re­
cognized by principles of international law, and thus there can be no
34right of intervention for such a purpose.
The Thomases concede that in special circumstances, interven­
tion may be legitimate under general international law even though 
intervention by one state in the affairs of another is not normally 
legal. For example, intervention is legal in general international 
law when it is carried out under the right of self-defense, as a sanc-
35tion, and by consent.
Jacobini also doubts the validity of a “right to exist.”
It is . . . highly questionable whether a good case can be made 
for the operation of a right to exist — at least on a legal basis 
. . . Excepting where it is a political reality and is written 
into treaties, this right . . . means only that a state has a 
right to protect itself and may attempt to maintain its indepen­
dence. . . .  No important legal right of independence as such 
exists, except where realistically guaranteed by the status quo.
. . . Yet, the huge network of treaties aimed at preserving the
status quo^guarantees a highly political— yet legal— right of 
existence.
34Ibid., p. 84. 
■^Jacobini, p. 55.
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Brierly tends to agree about the !,right of independence,M which 
is closely related to the ’’right to exist,” He says,
Independence is a descriptive term; it has no moral content. 
There is no "right of independence.” . . . We have no right to 
argue as though an independent state had a right to determine its 
own conduct without any restraint at all; independence does not 
mean freedom from law but merely freedom from control by other 
states.
Others would disagree with the above authorities about the lack 
of a ’’right of self-preservation” or ’’right to exist.”
Fenwick says,
International law is based upon the assumption of a body of 
states possessing certain fundamental rights; and the Charter of 
the United Nations confirms the established tradition. . . . The 
primary right of a state is clearly the integrity of its person­
ality as a state, since the existence of a state is the necessary 
condition of any other rights it may claim. . . .  A number of 
jurists„have made "the right of existence” the source of all other 
rights.
He goes on to say that practically, the "right of existence" may be 
described as "national security, the right of self-preservation, or 
the right of self-defense."
T. J. Lawrence accepts intervention for some purposes, sustain­
ing that "the duty of self-preservation is even more sacred than that 
of respecting the independence of other states." He admits, however,
that intervention should take place "only in the most clear cases of
39necessity and justice." Isidro Fabela rejects this idea, saying that 
it places weaker states in the category of semisovereign or in a
Brierly, p. 129.
70
Fenwick, International Law, p. 271.
Lawrence, p. 123.39
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subjected status in fact, if not in law.
Wheaton states,
*
Every state has certain sovereign rights to which it is en­
titled as an independent moral being; in other words, because it 
is a state. These rights are called the absolute international 
rights of states because they are not limited to particular cir­
cumstances. . . .
Of the absolute international rights of states, one of the 
most essential, and that which lies at the foundation of all the 
rest, is the right of self-preservation. It is not only a right 
with respect to other states, but a duty with respect to its ora 
members, and the most solemn and important which the state owes 
to them. This right necessarily involves all other incidental 
rights, which are essential as means to give effect to the princi­
ple end. . . .  In the exercise of the right of self-defense, no 
independent state can be restricted by a foreign power.
It must be noted that Wheaton may here be referring primarily 
to self-defense, since he does not mention intervention specifically. 
It may be assumed that there are circumstances in which a state may 
view its national interest as being so threatened that not to inter­
vene would mean its collapse. Nevertheless, the international com­
munity may not view the situation as being quite so serious. In such 
a case, intervention would be illegal in the eyes of the world, al­
though it would, nevertheless, occur. History would have to judge the 
correctness of the act. It would seem that in many cases, states are 
willing to let history judge, rather than curb their actions.
According to Roger Fisher, Professor of Law at Harvard Univer­
sity, policy decisions regarding international law are, indeed, very 
important. He says,
40
40Fabela, p. 3 1 .
41Wheaton, International Law, p. 86.
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Policy is taken into account in determining what is the law, 
but only to the extent consistent with a legal tradition reflect­
ing well-known canons of statutory construction and judicial 
restraint. . . .
The traditional conception of law seems particularly useful in 
the international arena, for it helps to focus attention on the 
gap between what a country believes the law to be and what it 
believes is wise or reasonable to do. . . .
In the . . . international arena, . . . seldom is it enough 
to persuade the Secretary of State or a presidential assistant 
that a proposed course of action would violate international law. 
He will want to know also whether the law should be observed. He 
will often accept a statement as to the rules of internation^^ 
law but believe that it is wise or reasonable to break them.
Nevertheless, governments prefer to justify what they do accord­
ing to principle. Every time a government acts openly contrary to 
principles it professes, that government may lose support. For that 
reason, governments either try to manage to stay within the law as 
they see it, or act contrary to the law in an undercover or subver­
sive manner.
It may be that a certain flexibility is necessary in interna­
tional law [and consequently in the non-intervention principle] due to 
the necessity of reconciling stability with progress in international
affairs. Inflexibility led to the demise of the balance of power
43system and to World War I. A legal system which cannot adapt today 
will probably tend to cause revolutions. Richard Falk stresses the 
need for a response which ’’engenders an attitude that perceives law
42Roger Fisher, ”Intervention: Three Problems of Policy and 
Law,” Essays on Intervention, Roland J. Stanger (ed.) (n.p. Ohio State 
University Press, 1*964), p. 4-5.
43Morton A. Kaplan and. Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, The Political 
Foundations of International Law (New York: John Wiley & Sons, I96I), 
p. 32.
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not as a fixed matrix, but as a dynamic dimension of social change.”
Arthur H. Dean, head of the U.S. Delegation to the Eighteen 
Nation Committee on Disarmament, has spoken of the importance of inter­
national law in the maintenance of peace.
In our contemporary world, the "vital interests" of almost 
every nation . . . have expanded and are expanding beyond their 
national territory to every corner of the globe. . . . Whenever 
there is such a failure to clarify rules respecting important 
current situations, international law tends to lose touch with 
reality. Legal concepts may have to be changed . . .  to deal 
adequately with the full contemporary scope of problems such as 
. . . sovereignty, non-intervention, international responsibility, 
self-determination, and the legal and juridical role of the United 
Nations and international organizations.
Non-intervention is not always the only moral recourse. It is 
doubtful that any state which is strong enough to prevent it will 
ever allow itself to be destroyed, rather than show disrespect for 
the principle of non-intervention. In such cases, the practices of 
states may not coincide or agree with international law. This fact 
reinforces the weakness of international organizations which make lav 
without having an ultimate power of enforcement. It also reinforces 
the fact that adherence to international law is a policy of states, 
especially powerful ones, but not always a necessity.
POLITICAL CONCEPT OF INTERVENTION
. . .  It must be admitted that, in the case of intervention, 
as in that of revolution, its essence is illegality and its
44Falk, in Stanger, Essays on Intervention, p. 40.
Arthur H. Dean, "The Importance of International Law in the 
Maintenance of Peace," United Nations (ed.), International Lav in a 
Changing World (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1963), P« 6 5.
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justification is its success. Of all things at once the most 
unjustifiable and the most impolitic is an unsuccessful inter­
vention.
The political school of thought on intervention includes the 
layman's ideas of interference in any form. In it, the term is not 
given a narrow technical meaning. Its proponents suggest that the 
creation of a commission of inquiry, the making of a recommendation 
of a procedural or substantive nature, or the taking of a binding 
decision, among other things, constitute intervention under the terms
47of Article 2, paragraph 7» of the United Nations Charter. Although 
the U.N. Charter does not mention political intervention, those 
speaking of the political concept of intervention refer often to the 
Charter. Furthermore, Resolution 2131 (XX) has included many types 
of intervention which earlier would have been classified as merely 
political, for example, subversion.
The concept in general. One writer lends much insight into 
the problems of political intervention in a world of power politics.
He says,
Intervention means interference by a Power in the internal 
affairs of another power. We may classify it as either defensive 
or offensive, according to whether it aims at preserving or alter­
ing the Balance of Power. The principle of defensive interven­
tion may be stated thus: no Power can allow the Balance of Power
^Sir William Harcourt as cited in Wheaton, International Law,
p. 90.
^Leland M. Goodrich and Charles Hambro, Charter of the United 
Nations (2nd rev. ed., Boston: World Peace Foundation, 19^9)> P - 120.
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to be decisively altered in its disfavour by a change of regime 
or policy in another state. . . . Offensive intervention is the 
technique of penetration and expansion, aimed at provoking a 
change of regime in another state or even at destroying its in­
dependence altogether, . . .
Intervention is the point at which domestic and international 
politics intersect, and there are particular opportunities for it 
in a period of conflicting ideologies; vertical natioggl loyal­
ties are then confused by horizontal loyalties. . . .
With the political concept of intervention, as with the juridi­
cal concept, the idea of intent is important. In this case, however, 
the concept of legality is employed, if at all, only as a vague excuse 
or merely another tactic. Political intervention includes policy de­
cisions of the intervening state which might have harmful intent to 
the target state, but which are not illegal.
The differences between the political and the juridical concepts 
of intervention are either of kind or relativity. The recipient nation 
of a political interference can allege intervention on the basis of 
its political convictions. It may not like the state which is inter­
fering, and might, therefore, wish to embarrass it in the eyes of the 
world. It can do the same with a case of illegal intervention, but 
in the latter case, it is evidently a breach of law, while in the 
former it is not.
Politically speaking, an act may be considered intervention if 
the intervened-upon country can convince its populace, or some ele­
ments of the international community, that said action had coercive 
intent. It need not allude to law, although it often does. Sometimes
48 /Martin Wight, Power Politics (London: Itoyal Institute of
International Affairs, 1946), p. 49-50.
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the legality of the act cannot he proved one way or another. The 
objections of the interfered-upon state may be the result of its own 
political motives. The same interference by a friendly power might 
not have incurred its disapproval.
Much of what is said about political intervention is the same 
as that which is said about juridical intervention. There is, however, 
a difference in degree, and in the fact that political intervention 
would not be handled in a court of law.
On the other hand, from the point of view of the interfering 
state, it may undertake acts which are not proscribed tinder a treaty 
or under international law, and which might not normally be classified 
as subversive, but which do have the intent of coercing a state against 
its will. This will not be considered in depth here. Nevertheless, 
it is submitted that in the modern world, what is juridical is in 
reality only relatively more of the same thing as that which is politi­
cal. A court might find one act juridically illegal and another not 
so, but the latter may be similar, may constitute political interven­
tion, and may have the same desired effect or goal as the one which 
is juridically illegal. It can perhaps be said that this is what 
diplomacy is all about, that it inevitably implies some degree of inter­
vention, interference, or coercion.
Isidro Fabela speaks rather strongly on the subject. He gives 
a good (although biased) example when he says,
We sustain that modern diplomacy, especially that which is 
utilized by powerful nations, is the most practical and efficient 
way to intervene in weak countries when they want to impose their 
will. . . . Diplomacy of powerful states is a two-edged sword;
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it serves to soften and arrange existing difficulties, but it is 
also an arm of combat which serves to help a strong state extend 
its dominium and its politig^l, commercial, and financial hegemony 
beyond its frontiers. . . .
It may be assumed that smaller nations use diplomacy for the same 
reasons, playing on the sympathies of world opinion.
Fabela wasn't the only one to imply that the limits of non­
intervention affect the larger nations to a greater extent than the 
smaller ones. Note the following statement by Morton A. Kaplan, 
noted international lawyer and author on the subject, and Nicholas 
deB. Katzenbach, presently serving as Attorney General of the United
States under President Lyndon B. Johnson:
Now it is clear that a doctrine authorizing or inhibit­
ing forcible intervention or direct control of the political in­
stitutions of another entity . . .  is a limitation only upon the 
great nations. All states may be equally governed by the same 
general rule against intervention, but its bite is only against 
those who have the capacity to intervene. . . . Small states do 
not intervene against large, whatever t^g provocation, and no 
rule of law is necessary to prevent it.
The above assumes, of course, that "intervention" entails 
direct control or use of force (i.e. arms) in another country. This 
is one interpretation of the subject, but both general and American 
international law see intervention as having a broader meaning, par­
ticularly after the passage of Resolution 2131 by the United Nations. 
Although it is a mere resolution, still it can be referred to in 
international law, especially since it was passed unanimously with
^Fabela, p. 19-
5°Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, "The Patterns 
of International Politics and of International Law,^ American Politi­
cal Science Review (LIII, 3, September 1959), P* 693-
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only one abstention.
It is important to note in the above quotation the interest 
given indirectly to the idea of the equality of nations under the law 
and of the problem of equal applicability of the law. Law is not 
viewed as applying in the same manner to large and small nations alike. 
Mexico, however, argued vehemently in 1964 that a vote taken at the 
Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which 
instructed all Latin American countries kto break relations with Cuba, 
was illegal because only four countries still maintained relations 
with that country. It alleged that the law was being applied unequally 
to the states which were unwilling to voluntarily break said rela­
tions, since it obviously could not apply to the others which had
51already done so. However, Mexico would probably be unwilling to 
admit, applying the same reasoning, that larger states should not have 
to succumb to the principle of non-intervention since it applies to 
them in a degree unequal, that is greater, to that to which it applies 
to smaller states.
The decision of the more powerful states to place themselves
/
under the jurisdiction of a doctrine of non-intervention is necessar­
ily a political decision in the first place. It affects them more 
than it does the smaller states. The types of intervention affecting 
relations between larger and smaller (i.e. stronger and weaker) states 
are usually juridical and generally curb the larger state. Political 
interventions which are not usually specifically covered by international
J^See section on Mexico's attitudes on Cuba, Chapter IX.
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law are of a type which smaller states are more likely to employ.
This creates a vague kind of "balance of influence" between the two
52extremes of power.
Kaplan and Katzenbach observe,
The uncommitted nations are not committed to non-intervention, 
although they often use this slogan to cloak their resistance to 
bloc pressures. The revolutionary and subversive appeals and 
campaigns initiated against other uncommitted states by leaders 
like Nasser, Kassem, Castro, and Nkrumah bear striking witness to 
this fact. Consequently, the legal values associated with non­
intervention and those associated with sovereignty meet far less 
support under current international conditions than they did 
during the "balance of power" period.
It would be difficult to legislate rules to cover many political- 
type interventions. They are almost infinite and often the same act 
will have no aim of coercion or detrimental effect in a state, while
^2There are several examples of small-state intervention into 
the internal affairs of larger states, which would appear to challenge 
any assumption that small powers cannot directly intervene in tne af­
fairs of great powers. The following cases are exemplary:
First, British investigation in 1954 showed that Guatemala had 
given assistance to the People's United Party of British Honduras, 
which wanted separation from Great Britain. A Guatemalan consul at 
Belize had given $500.00 to help defend party members on trial for 
sedition. Broadcasts were made against Great Britain from Guatemala, 
and other, less active support had been given by Guatemalan officials. 
(This was cited in C. Neale Ronning, Law and Politics in Inter-American 
Diplomacy ((New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963)), P- 73 > from an In­
quiry Report by Reginald Sharpe, British Honduras, 1954.)
Secondly, the Dominican Republic under Leonidas Trujillo inter­
fered into United States congressional elections in 1958. An official 
of the Trujillo regime wrote letters to state party leaders in the 
United States urging the defeat of four congressmen who had been criti­
cal of Trujillo. (Cited in Charles 0. Porter and Robert J. Alexander, 
The Struggle for Democracy in Latin America ((New York: Macmillan Co., 
1961)), pri55:
•^Kaplan and Katzenbach, The Political Foundations . . p. 55.
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at other times it might. To control this, over-legislation would be 
necessary, which would probably be more detrimental than the situation 
it tried to correct. Smaller states are able to intervene politically 
in the affairs of larger states. The type of ’’international black­
mail” practiced by smaller nations, either individually or as a group, 
which attempts to exort some favor from a larger nation, under the 
threat of throwing its support to the opposite side in the Cold War 
if it is not satisfied, is intervention of a political type. It may 
not be illegal, but it does threaten international peace.
The Latin American nations have not practiced this so patently 
as have some others, but the Alliance for Progress did grow out of 
such pressures. In such a case, these pressures can be considered 
beneficial. In other cases, however, this is not so. Cuba used these 
tactics after her revolution, and although her aim was soon clear, 
she pushed the will and patience of the United States as far as she 
could. It is another case of a nation threatening world peace legal­
ly, then later making the opposing nation appear to be the intervenor 
when it tries to take countering measures.
Fidel Castro himself has publicly admitted that he would let
. 34his loudly-proclaimed adherence to the doctrine of non-intervention 
be compromised for political reasons. He has said that the principle 
of non-intervention must not be permitted to serve as a shield behind
^New York Times (February 20, 1959), p. 1? and speech by Raul 
Ho a Garcia upon the' invasion of Panama, cited in In t e r-Akie r i c ari Treaty 
of Reciprocal Assistance Applications (i, Washington D.C.: Pan American 
Union, 1964), p. 328.
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which dictators such as Trujillo could hide. This is another ex­
ample of the fact that, at times, the interpretation of the doctrine 
of non-intervention depends upon what side of the political fence one 
is on.
In 1900, the French jurists Brentano and Sorel said that to 
decide whether an intervention be good or bad, one had to consider 
the politics between the states concerned, in order to determine in 
what measure the results depart from the reciprocal respect for their 
rights, duties, and interests. They considered these to be questions 
of acts (i.e. policy) and not of law. As such, they said, "these
56acts belong to the critique of history and not to the law of men."
Of course, the inter-American system has rejected this point of view. 
It has, indeed, made non-intervention a part of American law. Never­
theless, interventions do occur which are motivated by politics, and 
which often make at least surface attempts to appear to be legal, as 
in the case of the United States intervention in the Dominican Repub­
lic. The United States has not admitted the illegality of her actions 
in the Dominican Republic, and has even carried the case to the United 
Nations. Nevertheless, this intervention was obviously political and 
motivated by the national interest of the United States, as well as 
by the interest of others. It may or may not be legal, depending on
57the validity of the Bemis concept.
Cited in Ronning, p. 66.
56Funck Brentano and Albert Sorel, Precis de droit de f^ ens 
(Paris: Libraire Plon, 1900), pp. 215-217.
57See page 13 above.
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II. B. Jacobini has observed, "For the political scientist, law 
must be viewed as a political phenomenon, and international law has 
an even more obvious political orientation than municipal law. . . ." 
Isidro Fabela would seem to agree, but has said, "For the politician 
there may be doubt as to the justifiability of an intervention; for 
the jurist, there is no doubt, because all interventions are anti- 
juridical, except collective ones, and those only in determined cases. 
In other %>rords, he does not seem to agree as to the political nature 
of the law, since he would see no political motivation as excusing 
intervention.
No matter which of the above contentions is correct, according 
to Roger Fisher there still remains the big problem of characterizing 
the factual situation. He notes, "Even if countries agree on the 
rules, there remains the difficult question of applying the rules to 
the facts.
In the meantime, as Richard Falk has observed, 11. • • Inter- 
ventionary policy accounts for the most intense forms of violent con­
flict present in the world today.
■^Jacobini, p. 28.
■^Fabela, p. 23.
^Boger Fisher, in Stanger, p. 18.
6lFalk, in Stanger, p. 34.
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SUMMARY
The evolution of the concept of intervention was by no nieans 
steady. At the time of the passage of Resolution 2131 by the United 
Nations General Assembly, authorities were not in agreement regarding 
the exact definition of intervention or when it was illegal. These 
various definitions are still important in the problems of interpre­
tation and application of the principle of non-intervention.
Resolution 2131 has broadened the concept of intervention and 
its prohibition, at least as it affects U.N. members. In passing the 
resolution, the members have supposedly emphasized their adherence to 
the principle of non-intervention in as absolute a manner as that to 
which the members of the O.A.S. have expressed their adherence since 
1948. Collective intervention is acceptable under certain specific 
conditions.
There remains the difficult problem of interpretation and ap­
plication of the principle of non-intervention. It is probable that 
many interventions will continue to occur due to political interpre­
tations of what the documents and international law have to say.
There is a legal principle of non-intervention, but its recognition 
will often depend on politics.
The political concept of intervention is a matter of relativity 
and point of view. Politicians may consider an act as interventionary, 
and may act accordingly. There is a large area of grey and uncer­
tainty in international law concerning interventions which are not 
definitely included under some legal prohibition. Political-type
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interventions range from the middle to one end of the spectrum, juridi­
cal interventions go the opposite way. Those acts which fall in the 
middle pose the problem, and often a political decision will be the 
thing which decides whether an act is juridically illegal or not. The 
question of intent is very important, but usually difficult to prove 
or to determine; however, it may be the crux of the question as to 
the interventionary character of an act, as opposed to mere interfer­
ence .
As Isidro Fabela admitted, a politician may take exception to 
justifiable interventions, or may call an act intervention when actu­
ally it is not, depending upon his point of view. The juridical con­
cept of intervention sees no exceptions, one way or another, and once 
the nature of an intervention has been determined, point of view is 
considered irrelevant. In international law, however, it often seems 
possible to justify interventions under one or another practical 
loophole in the general principle of non-intervention. A nation is 
quite able to proceed as it wishes in many cases. It may receive the 
wrath of public opinion, but no juridical sanctions will be forth­
coming.
Some political interventions are not obvious, although they 
have the same effect as outright interventions, and perhaps more.
Many subversive activities come under this category, as they are often 
difficult to know of or identify until after the fact. Again, the 
censure which could result from these acts depends upon point of view, 
since they usually cannot be pinned down to a legal violation. Diplo­
macy is often included in this category, as well.
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As has been mentioned previously, the decision of the great
powers to adhere, even partially, to international law is a political
one. "In the environment of world anarchy, there is not, in fact,
63law; there is only policy. . . ." Although this statement is ex­
treme, the fact remains that policy does, indeed, determine the nature 
of international relations more than law. Even adherence to the prin­
ciple of non-intervention is a policy decision. There is a law, but 
policy determines a nation's adherence to it. Political intervention 
is as important in influencing the course of affairs as is illegal 
intervention.
62See p. 27 above.
^J.P.Speer, "The United States and Non-Intervention in the 
Americas, 1954-1965," Unpublished paper prepared for Political Science 
521, University of Colorado (August 10, 1965)» P- 33*
CHAPTER II
THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 
AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION
Several theorists. . . . have seen in the sub­
stance of inter-Aiaerican agreements, organization, and 
cooperation, a typical American international law.
Whether or not the degree of particularity justifies 
the denomination "American international law" has been 
a source of much dispute, but it must be acknowledged 
that some elements of particularity do obtain. . . .
1— H. B. Jacobini
The United Nations Charter does not define "intervention" £er 
se, but it does say things relevant to the question. To some extent 
it indirectly implies the intent of the framers. Resolution 21_>1 
(XX), on the other hand, passed by the General Assembly in 1965, 
specifically condemns most forms of intervention. As it does not in 
any way contradict the U.N. Charter, it serves to broaden the applica­
bility of the principle of non-intervention as it concerns member
2states of the U.N.
The inter-American system has developed similar prohibitions 
regarding non-intervention. It did, in fact, have a very broad prin­
ciple of non-intervention included in the 1948 O.A.S. Charter, long 
before the U.N. passed Resolution 2131 in 1965. The wording of the 
Resolution and the O.A.S. Charter are very similar, although the former
^Jacobini, p. 27. See: Alejandro Alvarez, Le droit .inter— 
national American son fondement—sa nature (Paris: A. Pedone, 1910.)
2See Appendix, Resolution 2131, and also discussion, p. 6.
35
is even more comprehensive.
The inter-American system has had a large influence on the 
evolution of the principle of non-intervention and on the ultimate 
adoption by the United Nations of such a comprehensive resolution on 
non-intervention. In this context, a brief summary of the develop­
ment of the political aspects of the inter-American system is in order.
THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE KTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
Modern Pan-Americanism began with the first International Con­
ference of American states, held in Washington D.C. in 1889. Little 
of a political character was accomplished at this meeting, however.
For the next half century, the system developed gradually, but with­
out the direct involvement of the system as such in action in the 
political field. Apart from technical treaties, some eight multi­
lateral treaties on the peaceful settlement of disputes were adopted 
which made available to disputing parties several bilateral procedures 
of settlement. Furthermore, the codification of public and private 
international law and the promotion of comparative law were favorite 
topics.^
In these early years, the system was not empowered to act in 
a collective capacity in the settlement of disputes. The process of 
institution building proceeded on the basis of conference resolutions; 
there was no contractual or treaty basis for institutions. The system,
3See Appendix B, O.A.S. Charter.
4William Sanders, "The Expanding Fabric of our Common Interest," 
Americas (July 1964), pp. 1-2.
3
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in other words, was not a highly developed political organization.
Changes which began in the mid-thirties culminated in 1948.
The principle of collective consultation for peace and security was
accepted in treaty form at Buenos Aires in 1936. It was put into
practice and given institutional form during the war years by means
5of three meetings of Foreign Ministers.
The consolidation and development of the inter-American system 
in all fields occurred in 194? and 1948. This took the form of the 
two basic treaties of today*s 0#A.S. These are the Rio de Janiero 
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and the Bogota Charter 
of the Organization of American States.^ In addition, the bilateral 
procedures were codified and developed in a single multilateral 
instrument called the Pact of Bogota.
Article 6 of the Rio Treaty is based on Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter, which recognizes that the Charter does not 
do away with the inherent right of individual and collective self- 
defense in the case of armed attack. This right is also referred to 
in Article 3 of the Rio Treaty. The Rfo Treaty proposes to delineate 
the collective responsibility for the maintenance of peace and secu­
rity in the Western Hemisphere. All American states are to assist 
immediately any American state that is the victim of armed attack,
7either by an American state or an outsider. Collective action is
5Ibid., p. 2.
6
See Appendixes B and C.
^See Appendix C, Article 3> Rio Treaty
37
also provided for through a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Council 
of the O.A.S.
In Article 6, the Rio Treaty states,
. . .  if the inviolability or the integrit3/ of the territory 
or the sovereignty or political independence of any American 
state should be affected by an aggression that is not an armed 
attack or by an extra-continental conflict or by any other fact 
or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the par­
ties shal^ consult immediately to decide upon the measures to 
be taken.
This article has been utilized in twelve out of thirteen cases
9in which the Rio Treaty has been applied. Decisions reached through 
the process of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs are bind­
ing on the parties, except when the decision involves the use of force, 
in which case compliance is optional.^
In the opinion of William Sanders, Assistant Secretary General 
of the Organization of American States,
g
Ibid., Article 6.
9Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance Applications 
(i and II, Washington D.C.: Pan Araerican Union, 1964 and 1965). The 
Rio Treaty has been applied in the following cases: Between Costa
Rica and Nicaragua in 1948; in the Caribbean in 1950; in the Guate­
malan situation in 1954; again between Costa Rica and Nicaragua in 
1957; in the Panamanian situation in 1959? and that in Nicaragua in 
the same year; on the request of Venezuela in i960 (the attempted 
assassination of President Betancourt); 011 the request of Colombia in 
November I96I (threats to the peace from the intervention of extra­
continental powers); on the request of the U.S. government in October 
1962 (upon the establishment in Cuba of nuclear offensive weapons 
under the control of extra-continental powers); on the request of 
Costa Rica in 1963 (situation between Dominican Republic and Haiti); 
on the November 1963 request of Yenzuela (denunciation of acts of inter­
vention and aggression by the Cuban government); and on the request of 
Panama in late January 1964 (situation between Panama and the United 
States). For more information see: Appendix G and Americas (August 
1964), p. 5.
10See Appendix C, Article 6, Rio Treaty.
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The essence of the Rio Treaty is the principle that anything 
that endangers the peace and security of the United States endan­
gers the peace and security of Latin America, and that anything 
that endangers the peace and security of Latjy America endangers 
the peace and security of the United States.
The Charter of Bogota is the comprehensive constitutional 
instrument of the O.A.S. It contains the legal or contractual pro­
visions on the nature and purposes of the O.A.S., its principles, the 
rights and obligations of its members, and the organs or institutions 
and their functions. These include the Inter-American Conference; 
the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs; the Coun­
cil of the Organization; the Pan American Union, which is the Secre­
tariat; the Specialized Organizations, and the Specialized Conferences.
Articles 7, 13, 15, 16, 17, and 18 relate most specifically to self-
12 - • determination and non-intervention. Article 15 is the most specific
in this respect when it states,
No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly 
or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external 
affairs of any other state. . . .
Other aspects of the O.A.S. Charter which concern the principle of
non-intervention will be discussed later in this chapter.
During the 1936 Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance 
of Peace held, at Buenos Aires, the Additional Protocol on Non-Inter­
vention was signed. In it, the United States and others accepted 
without reservations the absolute principle of non-intervention in 
the internal or external affairs of the other American states, thus
11Sanders, p. 3.
1 2See Appendix B, O.A.S. Charter.
39
underlining the equality among the nations of the hemisphere. Since
that time, the principle of non-intervention has been accepted in
13theory in this hemisphere.
At the Buenos Aires conference, the theme of mutual cooperation 
14was dominant. Later, at Lima, Peru, at the Eighth International
Conference of American States, the desire for still closer cooperation
for peace in the Americas was manifested. The American republics
were determined to strengthen the machinery for continental defense,
and to begin to form the mechanisms for a system of collective security.
Definite procedures of consultation which could be quickly utilized
15in an emergency were provided for in the "Declaration of Lima."
Through these procedures, it was hoped that the nations of the 
hemisphere as a group would do what the United States had often pre­
viously attempted to do alone, usually under the Monroe Doctrine or 
one of its corollaries— that is, protect the continent from outside 
interference and promote stability. At the Seventh Inter-American 
Conference held at Montevideo in 1933, at Buenos Aires, and at Lima, 
some of the first concrete steps toward this greater responsibility 
on the part of the inter-American community were taken.^
13Thomas and Thomas, p. 62.
jL 2^
Graham H. Stuart, Latin America and the United States (5th ed., 
New Yorks D. Appleton Century Co., 1955), P- 509.
15Eighth International Conference of American States, Lima,
Peru; December 9-27, 193&. "Report on the Results of the Conference," 
(Congress and Conference Series No. 27), No. CIX, p. 92.
“^ Charles G. Fenwick, "Inter-American Conference for the Main­
tenance of Peace," AJIL XXXI (1937), p. 201.
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Thomas and Thomas have given the reasons behind these concrete 
decisions as follows:
It was quickly recognized that non-intervention was excellent 
in theory, but could be as dangerous to the sovereignty and 
political independence of an American State as was the doctrine 
of intervention. An alternative to individual intervention to 
uphold international law was found in the doctrine of collective 
intervention, bringing with it a continentalization of the Mon­
roe Doctrine. . . .  It was realized that in the inter-American 
system, the whole inter-American community should be responsible 
for the maintenance of law and order.
THE O.A.S. CHARTER AND NON-INTERVENTION
The Charter of the O.A.S., which is so specific in its condem­
nation of intervention, has been developing its conception of the 
principle and its interpretation since 1948. Although it is clearer 
than the United Nations Charter concerning what it understands inter­
vention to be, there is still much room for differing interpretations. 
There has been much dissension, especially concerning applications of 
the Rio Treaty.
As noted earlier, Article 15 of the O.A.S. Charter specifically
forbids intervention. Intervention by armed force is proscribed, as
well as is any other form of interference of attempted threat against
the personality of the state or against its political, economic, or
18cultural elements.
Under the chapter on the rights and duties of states, a state 
is prohibited from using or encouraging the use of "coercive measures
17Thomas and Thomas, p. 113.
18See Appendix B, O.A.S. Charter, Article 15.
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of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign 
will of another state and obtain from it advantages of any kind.
It is evident, that under this document, a broad concept of non­
intervention is accepted as a principle of American international law.
Under the O.A.S. Charter, Thomas and Thomas believe that the 
American states have also proscribed by implication any intervention
for reasons of sanction or general consent by the target nation in
20other than a specific case. In other words, it is not acceptable 
for a state to sign a treaty stating that another state has general 
permission to intervene in its affairs. The American doctrine of non­
intervention proscribes all intervention in the internal affairs of 
a country, except when undertaken by the international juridical 
community for specific purposes. Therefore, an individual state can 
request specific interference at a given time, which would not put 
the matter within the scope of intervention. This underscores the
idea of intervention comprising an intent to go against the will of
21the state, which in this instance would not be the case.
Since the U.N. passed Resolution 2131, individual U.N. member 
states and groups of states alike are prohibited from intervening 
over the world. The further legality of intervention by the O.A.S.
(as, for example, against Cuba in 1964 and in the Dominican Republic 
in 1965) depends necessarily upon the conception of that body as a
19lbid., Article 17.
“^Ibid., Articles 13 and 15.
21Thomas and Thomas, p. 95; and Aureliano Rodriguez Larreta,
p. 227.
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juridical entity rather than as a mere group of states. This will be 
discussed more later.
TWO MAJOR AREAS OF MISUNDERSTANDING
Apart from the general influence that politics exercises over 
international law, there remain two other special areas which especial 
ly allow for different juridical interpretations of the facts pertain­
ing to an action which is allegedly interventionist. These constitute 
two of the most fundamental reasons for misunderstandings and mis- 
usages arising under the principle of non-intervention in the Americas 
One area of interpretive debate has to do with differing interpreta­
tions as to the juridical character of the O.A.S. The other concerns 
the problem of subversive intervention.
The juridical character of the Organization of American States. 
The first area of interpretive debate in the inter-American system 
which affects intervention in the hemisphere, or rather its enforce­
ment, arises out of the fact that it is a matter of controversy as 
to whether the O.A.S. is a juridical entity itself or just a mere 
grouping of states. If it is a juridical entity, it is consequently 
not limited by the non-interventionist dictates of Article 13 of its
Charter. If it is a mere grouping of states, then it would be ruled
22by these dictates.
This issue is far from settled. The position of the United
22See Appendix B, O.A.S. Charter, Article 15.
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States on this question is unclear.
William Sanders, Assistant Secretary General of the Organiza­
tion of American States and an American citizen, has commented on the 
subject as follows:
. . . The question of the Castro Government and its alliance
with international Communism . . . has resulted in a basic cleav­
age on how best to meet this new development and as to the appro­
priate role of the O.A.S. in the matter. . . .
There are some Latin Americans who consider that the O.A.S. 
would not be justified in adopting further coercive measures 
against Castro, on the ground, among others, that such action 
would constitute a violation of the principles of non-intervention 
and self-determination. Other Latin Americans contend that such 
a view misrepresents and misinterprets these two principles in a 
way that would convert them into a nclosed-eyes and hands-offn 
policy. In fact, it has been said that it is of the utmost 
urgency that the O.A.S. acquire the characteristics of a truly 
supra-national structure, capable of adopting decisions consonant 
with the gravity of the9events that threaten the peace and secu­
rity of the Hemisphere.
He then concludes that it is evident that some of the problems facing
the hemisphere will require a further stage in the development of the
system— a stage of transnational institutions.
Mr. Sanders does not consider that the O.A.S. has, to date, 
acquired any nature other than that of a ’’group of states”, since he 
obviously sees the necessity of developing a supranational structure 
as a task. Whether his contention is correct is not certain for two 
reasons. First, because there are other points of view, and second, 
because there may be a position which lies between ’’group of states” 
and ’’supranational” which would allow the O.A.S. to be a single entity 
while ultimately succumbing to the will of its member states on a 
h i gh e r-than-everyday level.
William Sanders, ’’The Expanding Fabric . . .”, p. 5.23
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Thomas and Thomas stress the desirability for collective inter­
vention in bringing about enforcement of the principles of international 
law and in maintaining a just and peaceful international order. Under 
general international law, they say, the individual states in the 
international community may take sanctions to uphold the law against 
a state which is responsible for some violation.
If nations subscribe to the theory of the supremacy of the law, 
then community action is the only alternative to individual action.
If a state may violate all norms of international law, and if all 
other states are required to remain indifferent, then it would be 
impossible for international society to exist. Consequently, all 
measures designed to assure the authority of the international legal 
system are within the scope of collective protection by all states.
As a consequence, Thomas and Thomas say that in the inter- 
American system, the collectivity alone is given the right to protect 
international law as envisioned in the O.A.S. Charter. According to 
this view, since individual intervention has been prohibited alto­
gether, and since collective (that is, groups of states) action is 
prohibited in more instances than are included under general inter­
national law, the only agent left to protect general international
24law is the legal entity which is the Organization of American States.
In other words, to preserve the order and justice of the Ameri­
can international community, it is presumed that some organ must be 
available to protect it in times of absolute necessity. Although it
Thomas and Thomas, p. 103.24
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is not stated in the O.A.S. Charter, neither is it denied, that the 
O.A.S. as a juridical entity is that organ, and that it may take 
action where the proscription of intervention by a "group of states" 
applies.
This does not signify that the O.A.S. is a supranational 
structure. As with other semi-autonomous organizations, it may have 
jurisdiction as a single entity among its member states, while the 
members are nevertheless free to belong to the organization or not 
as they wish. If they choose to belong, they must accept its juris­
diction. As such, the organization is semi-autonomous, which places 
it between the classifications of "group of states" and "supranational". 
Brierly has said that the United Nations is
. . .  a subject of international law. It is not a state or a 
super-state. It is capable of possessing international rights 
and duties. What they are depends upon its purposes and func­
tions as gpecified in its constituent documents and developed in 
practice.
The nature of the O.A.S. is not precisely stipulated in the 
Charter. There may be more than one correct point of view regarding 
the matter. Nevertheless, the semi-autonomous concept may be a good 
answer to the complex problem, one which has not been fully recog­
nized .
The reorganization of the O.A.S. structure and the whole inter- 
American system is being considered at present. Proposals for moderni­
zation were made in Bio de Janeiro at a special conference of Foreign
Brierly, p. 121e25
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Ministers held in November of 1965. The Third Special Conference 
of American States was to be convened in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on 
August 29, 1966, to undertake this reorganization. It has been post­
poned indefinitely, however, due to recognition of problems concerning
27the Argentine government and other member states of the O.A.S.
At this writing, one can only refer to the draft of the Special
Committee which was set up to study the possible amendments and to the
28Report of the O.A.S. Council which treated the same subject. How 
much stronger the O.A.S. will become when these revisions are accom­
plished, or how much clearer its nature will be must await the new 
changes.
Subversion as intervention. Subversion is a major problem in 
Latin America today. In the words of a perceptive student of inter­
national affairs,
Liberal governments are loathe to control it [subversion] , 
whereas illiberal ones do not permit it and thereby achieve an 
advantage at the same time that they are most effective in employ­
ing it, thus achieving another advantage in that they force rival 
states into the use of intervention.
/- 26
26 /Final Act, Second Special Inter-American Conference (Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil, November 17-30, 1965) (Washington D.C.: Pan American
Union), OEA/Ser.C/l.13. 
^ Denver Post (August 7, 1966), p. 5.
28See: Final Act of the Special Committee to Prepare a Pre­
liminary Draft on Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of 
American States signed at Panama City on April 1, 1966, OEA/Ser. K/ 
XIIl/l.l, Doc. 90.
29James P. Speer, graduate student, seminar in international 
relations, University of Colorado, Boulder campus, July 1965.
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New devices of subversion are being widely and intensively 
employed in the hemisphere by communist powers which seek to expand 
their spheres of influence. Foreign subversion is aided and abetted 
by nationals of the countries which are the targets of the interfer­
ence, thus further complicating the problems of enforcement of sub­
version under the non-intervention principle. This is a primary 
problem with which the United States must contend.
Thomas and Thomas say,
No matter what the theory, the idea that only force or threat 
thereof can constitute intervention is exceedingly restricted in 
the world of today; and it is dangerous, for it excuses various 
types of interference that have often occurred, particularly in 
modern times. The totalitarian nations have reduced intervention 
to a science, and to them it has become a duty and a legitimate 
method of political warfare. Economic pressures . . .; diplo­
matic demands backed up with political threats to force a state 
to curb freedom of speech, press, and radio; fifth column activ­
ities; the inciting of another state!s peoples to rise against 
their government; and a multitude of other refined techniques of 
interference must in many instances come under the heading of 
"intervention". . . .
Another authority notes that
. . . The line between internal strife and international con­
flict has not only become more difficult to draw, but is now less 
significant with reference to the basic concern, threats to the
30Thomas and Thomas, p. 69. For other discussions about types 
and methods of subversion, see the following, among others: Pan
American Union, Applications of the Rio Treaty, op. cit.; Robert J. 
Alexander, Communism in Latin America (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers, 
1957); William Benton, The Voice of Latin America (rev.; New York: 
Harper & Row, 1965); Cyril Ee Black, Communism and Revolution: The 
Strategic Uses of Political Violence (Princeton, 1964); Paul W . Black- 
stock, The Strategy of Subversion (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), 
pp. 13-9^; J. Lloyd Mecham, A Survey of U.S.— Latin American Relations 
(N.Y.: Houghton Mifflin, 1965)V Dorothy Dillon, International Com- 
munism in Latin America (Gainesville, Fla.: University of Florida 
Press, 1964).
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peace. Furthermore, the drawing of a clear line between permis­
sible and impermissible interventionary acts, never easy but 
always desirable, is now both harder and more urgent. . . . 
Standards of customary international law relating ±o intervention 
are ambiguous, confused, outdated, and inadequate.
Again, we must affirm that it is largely the idea of intent 
which determines the interventionist character of some of these acts. 
Due to the veiled character of many of them, nations are forced to 
make judgments on the basis of political knowledge or belief.
Latin Americans have, to date, been reluctant to act upon sub- 
version-as-intervention. They fear that such action might open the 
way for United States intervention or interference in their affairs.
The Organization of American States must often, in fact, decide 
legal questions on the basis of votes which are dependent largely upon 
political opinions. This would be probable even if the intervention­
ist character of subversive activities were made clear. But the 
situation is almost hopelessly clouded when, in such organizations, 
pure politics is allowed to hide under the mask of law, however poorly 
defined that law may be. This is especially serious when one side 
tries, even halfheartedly, to build respect for that law, while the 
other is determined to use the law to destroy both the law and the 
opposing side.
The lack of a clear reference to subversion in the O.A.S. 
Charter has made the interpretation of "subversion-as-intervention" 
uncertain. Such uncertainties of the Charter on this topic have led 
to actions by the O.A.S. on the basis of interpretations which some
31 /Roland J. Stanger (ed.), Essays on Intervention, pp. vi-vii.
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loyal members of the organization firmly believe to be illegal.
Since subversion is definitely listed as a type of intervention 
in Resolution 2131 (XK), which was passed in 1965, the problem of 
interpreting subversion as intervention would seemingly be solved.
33Nevertheless, as was mentioned earlier, the provisions of the re­
solution will mean different things to different people. The problem 
of controlling subversion and of publicizing subversive acts will 
remain. It is, therefore, doubtful that subversion will be eliminated 
in the Americas or elsewhere due to the passage of Resolution 2131, 
or due to provisions in the inter-American documents.
Reinforcing this doubt is the fact of the convocation of the 
"First Afro-Asiaa-Latin American People !s Solidarity Conference11 which 
was held in Havana less than a month after the passage of Resolution 
2131. Many of those who voted for the resolution in the U.N. were in 
attendance at the conference. There follows an account of that con­
ference and its significance for future subversive activities in the 
hemisphere.
THE TRICONTINENTAL CONFERENCE
The U.N. resolution of December 1965 condemned intervention 
by subversion, terrorism, indirect intervention, intervention in
32For example, note the Chilean and Mexican reactions to O.A.S. 
sanctions voted against Cuba in 1964, and to Inter-American Peace Force 
actions in the Dominican Republic in 1965. They opposed the O.A.S. 
actions in both cases, saying that the O.A.S. did not have jurisdiction 
for subversive activities. See sections in this paper on Cuban sanc­
tions, chapter IX, and the Dominican Republic intervention, chapter III.
33By British Ambassador Sir Roger Jackling, p. 7 above.
32
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civil strife, as well as other more standardforms of intervention.*^1
In Havana, Cuba, from January 3 to 15 , a meeting sponsored by
the Communist governments of three continents was held. The official
title of the meeting was "First Afro-Asian-Latin American People!s
Solidarity Conference." It was of great importance to the above-
mentioned resolution and to world security in general. All of the
Communist and several non-Communist nations sent official delegates,
although the delegates from most non-Coramunist nations were not sent
by their governments. Six hundred delegates from eighty-two countries
35were in attendance. It was the first time that Latin America was 
included in such a "solidarity" conference.
The conference took the following steps, among others: First,
in the course of the deliberations nearly all the member states of the 
O.A.S. were specifically mentioned, either as objects of attack or 
as primary targets marked for overthrow through the support of sub­
versive movements. Secondly, the political resolution approved by 
the conference called for "maximum development of militant solidarity" 
with the Latin American groups who are under arms against their
34United Nations General Assembly, Ilesolution 2131 (XX), Declara­
tion on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs 
of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty.
See Appendix I.
35Paul D. Bethel, "The Havana Conference," The Reporter (March 
24, 1966), p. 25.
<7^
The "First Tricontinental Conference," Another Threat to the 
Security of the Inter-American System, Study prepared by the Special 
Consultative Committee on Security at its 6th Regular Meeting; OAS [PEA]/ 
Ser. L/x/lI.12 (English) (Pan American Union, 2 April 1966), p. 40.
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governments in Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, and Guatemala, as well as 
with subversive groups in Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, and elsewhere, 
and particularly in the Dominican Republic. Thirdly, a separate re­
solution which was approved by acclamation demanded that "all the 
revolutionary forces of the three Continents intensify their efforts 
to aid . . . materially and financially (including arms and munitions),
all the Directing Movements of the countries which fight with arms in 
37hand." Fourth, the conference established the Provisional Head­
quarters of the Executive Secretariat of the "Solidarity Organization 
of the People of Africa, Asia, and Latin America" in Havana itself.
It set up a special committee whose members include representatives 
of the Soviet Union, Communist China, and Cuba, and whose objectives 
include the provision of ". . . all necessary moral, political and 
material assistance to national liberation movements, particularly 
those which are up in arms." Fifth, the so-called "delegations" claim­
ing to represent Latin American countries were directed to remain in 
Havana following the conclusion of the conference, for further secret 
meetings.^ 0
In other words, the Tricontinental People’s Solidarity Confer­
ence set the goal of planning the strategy and tactics for vigorous 
subversive and terrorist activities to be carried on throughout the 
world, and notably in Latin America, in defiance of United Nations
rzn
Ward P. Allen, U.S. delegate, speech: Acta de la sesion
extraordinaria celebrada el 24 de enero de 1966 (OAS ~[OKI] Ser. C/
n/c-a-590), p. 31.
38Ibid., p. 3 2.
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Resolution 2131, which firmly prohibited such activities. Havana,
Cuba, is to be the provisional headquarters for such subversion.^
The statements by delegates who attended the conference are
indicative of the intention of the Communist nations to ignore the
U.N. Resolution. In a speech to the conference on January 7, 1966,
the Soviet delegate, Mr. Sharaf P. Rashidov (candidate member of the
Soviet Presidium) urged the creation of "a united front against the
common enemy, international imperialism headed by the United States."
He said further,
. . . The Soviet people have always supported the wars waged 
by the peoples, the armed struggle of the oppressed peoples, and 
renders them all-round support and aid. . . .
The Soviet people are deeply in sympathy with the courageous 
struggle waged by the peoples of Latin America who are striving 
to defend their national sovereignty. . . .  We express our fra­
ternal solidarity with the armed struggle being waged by the 
Venezuelan, Peruvian, Colombian, and Guatemalan patriots for 
freedom against the stooges of imperialism. . . .
. . . May this conference increase and strengthen the unity 
of our ranks, and imp^jt new force to the liberation struggle 
throughout the world.
A very inflammatory, but very typical, speech was given by a
delegate of the People's Republic of China, calling for violent revc—
42lution and unity in "the struggle against imperialism".
39.The U.S.S.R. and Cuba voted in favor of Resolution 2131.
(New York Times, December 22, 1965, p. 13.)
40Cited by Paul D. Bethel, Latin America Report IV (Miami, 
Florida: Citizen’s Committee for a Free Cuba, January 24, 1966), p. 2
41O.A.S. [OEAJ/Ser. L/x/lI.1 2, pp. 27-29.
Ibid., Speech by Wu Hsuch-Chien, January 6, 1966, p. 30.42
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The Cuban representatives to the conference issued statements 
and made speeches which should leave little doubt in the minds of 
Latin Americans as to the intentions of Cuba in the Western Hemisphere. 
Dr. Osvaldo Dorticos, President of Cuba, said in a speech on January 
3 , 1966 ,
. . .  On this . . . occasion, Cuba declares that it is a right 
and a duty of the peoples and governments of the countries that 
have won independence and have begun construction of a new life, 
to give unrestricted aid to the movements of liberation of Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America.
. . . Those here represented have pledged their history in the 
struggle for liberation and sovereignty. . . .  It is important 
now to find forms of,a common language and joint action against 
the imperialist foe.
Cuban delegate Osmany Cienfuegos, Cuban Minister of Government, 
was made director of the Permanent Executive Secretariat of the 
"Solidarity Organization of the African, Asian, and Latin American 
Peoples." He said in a speech on January 6, 1966,
It is necessary to ask ourselves what kind of organization we 
want and what it is going to serve. We must find the path that 
leads us to an organization that in its form and content will be 
effective in giving impetus to the revolutionary struggle of 
peoples. . . . The paths of unity of the j3eople are the paths o ^  
revolution. There is no true popular unity without revolution.
Prime Minister Fidel Castro was by no means silent at the con­
ference. In the closing session he called for unity of struggles 
throughout Latin America, so that the "imperialists" would not be 
able to cope with them all. He said, furthermore,
43 xIbid., Speech by Dr. Osvaldo Dorticos.
44Ibid., p. 31-32.
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. . .  In many other American nations, every condition exists 
for revolutionary armed battle. This battle has been going on 
for some time. . . in Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, and Guatemala.
. . .  As the Havana Declaration says, "The duty of every 
revolutionary is to make revolution . . .; not be a revolutionary 
in theory alone, but a revolutionary in practice. . . . "
. . . Where the bourgeoisie and imperialism exercise their 
class rule through constitutionalist means, as is the case of 
Uruguay, the force of the mass movement and the people's revolu­
tionary spirit are more and more evident.
There was some notable support from governments which proclaim 
themselves to be merely Socialist rather than Communist. The chief 
of the delegation of the United Arab Republic, Khalid Muhyi-Din, said,
Our program of action is very clear:
We must continue our struggle to eliminate the latest entrenched 
forces of imperialism and of the old colonialism by every means 
at our disposal, including recourse to armed conflict if necessary. 
. . . We must wage a . . . ceaseless struggle against all of the
tactics and machinations of the neo-colonialists. . . . Long live
the solidarity of the peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America!
He then mentioned that President Nasser has invited the next confer­
ence to meet in Cairo in 1968.^
According to Paul D. Bethel, on January 18, 1965, the Russians 
issued a communique directing Communist parties in the Western Hemis­
phere to push "on an ever greater scale, the movement of solidarity
with Cuba on the entire continent." It promised "active aid" to ter-
2 «
rorists operating in Latin America.
Ambassador Spruille Braden has quoted Soviet Ambassador Rashidov
Ibid., p. 32. Speech on January 15, 1966.
46Ibid., p. 35. Speech on January 6, 1966. 
47Bethel, p. 1.
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as saying that communist operations in this hemisphere would soon 
capture Venezuela, Guatemala, Peru, the Dominican Republic, British, 
French, and Dutch Guianas, and Puerto Rico. This subversion in America 
is to follow Viet Cong tactics perfected in Asia. As can be expected, 
the United States, its friends, and their interests are to continue 
to be prime targets.^
Ambassador Spruille Braden notes a resolution issued at the 
Tricontinental Conference on January 15 which states,
. . . Peaceful coexistence applies only to relations between 
states with different social and political systems. It cannot 
apply to relations between social classes, between the exploited 
and the exploiters within separate countries, or between op­
pressed peoples and their oppressors.
This resolution, in effect, voids any real concept of peaceful 
coexistence or of non-intervention, since in supporting "class strug­
gles" against other governments and social systems, intervention and 
a kind of "undeclared war" are inevitable.
Ambassador Braden also stated that the United States is not 
bound to abide by President Kennedy's promise to Chairman Khrushchev 
that the United States would not attempt to overthrow Castro, since 
part of that agreement included on-site inspections in Cuba. Such 
inspections were never permitted. He also said that no man can
Ambassador Spruille Braden, speech presented to Cuban Organi­
zations in Exile, in special edition of Latin America Report (Vol. IV, 
No. 6, March 21, 1966),, p. 2. Ambassador Braden is Assistant Secre­
tary of State for Latin American Affairs. He is presently a director 
of several corporations, consultant of foreign affairs, and trustee 
of the Citizen's Committee for a Free Cuba.
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guarantee that Castro and communism will be protected forever. Finally 
be warned that all guerilla wars are closely inter-related, including 
the one in Vietnam.^
The aims set forth in the addresses presented at the conference 
include the following: the creation of an ad hoc organization to give
impetus to revolutionary activity; repetition of the idea of "active, 
dynamic and militant solidarity11; use of the conference as a "revolu­
tionary school"; solidification of Soviet support for the Cuban 
revolution and, by extension, firm support to any other American 
country that follows Cuba*s example; a decided inclination toward the 
Chinese line of "violent revolution"; and the institutionalization of 
intervention by the Communist blocs into the internal affairs of the 
American countries. ^
The important resolutions adopted by the conference include a 
General Declaration, which outlines the reasons and methods for a 
"fight to the death against the imperialists", and proclaims the right 
of the "people" to resort to armed conflict to "liberate" themselves.^ 2 
There was also passed a General Political Resolution which 
closes as follows:
The conference also proclaims the need to tighten cooperative 
relations with the countries of the socialist system, the working 
class, and other revolutionary and progressive organizations of 
the peoples of Europe and North America.
50J Ibid., p. 1.
51See O.A.S. COEAJ/ Ser. L/x/lI.12, p. 3 6.
52Ibid., p. 39.
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Faced with the criminal alliance of the reactionary forces, 
the peoples of the three continents reply with active, dynamic, 
militant solidarity and the readiness to respond to every imperi­
alist aggression with revolutionary action, committing themselves 
to this fight until all forms of oppression by imperialism colo­
nialism, and neo-colonialism have been completely wiped out.
Considering the fact that the Communist nations consider all 
governments which were not represented as either colonialists, neo­
colonialists, stooges of the imperialists, or the imperialists them­
selves, little doubt remains as to what the representatives at the 
conference want to do to the rest of the world. There is also little 
doubt about their determination to attempt to do so.
There was also passed a Declaration on Colonialism and Neo­
colonialism, and a resolution establishing a Permanent Executive 
Secretariat, with headquarters provisionally in Havana. According 
to the Special O.A.S. Consultative Committee on Security, which put 
out the report from which much of this information is derived,
The long list of topics of resolutions makes constant reference 
to the support and encouragement of subversion, to the ’’struggle 
to the death against imperialism”, attacks and abuses the insti­
tutions of the free world, fosters the creation of permanent 
organizations to spread violent revolution, and seeks the strength­
ening and maintenance of a spirit of ’’active, dynamic, and 
militant solidarity.” All of this, without taking into account 
the secret resolutions and agreements that no doubt must have 
been adopted behind closed doors.
Finally, the Conference made several declarations relating 
specifically to Latin America, among which is a Declaration on the 
O.A.S. The aim of the latter is to discredit the Organization and
53Ibid., p. 41.
54 .Ibid., p. 37. The committee believes, furthermore, that the 
resolutions were prepared beforehand, due to the great number of them, 
the relative lack of discussion, and their rapid approval.
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its basic documents, "making use of virulent diatribes and false im-
55putations. 11 It is obvious that these attacks are directed toward 
weakening the inter-American system and its objectives.
Furthermore, specific resolutions were made dealing with the 
Dominican Republic, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Guatemala, and other 
countries, including Puerto Rico. All reiterate, regarding the
56specific countries, what was said in the General Declaration*
Reaction of the 0oA oS. The inter-American community was un­
animous in its condemnation of the Conference and its purposes. A 
special session of the Council of the Organization of American States 
was called on January 24, 1966, at the request of the Peruvian govern­
ment. The head of the Peruvian delegation gave his reasons as follows
In accordance with the instructions of my government, I must 
request the convocation of a special extraordinary session of 
the Council of the Organization, to formulate a denunciation on 
the violation of the principle of non-intervention, as consecrated 
by the Charter of the Organization of American States, and rati­
fied by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its Resolu­
tion 2131 (XX), approved in the session of December 21, 1966.
Every delegation spoke out against the Tricontinental Confer­
ence and its purposes in the Western Hemisphere. There was unanimity 
on the resolution adopted by the Council at the meeting on February 
2, 1966, condemning the policy of intervention manifested in the 
discussions and decisions of the Tricontinental Conference, and
Ibid., p. 49.
56Ibid.., P. 50-51.
O.A.S. Council Series, Acta de la sesion extraordinaria 
(January 24, 1966), O.A.S. C0EAj/Ser- C/ll/C-a-590 (Aprobada), p. 2.
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declaring the inadmissibility of giving support to any indirect forms 
of aggression. All the delegations reiterated their adherence to 
the principle of non-intervention and self-determination, and con­
demned the Communist countries for their obvious betrayal of these 
principles.
Several inter-American labor organizations, among them the
ORIT (inter-American Regional Organization of Workers), the CLASC
(Latin American Christian Trade Unionists), and several other unions 
from Costa Rica, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, and exiled Cubans, also
59passed resolutions condemning the conference and its goals.
The only disagreements concerned the length to which the Coun­
cil of the O.A.S. could legally go in taking action on the results 
and actions of the Tricontinental Conference. Chile and Mexico felt 
that Resolution II, number 1, of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation 
at Punta del Este, Uruguay, could not be applied in the case at hand, 
since it was specifically aimed at aggression, and the two governments 
were not willing to see the label "aggression" applied to the actions 
of the Conference. They admitted that it would be an obvious case of 
violation of the principles of non-intervention and self-determination,
^See Appendix J, O.A.S. Resolution, Ser. G/V/C-a-1379> February 
2 , 1966 .
59Some of these other unions included the Federation of Workers 
and Peasants of Costa Rica, Confederation of Peruvian Workers, Social 
Center for Private Peruvian Employees, National Federation of Farmers 
of Peru, Colombian Federation of Democratic Organizations, Confedera­
tion of Colombian Workers, and Ecuadorian Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions. (See: Editorial in Cuban Labor ((Vol. Ill, No. 22, February 
1966)), p. 2-3; and OAS Document Ser. G/ll/C-a-593 Aprobada ((February
2, 1966)), p. 5-6.)
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should any of the declarations or resolutions he implemented. They
objected, however, to any attempt to make intervention synonomous with
. 60 aggression.
The delegate of Chile said that a declaration against "aggres­
sion11 would be excessive, since Chile considered that the agreements 
of the Conference could not change a factual situation, existent for 
many years and object of many declarations on the unity of the world 
Communist movement, a unity more figurative than real. Such a declara­
tion would not advance the situation established by the Eighth and 
Ninth Consultative Meetings, and it would put the peace of America in 
danger due to more declarations and threats, not real and effective 
acts. Chile and Mexico abstained from voting on the resolution since, 
although they "deplore intervention," they considered that the resolu-
61
tion exceeded the powers of the Council.
This reaction of Mexico and Chile was not unexpected, since 
these two governments are always opposed to anything which would expand 
the jurisdiction of the O.A.S. or tend to equate intervention with 
aggression. This difference of opinion as to the reach of the O.A.S. 
Council does not diminish the unanimous condemnation which the American 
states, with the exception of Cuba, gave the Tricontinental Conference 
and its aims.
The O.A.S. Special Consultative Committee on Security concludes
^%.A.S., Council Series, Acta de la sesion extraordinaria, OAS 
rOEA]/Ser. G/ll/C-a-59^ (AprobadaT^ (February 2, 1966), p7 17-21.
^ Ibid., p. 2 1.
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its report on the Conference with the following statement:
THAT THE SO-CALLED FIRST AFRO-ASIAN-LATIN AMERICAN PEOPLES' 
SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE CONSTITUTES A POSITIVE THREAT TO THE FREE 
PEOPLES OF THE WORLD, AND, ON THE HEMISPHERE LEVEL, REPRESENTS 
THE MOST DANGEROUS AND SERIOUS THREAT THAT INTER-NATIONAL COM­
MUNISM HAS YET MADE AGAINST THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM.
The Committee recommends and stresses the need for strong, 
joint action on the part of the inter-American system to counter the 
Communist plans, and that a high level meeting should be invoked to 
consider the problems of Communist subversion and of establishing the 
provisions and procedures necessary to decide upon the joint manner 
of achieving the objectives sought through these recommendations.
The resolution which was passed by the O.A.S. Council on Febru­
ary 2, 1966 was transmitted to the Secretary General of the United 
Nations.^ In the United Nations, however, the O.A.S. received little 
satisfaction. The Secretary General requested that the Cuban govern­
ment reply to the charges made in the O.A.S. resolution.
In his reply, Fidel Castro said that all eighteen signatories 
of the appeal were lackies of the imperialist aggressors. As a con­
sequence, the actions proposed by the Conference did not constitute 
aggression. He asserted the right of the delegates to the Tricon­
tinental Conference to propose to overthrow the other governments of 
Latin America.^
62O.A.S./Ser. L/lI.12 (April 2, 1966), p. 68.
^ Ibid., p. 69.
64See Appendix J, Resolution.
^New York Times (February 11, 1966), p. 12.
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In other words, the inter-American system is cognizant of the 
threat to the non-intervention principle presented by the Triconti­
nental Conference. It, and the United Nations, after recognizing the 
threat, are left to prove that they can handle the problems which 
arise due to Communist subversion. If they cannot, one must assume 
that nations will have to make policy decisions on the basis of their 
national interest, adhering to law as they can, but acting first on 
their diplomatic instincts. International organizations have tried 
to make this unnecessary, but the Tricontinental Conference has brought 
the problem to the fore once again.
To date, therefore, the problem of subversion in the hemisphere 
appears to be worse, not better, since the passage of Resolution 2131 
(XX). This can be blamed, first, on the Tricontinental Conference 
and the intentions of its participants to subvert and undermine the 
legitimate governments of the hemisphere; and second, on the inability 
or unwillingness of the international organizations to do more than 
pass resolutions on the subject, resolutions which are scoffed at by 
those at whom they are aimed.
REACTIONS OF THE U.S. PRESS TO THE TRICONTINENTAL CONFERENCE
Although only two newsmen from the United States were allowed 
to attend the conference out of the thirty-five who applied (and those 
two were from small Marxist publications), there was extensive cover­
age by other members of the international press corps. L<e Monde of
66Paris ran a series of detailed articles on the conference * In spite
^Bethel, "The Havana Conference", p. 26.
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of this, relatively little mention was made in this country of the 
conference, which was surprising when one considers the importance to 
the peace and security of both the United States and to the whole 
hemisphere which it implies.
Paul D. Bethel, editor of the "Latin America Report11 and former 
press attache of the U.S. Embassy in Havana, notes that few of the 
news media have issued statements alerting the public to the signi­
ficance of the conference. He has observed,
. . . Our nation's news organs have either ignored the Havana 
meeting for the most part, or bemuse themselves with conjecture 
that the conference bears no more importance than a widening of 
the Sino-Soviet split. Yet the Havana Conference represents the 
largest gathering of guerrillas in one spot in the world's history.
In spite of this relative lack of alarm on the part of the
United States news media, the Tricontinental Conference would appear
to be of great importance to the problems and future which the United
States faces. Mr. Bethel reports that evidence indicates that a huge
radio and communications complex is under construction in Cuba, which
69will help to co-ordinate subversive activities in the hemisphere.
U.S. News and World Report (January J l ,  1966), p. 50, was the 
only one of the U.S. mass media periodicals which, following the close 
of the conference, carried an article on it. Later, another article 
appeared in The Reporter, written by Paul D. Bethel, as cited above. 
Extensive information is also available through O.A.S. documents, as 
cited above.
68Bethel, "Latin America Report", 4 (No. 5, February 1966), 
p. 2. It is true that many of the delegates from Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America were Communist guerrilla fighters, including many Viet 
Cong, according to U.S. News bO, p. 50, and O.A.S./Ser. L/x/lI.12, 
p. 4.
^Bethel, "Latin America Report", 4 (No. 5), p. 3.
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He also points to the well-equipped subversive apparatus already active 
in the hemisphere out of Cuba. Many obsolete Soviet missile bases in 
Cuba were converted after 1962 into guerrilla training camps. The 
U.S. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee listed ten such installa­
tions as early as 1963, and today, some intelligence estimates list 
forty-three such camps. They could train about ten thousand guerrillas 
a year. Mr. Bethel notes that this training program "is co-ordinated 
with international Communist subversion over the world.
That these facts have multiplied in importance since the Tri- 
continental Conference should be obvious. For this reason, the lax— 
ness of the United States press in this respect is a matter for 
sincere but curious concern.
Bethel, "The Havana Conference," p. 28.
CHAPTER III
INTERVENTION FOR DEMOCRACY
Law and politics are inseparable . . . Law . . . con­
serves the values of a going social system. . . . When 
the values are themselves in transition, the system of 
law gives way to political or quasirlegal activity.
— Morton A. Kaplan and ^
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
TIIE PROBLEM IN GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
The idea of domestic jurisdiction is a dynamic one. Today,
since an important concept in contemporary international law is the
right of internal and external independence, a state should be free
to adopt whatever form of government it chooses. "The right of
2revolution is implicit in this concept."
Hall defends the concept of independence thusly:
A state (i.e. a people) may place itself under any form of 
government that it wishes. . . .  A state has a right to live its 
life in its own way, so long as it keeps rigidly to itself, and 
refrains from interfering with the equal rights of other states^ 
to live their life in the manner which commends itself to them.
Thomas and Thomas agree with Hall when they say, "A government
brought into being by the machinations of another cannot be called
4the chosen government of the people of a nation."
Hlorton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, "The Patterns 
. . .," American Political Science Review, p. 703.
2Thomas and Thomas, p. 359.
^Hall, pp. 43-44.
^Thomas and Thomas, p. 359.
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Historical background. One early concept of non-intervention 
relating to a democratic or republican form of government grew out of 
the French Revolution and Jean Jacques Rousseau's concepts of the
5sovereignty and the self-determination of the state. Since the 
state was subject to no authority but its own, intervention was not 
legitimate.^
Immanuel Kant was very much influenced by Rousseau. He put
forth a principle of non-intervention in his essay entitled Perpetual
Peace in 1795> declaring, "No state should interfere in the constitu-
7tion or government of another state." Therefore, Kant proscribed 
intervention absolutely, but it must be noted that he probably meant 
it to apply only among republican states. This is because he believed 
that world peace could be maintained only when republican government 
was universal. As a consequence, he might condone intervention to 
help overthrow authoritarian governments in order to achieve univer­
sal republicanism and peace.
During the nineteenth century, under the balance of power system 
the great "civilized" nations shared a similar economic philosophy, 
a similar regard for the individual, and similar views as to domestic
5Jean Jacques Rousseau, "The Social Contract", in 38 Great 
Books of the Western World (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 
1952), pp. 387-400.
As the French Revolution progressed and France became stronger, 
however, France justified her interventions by the necessity to free 
Europe from absolute monarchies and to confer democracy upon the people 
It should be noted that Napoleon employed interventionary methods in 
the name of liberty in his designs for power and control in Europe.
See Thomas and Thomas, p. 7.
^Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace (Los Angeles, Calif.: U.S. 
Library Association, 1932), p. 1 8 . See also pp. 19-27.
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politics. They "shared the principle values of a common civilization, 
of a common legal heritage, and of a common faith in laissez faire 
g
economics. 11 They imposed these values on the world at large whenever 
it was in their interest to do so.
Fear of the revolutionary character of democracy and a desire 
to maintain the social order had led the Holy Alliance, formed in 
1 8 15, to temporarily proclaim a doctrine of collective intervention 
against republicanism. This doctrine was abandoned, however, due to 
the even stronger desire to preserve the stability of the international 
order and the independence of the nation, both of which were prere­
quisites of the system. The guiding norm of national independence—  
for the more important European nations— was supported by the exist­
ing political circumstances. The community of nations would turn its 
outraged resentment against any violator. Under the balance of power
system, even war had to stop short of interference into a nation*s 
9internal affairs.
Formerly, smaller and non-European states were not thought of 
as having or deserving any ,frightf! of sovereignty or independence, 
except as they were needed to contribute to the balance of power sys­
tem. It was in the interest of the larger nations to preserve that 
system, and therefore its values were imposed upon any new nation
O
Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, The Political 
Foundations of International Law (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 196l), 
p. 40. This contains a good resume of the nature of the balance of 
power system, with several references to intervention.
^Ibid. , pp. 31-^1. See also: Thomas and Thomas, p. 7-8,.
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which was permitted to take part in it.
In the twentieth century, the world tended to drop previously 
accepted ethical values as part of the requirements for members of 
the community of nations. In fact, few if any requirements were re­
tained as the geographical limits of international law were extended 
to include all states. In the inter-war period, furthermore, although 
democracy was encouraged, no one nation thought that it-had the respon­
sibility to intervene or to initiate a collective intervention in
support of democracy. In the opinion of Kaplan and Katzenbach, a
10lack of leadership hampered the collective security system.
After World War I, according to Kaplan and Katzenbach,
. . . national self-determination was the order of the day, 
and every nation was to be the legal equal of every other nation. 
The crystallizing force for peace was to be found in the demo­
cratic sentiments of the free citizens of independent nation­
states, whose interests were harmonious and whose energies for 
constructive peace would be mobilizjjji by national independence 
and democratic political processes.
After the war, therefore, states began to proclaim their 
"rights11 to sovereignty and independence, taking little notice of the 
responsibilities inherent under these so-called "rights". The "right 
of revolution" was strongly asserted once more, especially against 
colonial nations, but also against domestic governments.
Kaplan and Katzenbach go on to explain that under the inter­
war system of collective security, due to the absence of any predomi­
nant great powers, there was no one nation to lead the call for action
Kaplan and Katzenbach, Political Foundations . . .t p. 40.
1 1Ibid..t p. 42.
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against a transgressor. Every nation looked to other nations to act,
since "reasons for procrastination seemed stronger than reasons for 
12action. 11
Since the internal form of government was not considered im­
portant to world peace, since there were few, if any, standards to 
which nations all conformed, since the collective security system was 
weak and insecure, and since the principle of non-intervention was 
beginning to take shape, problems arose which the international com­
munity could not handle. Specific minority groups were supposed to 
be protected, but they were not. Totalitarian governments became 
immune from intervention for democratic purposes; they could flaunt 
the democratic ideals of the League of Nations and no nation felt it 
its responsibility to do anything about it. Therefore, where modern 
totalitarian governments came to power, new methods of internal and 
external control made the "right of revolution'1 somewhat irrelevant,
except in cases where the government was not highly organized or
13where it was overthrown after a war.
Under the loose bipolar system of today, members of the blocs 
have little interest in maintaining the independence of the members 
of the opposing bloc, as was the case under the balance of power 
system. Alignment must be on the basis of long-term interest. The
12Ibid., p. 43.
13Thomas and Thomas, p. 339-360. Note the cases of Eastern 
Europe where the Soviet Union exercises ultimate control over the 
fate of those countries, and of the People1s Republic of China where 
the people are highly organized and militantly controlled by the 
system.
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blocs become relatively stable patterns of alignment within which 
conflicts of short-term interest tend to be more or less ignored.
Apart from the positive motivations to intervene, the negative factor 
of the concentration of capabilities in the leading members of the 
blocs makes it difficult not to intervene. Just as the Soviet Union 
has an important interest in preserving the governmental forms present 
in Eastern Europe and in spreading them if possible, can the United 
States remain indifferent to possible changes in the NATO governments, 
changes which might throw one of them into the communist bloc? Since 
the United States has decided that encouraging representative democ­
racy is the most effective way of opposing communism, it requires 
great restraint on her part (restraint which may sometimes not be 
justified), not to interfere when totalitarianism threatens a formerly 
democratic country.^ 4 Many interventions which the United States 
undertakes indirectly have to do with trying to preserve democratic 
forms of government, if possible, and otherwise, with trying to pre­
serve, temporarily at least, any government which will oppose com­
munism.
Martin Wight has put the contemporary problem as follows:
. . . Like neutrality, non-intervention requires unassailable
confidence and strength to be an effective policy, and a non- 
intervening Power is likely to have its hand forced if it cannot 
make other powers follow non-intervention as well. . . . Inter­
vention is frequent in the relations between a Great Power and 
its satellites. The classic example^jLs the relations between 
the United States and Latin America.
■^See Kaplan and Katzenbach, Political Foundations . . ., pp. 50 55*
^"Vight, pp. 50-51-
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During the inter-war period, the bloc system was not in effect 
and the problem of losing or keeping satellites was not applicable.
At that time and before, however, nations did not interfere with 
another's colonies. It was somewhat the same thing, although inter­
national politics was balanced in a different manner.
THE PROBLEM IN THE UNITED NATIONS
In the United Nations Charter, the reference to equal rights 
16and self-determination is not a guarantee or a legal obligation
that the United Nations will act to bring about these democratic ideal
in the governments of its member nations. The Charter stipulation
that the United Nations shall not intervene in matters of essentially
domestic jurisdiction indicated that the organization does not have
the power to intervene for democracy, since, so long as it does not
threaten the peace, the government of a country is an internal affair.
That the organization has sometimes seriously considered such inter-
17vention, as in the case of a resolution involving Spain in 1946,
See Appendix A, Article I, paragraph 1.
17This refers to UNGA Resolution of December 12, 1946 which 
recommended that all members recall from Madrid their ambassadors and 
ministers plenipotentiary accredited there. The resolution gave the 
reasons as being that the Franco Fascist government of Spain, "im­
posed by force upon the Spanish people with the aid of the Axis powers 
. . . does not represent the Spanish people, . . . and is making im­
possible the participation of the Spanish people with the peoples of 
the U.N. in international affairs." (Cited in Dep't. of State Bul­
letin, Vol. XV, p. 1143.) Fenwick says that the same could have been 
done with Cuba in i960 when Cuba invited the USSR to strengthen her 
armed forces. The O.A.S. broke relations, but the U.N. did not act. 
(See Fenwick, International Law, p. 576.)
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does not alter the fact that it is not a legal right of the United
18Nations to intervene in support of democracy.
The concept of sovereignty of the state was the foundation
upon which modern international law was built. This sovereignty,
however, implied recognition on the part of the state of certain
ethical principles. "But when international law was emasculated by
the denial of ethical principles, sovereignty was assumed to mean
19that a state had an inalienable right to do as it pleased." There­
fore, under the latter concept, intervention into a state*s affairs 
in favor of the principle of democracy would not be legitimate, "for
if there is no ethical behavior to which a state must subscribe, any
20internal form of government is legitimate." If the ethical prin­
ciples of international law have only to do with external relations, 
then as long as a regime does not breach international law or endanger 
the peace, any intervention to bring about the overthrow of its govern­
ment, no matter how undemocratic it may be in its internal affairs, 
would not be legitimate.
Nevertheless, Thomas and Thomas feel that a case could be made 
for the legality of intervention when used against totalitarian regimes 
"like those of Nazi Germany or Communist Russia," which have repudi­
ated fundamental principles of international law. Such governments 
obviously do not consider themselves bound by its dictates. The 
j^ g
See Rosalyn Higgins, pp. 77-79; and Thomas and Thomas, p. 371.
19Thomas and Thomas, p„ 361.
20Even violations of international law may not now be considered 
sufficient reason for intervention. It would depend upon the nature 
of the violation.
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Thomases also contend that if the ethical principles which form the
basis of international law not only affect external relations but
internal affairs as well, then there is a legal duty which applies to
21each state to form a democratic type of government.
In theory, this latter contention would seem to allow some
right of intervention in support of democracy. The international
community has not, however, made it clear whether or not the ethical
principles of international law do relate to the internal affairs of
a state. Thomas and Thomas conclude that the opinions given by most
authorities on the subject indicate that the positivist contention
forbidding intervention in support of democracy is, for the present,
22the strongest argument in the interpretation of international law.
Therefore, it seems that a state has a right to do as it 
pleases internally, so long as it follows the international law pre­
cepts which are to govern its foreign relations. In other words,
presently, "no general law right exists to permit intervention for
23democracy."
THE PROBLEM IN THE AMERICAS
In Latin America, until 1959, the problem of subversive inter­
vention was not so evident. There were several notable exceptions, 
of course, such as with Axis sympathizer activities during World War
21Thomas and Thomas, p. 362. 
22Ibid.
25Ibid.
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II and with the situation in Guatemala in 1954. Latin American 
dictators have, of course, had many problems and disagreements. 
Numerous interferences have occurred among them, and between them and 
the democratic countries, as well.
Nevertheless, more serious than any previous problem concern­
ing subversion and interference is the establishment of a communist 
government in Cuba since 1959. This government has exported a so­
phisticated form of subversion and much unrest throughout Latin 
America. Although it calls itself democratic, it represses its own 
people and actively seeks to destroy other governments in Latin 
America, whether democratic or dictatorial. The Cuban government is 
an active Soviet agent of the Cold War.
Representative democracy is a common aspiration of the American
25 ^republics. Resolution XXXII of the Conference of Bogota reiterated
faith in democracy. The Charter of the Organization of American
States says, "The solidarity of the American States and the high aims
which are sought through it require the political organization of
those states on the basis of the effective exercise of representative 
26democracy." This is, of course, a principle in the sense of an 
aspiration, since the Charter contains no provisions for enforcement
24It must be acknowledged that some Latin Americans would say 
that the United States has been an "aggressor11 and "interrenor" for 
over a century.
2j)See Henry P. deVries and Jose Rodriguez-Novas, The Law of 
the Americas (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1965), p. 6*
26See Appendix A; 0oA.So Charter, Article 5, paragraph d.
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of the democratic principle.
The framers of the O.A.S. Charter wanted to avoid United States 
intervention nin the name of democracy. 11 In 1948, the legacy of 
history had made them fear the probable results of such intervention 
by the United States more than they feared any possible form of govern­
ment that they could imagine at the time which would result from non­
intervention on the part of the United States.
The principles of self-determination and non-intervention in 
the internal affairs of other countries are closely connected to 
anti-colonialism, notwithstanding the obscure nature of these 
principles in this century of "international civil wars," the 
first of which was the Spanish Civil War. . . .  It was in the 
non-interventionist sentiment that Brazil always interpreted the 
Monroe Doctrine and supported it from the beginning.
Speaking of democracy, Jorge Castaneda has said,
. . . This [democracy] is one of the Pan American principles 
which is farthest from reality. . . . The dual political composi­
tion of the continent has neither favored historically nor 
favored in actuality the practice of representative democracy in 
America. . . . One of the most powerful reasons for the perpetua­
tion of dictatorships on this continent is the decided support—  
moral and material— which the United States has historically 
given them. . . . The continental reality is not union in democ­
racy, but disunion, the division into dictatorships and democratic 
countries. The postulate of representative demggracy is null as 
a factor of solidarity and cohesion in America.
He goes on to say that while the fear of United States inter­
ference exists in the hemisphere, under the existing circumstances, 
the cornerstone of the inter-American system will not be democracy,
27Nelson de Sousa SampSio, "Brazil," Foreign Policies in a 
World of Change, Joseph E. Black and Kenneth Thompson (eds.) (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 636
28Jorge Castaneda, Mexico y el orden internacional (Mexico, 
D.F.: El Colegio de Mexico, 1956), pp. 193-94. (Translation by the 
writer.)
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but rather, intransigent nationalism (i.e. non-intervention). J
Whatever one might think about Dr. Castaneda*s allegations 
concerning democracy and unity, his further opinions as to the im­
portance of intransigent nationalism, due to fears of United States 
hegemony (and due to other fears as well), are unfortunately true. 
This underscores the importance on the continent of the principle of 
non-intervention, which is a negative principle, as well as the prin­
ciple of democracy, which is a positive one. Neither of these prin­
ciples is perfectly realized, but this does not mean that they do not 
exist.
TIIE PROBLEM UNDER THE O.A.S. CHARTER AND THE RIO TREATY
As particular international law, the Charter of the Organiza­
tion of American States does not provide for intervention in favor of 
democracy, although one may speculate that justification for it might
. , 30be present in the statement of principles.
29Ibid., p. 195.
30The early opinions of Latin American governments regarding 
the United Nations multilateral intervention in support of democracy 
are noted by Javier Rondero, former Mexican Minister of Foreign Af­
fairs. In El Dia on July 24, 1964, p. 4, he reports that the great 
majority of the American states rejected the idea of multilateral 
intervention for democracy "so as not to weaken the important prin­
ciple of non-intervention." He lists the governments of Bolivia, 
Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, 
Mexico, and the Dominican Republic as expressing this rejection. It 
must be kept in mind that in 1945 some of these countries were governed 
by dictators. It is highly probable that self-interest played some 
part in their reactions.
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The Preamble can be used as evidence in interpretation of the 
articles which follow it, but it does not have legal significance.
In other words, it does not guarantee the realization of the princi­
ples which it sets forth, and the principles are not self-activating. 
Therefore, there is no right of collective intervention by the O.A.S. 
in favor of democracy and the American states do not have a legal 
duty to establish a government under democratic tenets. Article 13
says, in this respect, that "each state has the right to develop its
31political life freely and naturally."
Likewise, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
(Rio Treaty) cannot undertake to enforce principles unless they come
32within the terms of Article 6 and the "if" clause. This means that 
if the "inviolability of the territory or the sovereignty or politi­
cal independence of [anj American State" would be affected by other 
than armed aggression, proper action would be taken after consulta­
tion.
Intervention for democracy would not apply in the above case, 
except perhaps indirectly under the Resolutions passed at Caracas in
■^See Appendix B, O.A.S. Charter, Article 13.
•^Article 6 : If the inviolability or the integrity of the
territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American 
State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed at- 
tack or by an extra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or 
situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Con­
sultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures 
which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the 
aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for 
the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security 
of the Continent.
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1954. Fenwick has noted that through 1959 > in the applications of
the Rio Treaty, there was nothing to suggest that collective action
would he warranted "beyond the protection of the state against an
armed attack or an act of aggression short of an armed attack by the
removal of the conditions giving rise to the complaint. 11 He says
34that the inferences are all the other way.
He further notes that at Caracas, the fear that collective re­
sistance to Communist intervention might result in collective inter­
vention by the American States themselves led to the adoption of a 
formal supplement to the effect that the declaration of foreign policy 
thus made was designed to protect and not to impair the inalienable 
right of every American state "freely to choose its own form of govern 
ment and economic system and to live its own social and cultural life.
33
33Resolution XCIII, "Declaration of Solidarity for the Preser­
vation of the Political Integrity of the American States Against the 
Intervention of International Communism;" and Resolution XCV, "Declara 
tion of Caracas." The former condemns the extension of Communism in 
the New World and declares it to be incompatible with the tenets upon 
which the inter-American system is founded. It can come under Article
6 of the Rio Treaty. It is, however, an indirect way to protect dernoc 
racy in the Americas, excluding only one type of anti-democratic 
government, while leaving the possibility open to many other types. 
Furthermore, its possibilities of enforcement are very scant. The 
"Declaration of Caracas" reiterates the adherence of the American 
states to many of the Charter principles, including democracy and non­
intervention. (See Appendix H, Tenth Inter-American Conference, Re­
solutions XCIII and XV. Also Final Act, March 28, 1954; Pan American 
Union, Congress and Conference Series, No. 33* Also: Philip B. Taylor 
"The Guatemalan Affair: a Critique of United States Foreign Policy," 
American Political Science Review L [September 1956 J, pp. 787-806; 
and Charles G. Fenwick, AJIL f I96I 1, p. 469.)
34Fenwick, "Non-Intervention and American International Law",
AuIL (1959), P. 875.
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Fenwick then concludes,
Collective action thus has its limits and they would appear 
to preclude action beyond the immediate threat to the peace that 
might lead to the convocation of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers.
. . . There is no suggestion of any collective action being taken 
(under the Declaration of Santiago de Chile) beyond the appeal to 
principles and to voluntary cooperation. The coercion of p^ jjlic 
opinion is for the present the only measure within the law.
From 1948 to 1959, the measures adopted by the Organ of Con­
sultation consisted merely in protecting a state which made a request 
for the application of the Rio Treaty. Constructive measures did not 
go beyond the bringing together of the two antagonists and encourag­
ing them to come to an agreement upon obligations acknowledged in
37principle but difficult in practics.
This changed in I960 when the Organ of Consultation took posi­
tive action against the Dominican Republic, and in 1962 and 1964 when
•70
it took measures against Cuba. Nevertheless, it is not legally 
authorized to intervene to protect democracy per se.
Secretary of State Christian Ilerter, responding to arguments 
at Santiago that the non-intervention principle should be set aside 
when the overthrow of a dictatorship was the objective, affirmed in 
strong terms that the principle held in favor of one and all. He 
said that it must not be weakened in an effort to promote representa-
39tive government.
36Ibid.
3 7Ibid., p. 874.
^8See Appendix G: Applications of the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance.
39Fenwick, AJIL (1959), p. 875.
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In the words of Thomas and Thomas, it is evident that
. . . In a test between democracy and non-intervention, the 
latter rules supreme in relations between the states of the 
Western Hemisphere, No government, therefore, is authorized to 
intervene in tjj^g name of democratic principles in the affairs of 
another state.
Possibly, collective action could be taken in the name of democ­
racy after the holding of a Meeting of Consultation to consider the 
adoption of action appropriate to the rules laid down in existing 
treaties. This possibility depends, however, upon the future inter­
pretation of the treaties.
Nevertheless, it is recognized that it is almost impossible to 
impose democracy upon a people from without; such action nearly always 
has the opposite result. Therefore, say Thomas and Thomas,
. . .  if only from the selfish standpoint of national or in­
dividual survival, some solution must be found. The inter- 
American system is searching for the right answer, and although 
its search is slow, it is careful and painstaking. At present, 
its primary achievement is the recognition t^jt intervention 
cannot in and by itself establish democracy.
They go on to say, interestingly, that since there is a recog­
nition of the problem, plus a desire to explore avenues to its solu­
tion, perhaps the American doctrine of non-intervention will eventually 
become Kantian, under which no democratic state could or would inter­
fere in the affairs of another democratic state. Furthermore, each
state would be guaranteed a democratic form of government by the inter-
42national community. This implies that democratic states would allow
40Thomas and Thomas, p. 366.
41ib id ., p. 368.
42t, . ,Ibid., p. j)D/.
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themselves— probably collectively— to intervene in non-democratic 
states to impose a government responding to the will of the people 
(i.e. a democratic government).
PROPONENTS OF INTERVENTION FOR DEMOCRACY
Early proponents. After the Latin American wars of independence, 
the theory of the right of intervention in favor of democracy was re­
jected by most Latin American writers and statesmen. But a minority 
has always been in favor of it.
In 1837, Pedro Vicuna of Chile urged the establishment of a 
general Congress of America with power to support popular revolutions 
against tyrannical governments. In 1844, Juan Bautista Alberdi, an 
Argentine, stated that intervention should be used to promote demo­
cratic governments. In 1847, at the Congress of Lima, a proposal was 
put forward by the government of Bolivia urging that collective inter­
vention be used as a means of establishing and supporting constitu-
43tional governments.
The Uruguayan Proposal and reactions to it. In 1945, the 
Foreign Minister of Uruguay, Dr. Eduardo Rodriguez Larreta propounded 
his thesis that there is a "parallelism" between peace and democracy.
He was reacting to a situation in Argentina in which civil rights of
^Thomas Mann, U.S. Dep't. State Bulletin (Vol. XXXXIII, No.
1118, July-December, i960), p. 812; Thomas and Thomas, p. 362; Robert 
N. Burr and R. D. Hussey (eds. and trs.), Documents on Inter-American 
Cooperation, 1810-1881, Document No. 19 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1956), p. 94.
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Argentine citizens were being violated. He addressed a note to the 
foreign ministers of all the Latin American states, which, in effect, 
urged collective intervention in some cases of violation of democracy 
and human rights. His note said in part,
A multilateral collective action, exercised with complete un­
selfishness by all the other republics of the Continent, aimed at 
achieving . . . the mere re-establishment of essential rights, 
and directed toward the fulfillment of freely contracted juridi­
cal obligations, must not be held to injure the government affect­
ed, but rather it must be recognized as being taken for the benefit 
of all, including the country which has been suffering under such 
a harsh regime.
The Rodriguez Larreta note said further,
The purest respect for the principle of non-intervention of 
one state in the affairs of another . . . does not protect un­
limited ly the notorious and repeated violation by any republic of 
the elementary rights of man.
In the name of Uruguay, Rodriguez was, in fact, reacting to
the above-mentioned undemocratic actions of Argentina. By the stand-
46ards of most Latin American jurists, this note would be a kind of 
indirect intervention itself, in that it was submitting a diplomatic 
protest concerning the treatment by a foreign government not of aliens, 
but of its own citizens. But nevertheless, the note did concern the
jb ill ^Cited in Thomas Mann, Ibid.; Aureliano Rodriguez Larreta, p.
1; C. Neale Ronning, p. 68, in which this proposal was published from
a note entitled: "Paralelismo entre la democracia y la paz,n from
Ministerio de Relaciones Esteriores (Montevideo, Uruguay: 1946), pp.
7-12; and Ramon Lopez Jimenez, El principio de no-intervencion en
America y la nota uruguaya (Buenos Aires: Editorial de Palma, 1947),
pp. 127-130.
45 rRonning, p. 68.
^Example: Jose Martua, "La declaracion sobre derechos y deberes
de los Estados en las Naciones Unidas," Revista Peruana de Derecho
Internacional, IX (1949), pp. 227-245.
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much larger issue of which we are speaking.
Eight states agreed with Uruguay, some with reservations, some 
only agreeing with the idea of consultation on the relationship be­
tween peace and democracy. Those eight states were the United States,
Venezuela, Panama, Cuba, Costa Eica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Uruguay.
47Thirteen rejected the idea altogether. United States Secretary of
State James F. Byrnes supported Rodriguez as follows:
Violation of the elementary rights of man by a government of 
force and the non-fulfillment of obligations by such a government 
is a matter of multilateral action after full consultation among 
the republics in accordance with established procedures.
This note met with much vocal opposition, nevertheless.
Castaneda affirms that the main reason the proposal was rejected was 
that the fear existed that the propositions could be used as an in­
strument of pressure and unwanted meddling by the United States to 
put the Latin American Republics in line with its way of thinking.
There was also a fear of one another. He gives the same reason for
the defeat of a Guatemalan proposal at the Conference of Chapultepee
49concerning the recognition of non-democratic governments.
An extra-continental jurist, Camilio Barcia Trelles of Spain, 
has sharply criticized Rodriguezfs point of view. Like Castaneda he 
attributes little importance to the democratic solidarity of America.
He believes that collective action in support of democracy would be
47Mann, p. 812; Lopez Jimenez, pp. 134-244.
48Cited in Mann, p. 812.
49Castaneda, p. 194c
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even more subjective and dangerous than would be the Tobar Doctrine."
The latter called for witholding recognition from any government which
51might come into existence through revolution.
Although the Tobar Doctrine was accepted for a time by the 
Central American republics, it has since been abandoned by all Latin 
American governments. Therefore, no intervention in such cases is 
precisely legal,
Barcia Trelles states that Rodriguez emphasized ideological 
motives more than he did the means of coming to power. "The truth is 
that the cited doctrine . . . constitutes no more than a dialectical
50
"^Barcia Trelles, p. 135.
"ilDr. Carlos Tobar, ex-Foreign Minister of Ecuador, sent a 
letter while serving as Consul-General in Barcelona to the Ecuadorian 
Consul in Brussels on March 15, 1907. The letter suggested that the 
following proposition be submitted to the Pan American conferences: 
"The American republics, to their good name and 
credit, if not for other humanitarian and altruistic 
considerations, should intervene, even partially and 
indirectly, in the internal dissensions of the conti­
nent. This intervention could at least be to deny
recognition to de facto governments which have come 
into being through revolutions against the constitu­
tional order."
Dr. Tobar felt that collective intervention was justified in 
such cases, due, furthermore, to the fact that the modern world inter­
venes in world social questions. He felt that in this respect, civil
wars were much more cruel than were international wars. He believed 
the Latin American nations to be solidly interested in ending the 
scandals of some of their more miserable brothers. (Isidro Fabela, 
pp. 142-147.)
Even Isidro Fabela doesn't question the good intentions of 
Dr. Tobar, admitting the desirability of ending the frequent military 
coups d'etat and rebellions in Latin America. He would have favored 
the incorporation of the Tobar Doctrine into positive international 
law by a Pan American conference or by a suitable international or­
ganization, if based on very clear, precise juridical principles and 
rules for implementation. Such collective indirect intervention in 
certain specific cases he felt would be justified. (Ibid.*)
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reaction in the face of a concrete fact, in this case the Argentine 
fact. . . , " 52
Ronning thinks it is a mistake, as well, to proclaim the "doc­
trine11 of intervention or of non-intervention in the face of specific 
threats. ^
Dr. Rodriguezfs note was not so rigid as it may have appeared 
at first, since it did call for "consultation on the parallelism be­
tween peace and democracy." This would at least have left open the 
question of whether or not American states were legally obliged to be 
democratic.
It is interesting to note that Rodriguez brought up the possi­
bility of a return to the Kantian concept of "non-intervention only 
for democratic (i.e. republican) countries," but this time in its re­
verse form, that is, intervention only towards non-democratic nations. 
He also returned to the concept of a link between democracy and peace.
The issue of whether the note was or was not in response to a 
specific threat is not very relevant. It proposed a general principle 
which, it may be assumed, was intended to be applied in a general way 
and under which the specific conditions in the Argentine nation hap­
pened to apply. The fact that a specific situation causes nations to 
seek a general principle does not invalidate the generality of appli­
cation of that principle. The same would be true of the Declaration 
adopted at the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas in 1954,
52Barcia Trelles, p. 135.
53Ronning, p. 69.
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in the face of a threat from Communist activities in Guatemala.
Finally, Thomas and Thomas have said that the fact that the 
majority of the American republics rejected the principles in the 
Uruguayan note is not the important thing. The significant fact is 
that, even considering all the difficulties inherent in the implemen­
tation of the principles in the note, over one-third of the republics 
were nevertheless willing to accept the doctrine as a principle of 
American international law, indicating strongly that the idea of inter-
55vention in favor of democracy is not dead in the hemisphere.
HEMISPHERIC POSITIONS REGARDING INTERVENTION FOR DEMOCRACY
Other nations of the hemisphere, besides Uruguay, have given 
hints of their opinions on the subject of intervention in favor of 
democracy.
Nicaragua has long accepted foreign intervention as a way of 
life, but not intervention for democracy. Her politics have been 
closely influenced by the foreign policy of the United States, although 
public opinion in that country may not be in favor of such intervention. 
It is unlikely that the Somoza family which rules the country would 
support any general principle approving intervention to support democ­
racy, since they are even somewhat fearful that Central American inte-
56gration might affect their government.
54See Appendix H, Tenth Inter-American Conference, Declaration 
of Caracas.
55Thomas and Thomas, p. 3 6 3.
56Charles V. Anderson, "Nicaragua,1 Chapter V in Martin C. 
Needier (ed.), Political Systems of Latin America (Princeton, N.J.:
D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1964), pp. 109-110.
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This is not to say that Nicaragua is completely against inter­
fering in the affairs of her neighbors, since she has intervened in 
the past, although not for the cause of democracy. Nevertheless, in 
1945, Nicaragua did indicate that she was in favor of the Uruguayan 
proposal.
Costa Rica is a strong adherent of Western democracy and firm­
ly opposes despotism. In the words of one writer:
Costa Rica has not always adhered as closely as she might to 
the principle of non-intervention, and from time to time her 
governments——particularly those of National Liberation— have 
looked the other way while armed civilians have intruded into the 
internal affairs_af Nicaragua and the dictatorial regimes of the 
Caribbean. . . .
Again, Costa Rica was one of the countries which supported the 
Uruguayan proposal.
Venzuela has used certain kinds of pressure, as have other 
governments, to express approval or disapproval of a government. 
"President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela followed a policy of seek­
ing hemispheric unity and the consolidation of democratic regimes.
58[He] took a dim view of dictatorial governments."
In 1961, Venezuela broke relations with Cuba and she voted, 
along with thirteen other countries, to exclude Cuba from the Organi­
zation of American States. Upon breaking relations with the Trujillo 
regime in the Dominican Republic in I960, she urged the exclusion of 
that country from the O.A.S. as well. The Venezuelan government said
^James L. Busey, "Costa Rica," Chapter VI in Needier, p. 126. 
■^Leo B. Lott, "Venezuela," Chapter XII in Needier, p. 264.
that it would no longer recognize any government coming to power
through illegal means.
President Haul Leoni seems to he an equally avid opponent of 
dictatorial regimes, hut has not seemed to propose intervention for 
such a purpose. Venequela does not recognize regimes coming to power 
through unconstitutional means. Venezuela, too, agreed to the Uru-
guayan proposal in 19^5.
It is very doubtful that Bolivia would agree to such a proposal 
as that of Dr. Rodriguez, or that she would lessen her adherence to 
the absolute principle of non-intervention. Although generally friend­
ly to the United States, Bolivia is quite independent in her conduct 
of foreign affairs and often does not take the side of the United 
States in controversies. She took the other side in 1962 at the 
Punta del Este Conference when the United States was seeking the ex­
pulsion of the government of Cuba from the Organization of American 
States. Through early 1964, Bolivia's was one of the four Latin 
American governments to continue to maintain diplomatic relations with 
Cuba, and it continued to do so until after the Ninth Meeting of Con­
sultation of Foreign Ministers which voted that all states should 
break said relations. Bolivia complied. Generally speaking, Bolivia
59has adopted a somewhat isolationist attitude.
Argentina, which was the immediate target of the Rodriguez 
proposals, certainly opposed them at the time. She has generally 
tried to avoid conflicts, especially those between great world powers
"^Robert J. Alexander, "Bolivia," Chapter XV in Needier, p. 3^5.
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in which Argentina*s vital interests were not involved. Although she 
does have an interest in world peace, she is isolated enough not to 
feel that her interests have been directly affected by non-democratic 
governments in other parts of the hemisphere. Furthermore, there have 
been times when Argentina, herself, has not been the best example of 
democracy. She has what seems to be an excess of nationalism, but 
has had at the same time a "fine record of willingness not only to 
submit disputes to international arbitration, but also to abide by 
adverse decisions.
Jose Julio Santa Pinter, in his chapter on Argentina in Foreign 
Policy in a World of Change, points out that while Argentina "adheres 
profoundly to the principle of non-intervention, she believes that 
nations should observe those obligations with respect to human rights 
and democracy outlined in the Charter and fortified by the Conference 
of Santiago. Nevertheless, while she may adhere to these aspira­
tions, it is doubtful that she would want to enforce them in other 
countries through intervention.
After World War II and until the advent of the present govern­
ment, Brazil evidenced a strong increase in nationalism. The United 
States was often the target of this nationalist attack, and a spirit 
of neutralism was emphasized by some recent presidents, especially
Joseph It. Barager, "Argentina," Chapter XVIII in Needier, p. 
443; and Jose Julio Santa Pinter, "Argentina," in Black and Thompson, 
pp. 606, 610-6 1 1.
6lBlack and Thompson, p. 594.
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Joao Goulart.
Needless to say, Brazil did not favor the Rodriguez proposals 
in 1945. However, under the present government of General Humberto 
Alencar, she might do so. In the past, Brazil opposed much of the 
overt United States and O.A.S. action against Fidel Castro, while 
today she is a firm opponent of the Cuban Premier's regime. She was 
also a principle participant in the O.A.S. intervention in the Domini­
can Republic in 1965.
It is interesting to note that on one occasion in 1946,^
Panama affirmed the belief that situations which represented a poten­
tial danger to world peace are essentially within international juris­
diction. This was expressed during consideration of the Spanish re­
gime of General Franco in 1946 and was an obvious step towards narrow­
ing the scope of domestic jurisdiction. Panama, at that time, was 
willing to accept parts of the Rodriguez proposal. It would be 
unlikely to do so today.
Chile is a country with a very independent foreign policy, as 
is evidenced by her attitude in many inter—American conferences.^
She has opposed many measures taken against Cuba, and it is certain 
that the government of Chile would not think it advisable to trust the
Phyliss Peterson, "Brazil," Chapter XX in Needier, p. 508.
63U.N. General Assembly— consideration of Resolution 39(l) 
(GAOR, 1st session, pt. 2 plenary, 59th meeting), p. 1222— cited in 
Rosalyn Higgins, p. 79.
^See: Americas (August, 1964), pp. 1-5; also see: New York 
Times (May 7, 1965) for Chile>s attitude toward United States inter­
vention in the Dominican Republic.
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good judgment of a majority of the other American states enough to 
support a principle which would allow them to interfere in another 
state in the name of democracy.
Mexico is a very firm adherent of the absolute principle of 
non-intervention and did not support the Uruguayan proposal. Her 
attitude is covered in a later section. While all of the nations of 
the hemisphere have not been covered here, a cross section has been 
presented to illustrate some of the differing attitudes prevalent in 
the continent regarding the idea of intervention for democracy as 
presented in the Uruguayan note.
SUMMARY
Daniel Cosio Villegas speaks of the vulnerability of the United 
States' position in the hemisphere with respect to her support for 
the principle of democracy. In an exaggerated statement, he says, 
"There is not a single Latin American government which can be said to 
enjoy evident and . . . active popular support." He explains that 
Cuba is an example of the fact that the presence of physical force, 
such as that of the United States, may be successfully countered by 
other forces, even that of the spoken word, which of course leaves 
the desirability of forceful intervention in favor of whatever philoso­
phy in question.^
65Daniel Cosio Villegas, American Extremes (Austin, Texas: 
University of Texas Press, 1964), p. 142.
66Ibid.. p. 144.
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There can he little doubt that the Communist success in Cuba 
could easily be repeated in the hemisphere* There is danger of this 
on many fronts. Nevertheless, that forceful intervention is the only 
alternative is not an acceptable argument. As Dr. Cosio has implied, 
force is very vulnerable. There are other types of action which, 
although implying intervention to some people, might prevent such 
governments from grasping control of American nations.
In turn, the concept of domestic jurisdiction is closely tied 
to the narrower question of intervention for democracy. What is and 
is not exclusively a matter of domestic jurisdiction is a concept which 
has frequently changed in the past and, in all probability, will con­
tinue to do so.
The new techniques of subversion perfected in this century and 
their intensified use in the post World War II world, have caused 
major concern over the questions of democracy, human rights, and domes­
tic jurisdiction. The idea that the internal situation within a country 
is never a matter of foreign concern is under question, even in the 
Western Hemisphere.
The Communist government in Cuba, and the dangers to other 
hemispheric governments that it presents, have caused consternation 
on many sides. The democratic aspirations of the Latin American 
republics are placed in a dangerous position, and there is a serious 
question as to whether the O.A#S. is prepared to handle this challenge. 
Nationalism and fears of U.S. hegemony make many Latin Americans re­
luctant to take steps which might be necessary to curb subversive 
activities in their countries. They fear that such action might open
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the door for some types of intervention or increased influence on the 
part of the United States. The Uruguayan note and the reactions to 
it, however, clearly showed that there are those in the hemisphere 
who would be willing to accept some type of intervention in favor of 
democracy, if practiced in specific cases and under strict controls. 
Nevertheless, today it seems evident that many hemispheric republics 
are not of this frame of mind, in spite of the case of the Dominican 
Republic. The latter intervention was not specifically and originally 
proclaimed to promote democracy, although it does relate to that prob­
lem, since it continued until elections were held. The following 
section is a resume of that intervention.
O.A.S. INTERVENTION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
On April 25, 1965, revolt erupted in the Dominican Republic 
when supporters of former President Juan Bosch rebelled against the 
military junta government in that country. The reaction of the United 
States to that revolt, irregardless of the reasons, is proof that the 
issue, practice, and condemnation of intervention have stirred with 
renewed vigor in the hemisphere.^
The United States sent troops to the Dominican Republic before 
consulting with the Organization of American States. In doing so, I
the United States caused much displeasure among the other nations of 
Latin America. Some did not deny the necessity for such action, but 
rather protested its unilateral nature. The reason President Johnson
/' *
New York Times, April 26, 1965, p* 1.
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gave for the U.S. action was that American lives were endangered.^
On April 30, the U.S. made efforts to have an inter-American military
peace force established, a step which would "internationalize1 the
69action it had already taken.
On April 30, President Johnson also stated, "There are signs
that people trained outside are threatening the legitimate aspirations
of the Dominican people, . . . for progress, democracy, and social
70justice are threatened.
In the Meeting of Foreign Ministers called in the O.A.S., Latin 
American resentment was evident, although Paraguay, Brazil, and Argen­
tina spoke out in support of the U.S. action. Chile took more or less 
the role that Mexico had taken in opposing sanctions applied to Cuba 
in 1964. She vigorously condemned the U.S. interventionist action. 
Uruguay and Mexico, although opposing it, remained silent.^
The debate over the U.S. justification for intervening has 
been extensive. Some have charged that Johnson immediately suspected, 
rightly or wrongly, that there was strong Communist influence in the 
revolt, and that he sent in the Marines to prevent another Communist 
takeover. Others believe that the intervention was to protect Ameri­
can and foreign lives, as originally announced, and that American 
authorities discovered the Communist influence in the revolt only
68Ibid.., (April 29, 1965), p. 1.
69Ibid., May 1, 1965, p. 1.
70Ibid., April 30, 1965, p. 6.
71Ibid., May 1, 1965, p. 7.
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after arriving on the island. Detractors charge either that there 
was no Communist infiltration whatsoever in the revolt, or that never 
theless, it was a domestic matter in which the United States had no 
right to intervene, Communists or not.
In defense of the United States intervention, and taking for 
granted that the U.S. action was to alter the course of things in the 
Dominican Republic, Professor Adolf A. Berle said that the U.S. recog­
nizes the right of revolution, but that it held that the Dominican 
revolt was "indirect attack."7"^
Former President Juan Bosch charged that the nationalistic 
revolt was won and would have been over in thirty-six hours, had the 
United States not intervened.Nevertheless, there does seem to 
have been evidence of some Communist influence and plans for taking 
over what started as a nationalistic revolt.
Predictably, the Communist bloc nations charged the U.S. of 
intervening illegally, France sided with them in their opinion, as 
did Mexico, Chile, and Uruguay.7"*
In the United States, an editorial in the New York Times on 
July 3, 1965, said that there was a need for the U.S. to seek inter­
national support at the outset of any "war of liberation."76 Another
72Thomas C. Mann, New York Times. October 13, 1965, p. 10.
73New York Times, Supp., October 10, 1965, p. 7.
74
Juan Bosch, "Communism and Democracy in the Dominican Repub- 
lic," Saturday Review 48 (August 7, I965), pp. 13-15.
75New York Times. May 4, 1965, p. 14; and May 10, 1965, p. 32.
72
Ibid., July 3, 1965, p. 18.
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editorial in November charged that the intervention violated multi-
77lateral hemispheric policy.
Senator William Fulbright condemned the intervention and what
he called "faulty advice" given to President Johnson. He elaborated
on the U.S. tendency to suspect Communism in any Latin American effort
for social change. He charged further that the U.S. intervened, on
78the pretext of saving lives, to prevent a rebel victory.
There has been less opposition to the O.A.S. peace force than 
there was to the unilateral U.S. intervention, although it has not, 
by any means, received universal approval. The Security Council de­
cided that it was a matter to be solved by the O.A.S., but did pass
a resolution stipulating that an observer be sent to report on the
79situation.
The O.A.S. force was sent under the justification of Articles 
six and eight of the Bio Treaty. Although Mexico, Chile, and Uruguay 
disagreed as to the legality of using these articles for such action 
in the Dominican situation, the majority agreed that it was legal.
Subsequent events have proved that the U.S. and the O.A.S. 
were sincere in their announced plan to try to help the Dominicans 
plan for free elections. Nevertheless, the advent of the O.A.S.- 
sponsored inter-American military force was not enough to silence 
the critics, partly because many of the troops provided came from
^ Ibid., November 27, 1965, p. 30. 
^ Ibid. , September 16, 1965, p. i. 
79Ibid., May 16, 1965, p. 1.
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non-democratic governments.
The presence of the inter-American forces was not an assurance
of peace and stability in the Dominican Republic, but they did keep
some modicum of peace until elections could be held. The provisional
80government proved inadequate to some of its tasks.
In spite of numerous problems, under the supervision of the 
O.A.S. peace forces, peaceful elections were held on June 1, 1966. 
Joaquin Balaguer was elected President and subsequently inaugurated. 
Preparations began for the removal of the O.A.S. troops.
Although necessary background for understanding the situation, 
the state of affairs in the Dominican Republic is not in question in
this thesis. What is in question is the state of the principle of
non-intervention since the U.S. and O.A.S. actions in sending in 
troops.
It seems obvious that the "Additional Protocol on Non-Inter- 
vention" of Montevideo signed in 1936, in which the signatories 
promised not to intervene in the internal or external affairs of a 
state, is null and void in the eyes of the U.S., as is Article 15 of 
the O.A.S. Charter. It is, however, highly probable that other govern­
ments had in fact nullified them before this, through their use of 
subversive tactics.
The problem again arises of striking some balance among United 
States power, its sense of responsibility, and its desire to encourage
80Theodore Draper, "The New Dominican Crisis," The New Leader 
(January 31, 1966), p. 3.
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a strong and vigorous inter-American system, composed of independent 
nations. The problem illustrated in the Dominican Republic and the 
principle of non-intervention in the hemisphere are inevitably tied- 
up with the above.
Also involved is the question of the role which subversion 
and infiltration play in the political crises in the hemisphere. Is 
a nation bound not to intervene when the result of its abstention 
would be frankly menacing to its national interest and to the inter­
ests of the inter-American system? The United States has apparently 
decided this negatively.
Nevertheless, if, when such interventions are undertaken, the 
results are more damaging than otherwise, if there is only suspicion 
of enemy subversion, but no proof, is there any right to intervene? 
Again the question of ideological orientation, of a nation*s concept 
of future goals and benefits, enters into play in these decisions. 
Legally, however, under the O.A.S. Charter, it is obvious that a 
nation has no right to intervene unilaterally to protect the lives 
of its citizens. That a powerful nation may continue to do so under­
scores the fact that international law often fails to correspond with
81political realities.
The legality of the O.A.S. intervention was also questioned, 
but in this case, intervention rested on firmer ground, since it was 
collective, and it was meant to protect the peace of the hemisphere. 
In fact, it may be argued that it has established a precedent for
81The Congo intervention by U.S., Belgian, and English troops 
in 1964 is another example of this situation.
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interventions to assure elections in countries rent by civil strife 
in the hemisphere.
CHAPTER IV
INTERVENTION POE THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The question whether a certain matter is or is not 
solely within the jurisdiction of a state is an essen­
tially relative one; it depends upon the development 
of international relations.
— Permanent Court of Inter­
national Justice, Nationality 
Decrees Case, 1921.
THE PROBLEM IN GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
In the opinion of the French jurist, Dr. Paul Fauchille, 
professor and member of the Institute of International Law, humani­
tarian intervention is the right (or the action) of one state to 
exercise international control over the acts of another with regard 
to its internal sovereignty when such acts are contrary to the laws 
of* humanity. 2
Does a right of intervention to protect human rights exist? 
There are three points of view on the subject. Those viewing it from 
a purely pragmatic position say that humanitarian intervention is 
outside tne jurisdiction of international law, since the individual
Permanent Court of International Justice, Nationality Decrees 
Case, Series B, No. 4 (1923), p. 23.
2
Paul Fauchille, Traite de droit international public (Vol. I,
Paris: Librairie Rousseau, 1922), p. 571. Fauchille"7 s version of the
definition does not include the idea of "action" as included above, 
a concept which the writer feels is important, since a state may actual­
ly perform a humanitarian intervention whether or not it has a right
to do so.
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per se cannot be a subject of that law. They say that international
3law concerns only nation states. This point of view is based on 
strict national sovereignty. If, on the other hand, international 
law is viewed as an intersocial law, then it may be said that the 
family of nations must be concerned with the life of the individual 
in his relationship with the state. Thirdly, a middle ground says 
that although intervention to protect human rights is definitely in 
violation of the law, it may nevertheless be praiseworthy and morally 
right.*
Intensified concern for protecting human rights. The inter­
national concern over the commission of crimes against humanity has 
been intensified recently. Although it has been a matter for con­
sideration for many years, even in the nineteenth century humanitarian 
intercession seldom proceeded beyond mere diplomatic representations. 
It never dealt with the cause of the abuse— that is, with a govern­
ment which failed to provide individual protection. It never serious­
ly challenged the right of a state to deal with its subjects as it 
5saw fit.
3T. II. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law (7th ed., 
Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., 1910), p. 47.
4Discussions of the subject are found in: George Manner, !,The
Object Theory of the Individual in International Law,1’ 46, AJIL (1952), 
p. 428; William W. Bishop, International Law: Cases and Materials 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1962), p« 265; Lawrence, pp. 4? and 
51; and Thomas and Thomas, p. 265*
5Thomas and Thomas, p. 373»
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James L. Brierly speaks of one facet of the question of inter­
vention for human rights as follows:
Under customary international law, no rule was clearer than 
that a state's treatment of its own nationals is a matter ex­
clusively within the domestic jurisdiction or the state, i.e. it 
is not controlled or regulated by international law. . . . Almost 
the only restrictions placed upon a state's treatment of its own 
nationals before the League period were to be found in a handful 
of treaty provisions for religious protection, although some 
writers did support a right of collective humanitarian inter­
vention. The first major advance came with the insertion into 
the peace treaties after the First World War of clauses for pro­
tection of minorities; the execution of these clauses vas placed 
under the guarantee of the League.
It raust be mentioned that these clauses covered specific minorities, 
not general obligations to respect human rights.
Prior to World War II, the democracies did not protest Nazi 
persecutions in Germany, nor Franco's actions in Spain. They held, 
instead, to the theory that to protest would be to intervene in the 
internal affairs of those countries. The same attitude held true 
after World War II with regard to Russia. "Humanitarian intervention 
in the twentieth century . . . retains but little vigor. " 7
Nevertheless, there is a distinct effort to revitalize the 
concept as an active part of general international law. Judge 
Shawcross stated at Niirnberg, "The right of humanitarian intervention 
on behalf of the rights of man trampled on by a state in a manner 
sho citing the sense of mankind has long been considered to form part 
of the recognized law of nations." He said that if such acts clearly
Brierly, p. 291.
7Thomas and Thomas, p. 374.
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imperiled the peace of the world, then they were violations of inter­
national law. ^
Professor T. 0. Elias, Attorney General of the Federation of 
Nigeria, has stated,
. . . It seems very urgent and necessary that Article 2(7 ) of 
the United Nations Charter should be reviewed with a view to 
effecting suitable modifications which would permit of inter­
vention by the United Nations on humanitarian grounds. It would 
require utmost care to avoid unwarranted infringement of the 
sovereignty of a member state, however. . . .
He then notes the case of the Union of South Africa, where Article
2, paragraph 7 is employed to prevent U.N. intervention into that
country’s racial situation.
There seems to be fear, however, of an inherent conflict be­
tween the defense of human rights through external intervention and 
a consideration of international peace threatened by such inter­
vention. Today, when misinterpretation of the spirit underlying the 
law of nations is so prevalent, ’’intervention for the sake of humanity” 
can conceivably become a weapon in the hands of the unscrupulous.
Under too many interpretations calculated to breed anarchy, it could 
cause international chaos, leading to war.
In spite of her fears in this area, Latin America does give 
evidence of sincere concern for human rights and welfare. Daniel Cosio 
Villegas has said that two reasons for much of the Latin American
Speeches of the Chief Prosecutors, Command Papers 6964 (Nurn- 
berg, Germany, 1946), p. 40.
9T. 0o Elias, "The Expanding Frontiers of Public International 
Law,” United Nations, International Law in a Changing World (Dobbs 
Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1963) / P* 103.
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sympathy for the Cuban revolution were the beliefs that it sought to 
benefit the poor, and that the aim was the welfare of the peox)le.^ 
The large number of international statutes and agreements 
which guarantee human rights and freedoms, or which at least verbally 
support them, is a modern development in the law of nations. The 
Treaty of Paris guaranteed some rights for individuals, but the re­
sults were slight. The League of Nations Charter protected minorities 
and strengthened collective security. This doctrine of protecting 
minorities became twisted into an excuse for illegal intervention, 
however, when Hitler1s armies crossed over into Czechoslovakia, os­
tensibly to "protect German minorities" in that country. The collec­
tive security provisions also proved to be very weak. Responsibility 
was shifted from one nation to another while no one state took any
responsibility for leadership. As a consequence, little in the line
11of collective security was accomplished.
The situation since 1945. With the framing of the Charter of
the United Nations in 1945, it was decided to set up guarantees of
individual human rights which would apply to all. Reference to this
12is found in the Preamble, in Article 1, and in Chapter 9.
10Cosxo Villegas, p0 148.
11See: Kaplan and Katzenbach, Political Foundations . . .,
p. 50.
12The Preamble states, "We the peoples of the United Nations 
determined . . .  to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in 
the dignity and worth of the human person, . . . "  Article 1 states, 
in paragraph 3, that the purposes of the U.N. are ". . .to achieve
105
Nevertheless, Brierly notes that the Charter doesn't define 
these fundamental human rights and freedoms, nor mention machinery to 
secure their observance. Consequently, one must note Article 2, para­
graph 7> which seems to make it clear that these are not legal 
13obligations. J It says that the organization shall not interfere
with matters which are essential^7 within the domestic jurisdiction 
14of the state. Brierly observes, however, that ". . .a pledge to
cooperate in promoting at least implies a negative obligation not to
undermine human rights.1’ He notes that South Africa is out of harmony
15with her Charter obligations.
Therefore, what can the United Nations do concerning human 
rigiits? Brierly notes two possibilities: (l) it can discuss and (2)
it can make recommendations. He says that according to one argument, 
it would only be considered intervention if the United Nations were 
to attempt or to prepare to enforce its recommendations. He says that
international cooperation in solving international problems of an . . . 
humanitarian character, and in promoting . . . respect for human rights 
and for fundamental freedoms for all. . . . "  Chapter IX, on Inter­
national Economic and Social Cooperation mentions in Article 55 equal 
rights, higher standards of living, solutions of social problems, as 
well as "c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion.11 In Article 56, all members "pledge themselves 
to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization 
for the achievement of the jmrposes set forth in Article 55."
13Brierly, p. 292.
14See Appendix A, U.N. Charter.
15Brierly, p. 292.
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dictatorial injunctions are interventions unless the breaches are of
a kind which endanger the peace. " . . .  The U.N. has not been an
effective instrument for remedying flagrant violations of elementary
rights and freedoms." He then notes that progress in the enforcement
of human rights is more likely to be made through regional organiza—
16tions, such as the O.A.S.
On the other hand, Fenwick has observed, ". . . It is in the 
field of recognition of fundamental human rights that the individual 
has come of recent years to be a subject rather than an object of the
17law.'r In other words, it would appear that the individual has at 
least made progress.
If it were acknowledged that there is a general international 
law right of humanitarian intervention, and that human rights come 
under international jurisdiction, then the matter would no longer be 
one to which Article 2 (?) applied. But since the United Nations is 
based on the idea of the sovereign equality of nations, it has been 
said that no nation is required to fulfill Charter duties which may 
not agree with the theories upon which its government is formed. 
Nevertheless, in the words of Thomas and Thomas,
. . . Under the Charter, if a nation carries on a program 
toward its own population in a way which violates the laws of 
humanity and which shocks the conscience of mankind to such an 
extent that the breach of human rights constitutes a threat to 
international peace, the issue can no longer establish immunity, 
either under the domestic jurisdiction clause or under the concept
^ Ibid., p. 295.
1 ^Fenwick, p. 152.
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of sovereign equality It becomes subject to collective action 
by the organization.
The International Court of Justice has said, furthermore, that 
the interpretation of the terms of a treaty for the purpose (of sub­
stantiating or negating an alleged violation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by that treaty) could not be considered 
as a question essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the 
countries concerned. It is rather a question of international law 
which, by its nature, lies within the competence of the courts.
The Declaration of Human Rights was passed by the General 
Assembly in 1948 in the form of a nonbinding resolution. In spite of 
efforts by the Commission on Human Eights to effect treaties which 
would make human rights legal requisites for nations and which could 
instigate legal measures for their implementation under the Charter, 
it has been impossible to reconcile the many philosophies on the sub­
ject. Therefore, there has been no definitive action in the field of 
legalizing human rights protections. The Declaration of Human Rights 
serves as a standard to which the ratifying nations should aspire, or 
as a basic definition of human rights which serves as a reference.^
Thomas and Thomas, p. 376.
19
International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments, Ad­
visory Opinions and Orders, Peace Treaties Case, 1950 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1953), p. 70.
20Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, U.N. General 
Assembly; cited in Gateway to the Great Books (Vol. VI, Chicago: 
Britannica, 1963), pp. 452-456.
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SUMMARY
As the matter stands today, in the opinion of Thomas and Thomas, 
if general international law permits humanitarian intervention, it 
does so only if the action of the government is in the nature of per­
secution or atrocities, or is shocking to the sense of mankind. It 
must also be widespread activity. Isolated instances of injustice 
are bound to occur in all governments. ’’Should a right of collective 
action ever be established for all the rights listed in the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, the right of humanitarian intervention 
would far exceed anything heretofore recognized by general international
i n 2 1law."
Under general international law, a state has a right to treat 
its citizens as it pleases. It is a domestic issue. But this right 
is limited by the doctrine of the abuse of rights— that is to say, if 
a state uses a right in a way which exceeds its equitable limits, it 
becomes legitimate to employ courses of action which might not be 
justified in another situation, so as to nullify its effect. An abuse 
of rights treatment of citizens occurs in general international law
99when a state takes action which shocks the conscience of mankind.w
The human rights mentioned in the Charter are much broader in 
content and scope than those whose breach would traditionally permit 
humanitarian intervention. But the Charter establishes no legal duty
Thomas and Thomas, p. 37^ .
22lbid., p. 384.
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upon its members to secure these additional human rights. In fact, 
by prohibiting intervention by force, except collective intervention 
by the organization in the event the actions constitute a threat to 
international peace, it has limited the general international law 
right to intervene for humanitarian purposes.
THE PROBLEM UNDER THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
It is only since World War II that there has been in the 
American Hemisphere an admission that human rights have become a sub­
ject of international concern in that their deliberate violation 
might constitute a serious threat to international peace. Neverthe­
less, even earlier, at the Montevideo Conference in 1933? the Execu­
tive Committee of the American Institute of International Law presented 
a project which, had it been accepted, would have altered the course 
of American law regarding intervention in protection of human rights.
It included the following:
The conservation of order within states and the guaranty of 
the rights of man are essential conditions of international juridi­
cal life. In the cases laid down by general or regional treaties 
of organization, the international community shall be able to 
intervene, by means of organs enjoying international authorization, 
for the purpose of insuring the existence, in the territory of 
any member state, of the minimum degree of order necessary, in 
order that the international rights of states and of individuals 
may be effective.
At the Chapultepec Conference in 19^5, a resolution (Resolution 
XL) was adopted on "International Protection for the Rights of Man,"
23« Raymond L. Buell, "The Montevideo Conference and the Latin 
American Policy of the United States," Foreign Policy Reports (IX, 
No. 19, November 22, 1933), p. 212.
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which proclaimed the adherence of the American republics to the prin­
ciples established by international law for safeguarding the essential 
rights of man. It declared their support of a system of international 
protection of these rights. This resolution was specifically aimed
at the elimination of the misuse of diplomatic protection of citizens
24abroad.
The Rio Treaty of 1947 delineates more clearly the influence
25which the violation of human rights has on international peace.w But 
the words used do not indicate legal obligation. No collective action 
is indicated in case of violation.
When the Charter of the Organization of American States was 
framed at the Ninth International Conference of American States in 
Bogota in 1948, there was strong pressure to incorporate legal obli­
gation for the respect for human rights into the Charter. This would 
have been binding on every nation0 There would have been a duty on 
the part of the O.A.S. to police these obligations. This idea was 
not put into the Charter, however, because it was argued that it 
should, go into a separate agreement instead. Therefore, the Preamble,
Article 5> and Article 13 mention human rights, but Article 15 p**o-
26hibits intervention into the internal affairs of state.
The exact meanings of these articles is debatable. They may
24Resolution XL, Inter-American Conference on Problems of War 
and Peace, Final Act 19 (Pan American Union, 1945).
25See Appendix'C, Preamble of inter-American Treaty of Recip­
rocal Assistance.
26See Appendix B, 0oA,S. Charter.
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be mere expressions of desire on the part of the O.A.S., but they may 
be binding. This issue revolves around the question of the nature of 
the Organization of American States. Is it merely an associated group 
of states or does it have a legal personality of its own, distinct 
from the legal personalities of the individual states of which it is
composed? If it does have a distinct legal personality, then the
O.A.S. would have different rights and duties from those of any or 
all of its members. It would not be bound by Article 13.
Thomas and Thomas list other possibilities by which there might
be justification for intervention to protect human rights under the
O.A.S. Charter. But they say that the Charter is not the final word
on the subject. At Bogota, the majority of American governments also
signed the Inter-American Charter of Social Guarantees and the Ameri-
27can Declaration of tine Eights and Duties of Man. These are not in 
treaty form and they establish no legal obligations, but they do out­
line social standards which, if put into practice by all the signatory
states, would establish many of the ideals embodied in the term "human
rights and fundamental freedoms." The main value of such resolutions 
is that at least some thought is being devoted to these questions. 
Furthermore, they clarify what is meant by human rights and fundamen­
tal freedoms as far as the Western Hemisphere is concerned.
It must be noted as well, that at Bogota another resolution 
was adopted which recommended that the Inter—American Juridical
27Resolution 29 and Resolution 30> Final Act, Ninth Interna­
tional Conference of American States (1948), Congress and Conference 
Series, No. 3 1, pp. 50-60.
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Committee prepare a draft statute providing for the creation and
functioning of an Inter-American Court to guarantee the rights of
28man. This has, however, been postponed/-
The Tenth Inter-American Conference adopted a resolution stat­
ing that each nation should strengthen its system for the protection
29of human rights. It also requested the Council of the O.A.S. to 
continue its studies on the jurisdictional aspects of the protection 
of human rights, including the possibility of creating an Inter- 
American Court for the Protection of Human Eights, so that the matter 
could be considered at the Eleventh International Conference of 
American States. However, this court has not been created, and the 
Eleventh Inter-American Conference has never met.
CONCLUSION
Thomas and Thomas provide a succinct conclusion to the topic 
of the protection of human rights in the Western Hemisphere when they 
say:
Although the Charter of the United Nations does not change 
the general international law right of individual intervention 
for humanitarian purposes, except that such intervention may no 
longer be intervention by use of or threat of force, it would 
seem that the Charter of Bogota does, as far as the American 
states are concerned, completely prohibit such intervention. As 
it establishes no clear-cut right for the O.A.S. to intervene for 
humanitarian purposes, it can be said that as far as the inter- 
American system is concerned, human rights are now less protected 
than they were under general international law.
og
Thomas and Thomas, pP 3&9•
29Resolution XXVII, Tenth International Conference of American 
States, Final Act (Caracas, Venezuela, 1954), p.
3°Ibid., p. 390.
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In spite of the truth in the last sentence, it must he remem­
bered that the American states strongly stress the respect fGr human 
rights. Perhaps they are not facing the problem realistically.
MEXICO'S POSITION ON NON-INTERVENTION
PART II
CHAPTER V
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
PRE-REVOLUTIONARY ERA
Francisco Cuevas Cancino, Mexican lawyer, writer and diplomat
who has been a delegate to the United Nations and member of the
Secretariat, has said that at the time of Mexico*s independence,
Mexicans, and many others as well, thought they were witnessing the
birth of a great empire, an empire which would exercise a dominant
position in the New World. ". . . Weakness and errors reduced her 
i,1power."
External crises, together with internal problems at the time, 
determined Mexico’s foreign policy for years ahead. The war with the 
United States weakened Mexico. In it she lost half of her territory. 
She could never again consider herself a great power. Her earlier 
foreign policy, based on the ideas of a great empire and a powerful 
nation, ceased to be. Her diplomats now needed defensive weapons, 
since several foreign powers were anxious to take advantage of Mexi­
co’s weakness.^
Jorge Castaneda has stated, nThe first half century of our 
independent life is no less than a history of attacks from outside
Francisco Cuevas Cancino, "Mexico,” Foreign Policies in a 
World of Change, Joseph E. Black and Kenneth Thompson, eds. (New York 
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1964), p. 643.
2Ibid., p. 646.
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. . . The 'exterior1 meant a fountain of evils for Mexico. " J
Mexico had to face the realities of United States "manifest
destiny" and of being "hemmed in" by United States influence. Daniel
Cosio Villegas says that Mexico became part of what he calls, "the
4North iiinerican system." Mexico has always resented such a position.
For this reason, she has struggled hard for her independence and her 
self-respect in foreign affairs.
It was logical that Mexico’s new policy in foreign affairs 
would be built around international law. This law was used by the 
nation to promote her interests and to assure her conservation.
"Mexico’s policy was aimed at attaining that ideal law to which she
5naturally aspired through conviction and self-interest." In the 
law Mexico found the only protective shield she could use in the face 
of threats from ambitious nations.
Mexico’s relations with the world’s powers were shaky during 
the 1850’s, with several threats of foreign intervention. Guerrilla 
actions threatened foreign nationals. In 1859? although the European 
countries recognized Miguel Miramon as president of Mexico, the United 
States supported Benito Juarez. According to some authorities, this 
split reflected the differences between the old line, clerical-supported
'z
Jorge Castaneda, "Mexico y el exterior," Mexico: Cincuenta 
anos dereyplucion (Mexico, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Economica y Social, 
I960), p. J06.
4 ✓Daniel Cosio Villegas, iiinerican Extremes (Austin, Texas: 
University of Texas Press, 1964;, p. J 8 .
5Cuevas Cancino, p. o48.
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elite and the new, emerging, anti-clerical middle-class which favored 
the liberal political ideas of the times. Miramon represented the 
first, while Juarez was a very liberal thinker.
After the French intervention and the Empire of Maximillian, 
which coincided with the American Civil War, Juarez came to power 
again in 1867 for the second time. His first term had been from 1858 
through 1864. The revived republic received United States support.
Maximillian1s Empire was Europe's last direct and open political at­
tempt to install a puppet government in Mexico.
111 e United States had implied its willingness to use force, 
unless the French withdrew from Mexico their troops which were sup­
porting Maximillian. It was partly due to this threat that the French 
did so, thus leaving Maximillian with no military backing. He was
soon overthrown.^ In this case, United States intervention favored "1
Mexico's interests. *»
1
THIRTY YEARS UNDER PORFIRIO DIAZ
Mexico's foreign policy during the period of the administration 
of Porfirio Diaz (1880-1910) was not very imaginative. Diaz made 
almost all policy. In the last years of his administration, Mexico 
appeared to lack any positive policy whatsoever. Diaz had allowed 
foreigners to come into the country in large numbers, and to wield
Henry B. Parkes, A History of Mexico (Cambridge, Mass.: Hough­
ton Mifflin, Co., I960), pp. 244-250; and Daniel James, Mexico and 
the Americans (New Yorlc: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 81-8?.
'’ibid.
great influence. The principle of non-intervention was usually ig­
nored. Mexico had no real diplomatic tradition after Diaz1 thirty
8years.
The government of Porfirio Diaz did take some unexpected posi­
tions regarding general international problems. Mexico attended 
several Pan American Conferenced and the two world conferences at the 
Hague during the Diaz period. At these, she defended— at times with
vigor— some principles appropriate to her position as an underdevelope
10country. Nevertheless, in general, Mexico followed a submissive 
international policy under Porfirio Diaz.
REVOLUTIONARY MEXICAN FOREIGN POLICY
The Revolution inherited this "vacuum" of tradition from 
Porfirio Diaz. Previous tradition had not been exercised for thirty 
years. Mexico seemed to be lacking the proper experience or clear- 
cut diplomatic directives.
The Revolution of 1910 was an indigenous one. Jorge Castaneda 
states that although it borrowed some ideas from abroad, it was not 
based on universal ideologies or foreign values. He says it merely 
sought what was best for Mexico. Although the philosophy of the 
Mexican Revolution was not at all clear-cut, its reaction to foreign
Cuevas Cancino, p. 649.
9"See Appendix. D.
10Castaneda, Mexico: 50 anos . . ., p. J07«
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influence was intense. Nationalism was reinforced, of course, after 
1910, due to the role of the United States Ambassador, Henry Lane 
Wilson, in the fall of President Madero;*^ by the occupation of the 
port of Vera Cruz in 1914;1:> by the threat of European intervention; 14
11
11A strong spirit of nationalism is reflected in the Constitu­
tion of 1917> as is evidenced by several of its articles. Among others, 
special note should be made of Article 2 7, which claimed all lands as 
the national patrimony and thus made expropriation legal; Article 123 
which gave Mexican labor a very privileged position. Both of the fore­
going worked against foreign entrepreneurs. Another article stipu­
lates that Mexican presidents must be of Mexican parentage and have 
a Mexican wife. Others concerning cultural affairs and economics also 
reflect nationalism. See: Frank Tannenbaum, Peace by Revolution
(N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1933), p. 243; Javier Rondero, 
Charactensticas del nacionalismo," in Mexico: 50 anos de revolucion, 
p. 293; and especially Daniel James, pp. 183-192.
12Henry Lane Wilson was the United States Ambassador to Mexico 
when the Mexican revolution began. He was a "fanatical" enemy of the 
government of President Francisco I. Madero for several reasons, 
economic, political, and personal. During a "coup d'etat", Wilson 
collaborated with the antigovernment forces, thereby aiding the 
usurper, Victoriano Huerta, who eventually had President Madero mur­
dered. (Parkes, p. 333; and James pp. 154-163.)
13
On April 21, 1914, several months before the outbreak of World 
war II, President Woodrow Wilson ordered the occupation of the Mexican 
port of Vera Cruz to prevent a German vessel laden with arms from 
rendering assistance to the regime of Victoriano Huerta which had 
overthrown the duly elected government of Madero. A battle ensued;
Vera Cruz was shelled. Later a commission of envoys from Argentina, 
urazil, and Chile mediated the dispute, and U.S. forces were withdrawn. 
Although the action favored his position, Venustiano Carranza, leader 
of the Constitutionalist forces opposing Huerta, condemned the U.S. 
move. (U.S. News [July 4, 1966], p. 84; and James, pp. 168-1/3.
14During the course of the Mexican revolution, and especially 
after the formulation of the Constitution of 191/, Mexico threatened 
confiscation o± some property owned by European and American nationals, 
furthermore, Mexico was unable to meet many of her obligations. This, 
plus the loss of the favored position enjoyed under Porfirio Diaz, 
caused some European and American countries and interests to threaten 
intervention in Mexico. (See James, pp. 212-224.)
and by the punitive expedition against Francisco Villa in 1917, led
iby General Pershing. In these cases, Mexico invoked principles in 
her defense such as the respect for the territorial integrity of the 
state and non-intervention.
Despite many trials, Mexico's relations with North /unerica 
and Europe slowly, albeit inconsistently, improved during the decade 
of the 1920's. Nevertheless, there was much unfavorable public senti­
ment on the part of North Americans toward Mexico.
Furthermore, United States recognition policy had changed.
Under Victoriano Huerta, Mexico had been the first of the Latin Ameri­
can "revolutionary" regimes to taste this new departure in policy 
which was inaugurated by President Woodrow Wilson. The United States 
had replaced her previous c[e facto policy with a d£ ;jure policy. One 
effect of this was that the right of revolution was thereby questioned, 
something which Mexico firmly believed in, after the experience of 
her own revolution. The United States questioned the future results
and natures of revolutionary governments. The government of President
/  * /' 
Alvaro Obregon was not recognized by the United States for three years,
15In March, 1916, rebel troops led by Francisco Villa raided 
Columbus, New Mexico. Seventeen persons were killed. President Wilson 
ordered 15,000 regular U.S. troops under General Pershing to pursue 
the offenders into Mexico. The Mexican government, still involved in 
revolution, was not consulted. Mexicans greatly resented this invasion 
of their territory by official North American troops. The troops were 
withdrawn in February, 1917. Villa was never apprehended. (U.S. News 
£ July 4, 1966 J, p. 84; and Daniel James, p. 1 7 8.)
16Only upon its signing of the Bucareli Agreements was recog­
nition extended to the Obregon government. In these agreements,
Mexico, in effect, postponed realization of two revolutionary goals—  
agrarian reform and the revindication of the petroleum industry— by
which did nothing to better relations from Mexico's point of view.
From 1922 through 1927, President Calles sought to enforce 
anti-alien ownership clauses affecting oil properties, in spite of 
the Bucareli Agreements. He ordered owners to exchange their titles 
for leases, which caused more tensions. Talk of American intervention 
increased. North American publications vigorously criticized Mexico 
and her revolution. However, wiser counsels prevailed and the United 
States did not intervene in Mexico at this time.
It must be remembered that it was during this period that the 
United States had troops in several Central American nations, and 
semi—protectorates in others. She was not opposed to intervention 
Per se. It was in Iy28 that the Sixth Inter—American Conference was 
held in Havana, in which the discussion of non-intervention was so 
heated. At that meeting, Mexico was a firm adherent of the adoption
i n
of the principle of absolute non-intervention by the -unerican States.
EMERGING PRINCIPLES
Since the time of the Carranza administration, Mexico has fol­
lowed several important principles of foreign policy. These include 
the propositions that all countries are juridically equal; that inter­
vention in another country's internal affairs is intolerable; that
renouncing the constitutional dispositions for these goals as they 
affected North Americans. It created a position of privilege for 
them in relation to Mexican nationals. (Castaneda, Mexico: 5‘d anos . .
P- 309.)
\ -“7
William Pierce Tucker, The Mexican Government Toda.y (Minnea­
polis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957), pp. 186-187.
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foreign residents must expect equality of treatment with nationals; 
and that diplomatic recognition does not depend on moral approval of 
the recognized regime by the country granting recognition. Mexico 
has adhered, as well, to the following principles: opxjosition to
secret agreements; opposition to aggression; advocation of arbitra­
tion of disputes; and upholding the right of asylum. More recently, 
Mexico has added the principles of support for the machinery of col­
lective intervention under stipulated conditions, and the recognition 
of political democracy and a healthy economy as protection against
totalitarianism, but these latter points will be discussed in more 
IQdetail later.
Revolutionary Mexico also upholds the principle of the pacific 
settlement of conflicts. She believes it to be, among other things, 
an important tool in the prevention of intervention and thus, in the 
achievement of peace. "Mexico has sustained that no controversy or 
conflict exists among states which cannot be solved by peaceful means."
The Mexican Revolution introduced into the hemisphere the con­
temporary phase of the problem of state responsibility toward aliens
This problem has been the cause of many interventions in the
past.
1^Tucker, p. 189. Note that Mexico may have her own ideas of 
what "political democracy and a healthy economy" signify.
20Quintanilla, p. 4. Note, in this respect, that Mexico pro­
posed a "Peace Code" in 1933, which was approved in various of its 
chapters at Buenos Aires in 1936. These chapters concerned maintain— 
ment and re-establishment of peace, good offices, and mediation, pre­
vention of controversies, compliance with treaties, and non-intervention. 
Furthermore, Mexico is one of the Latin American countries which has 
approved and reitified the Pact of Bogota, officially the "International 
Treaty of Peaceful Solutions." (ibid., p. 18.)
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and their property. The movements and policies adopted in Mexico at
this time have since influenced other Latin American governments.
They precipitated threats of intervention which, for some time after
the early 1930's, seemed to he a thing of the past. Nevertheless,
recent actions in the Dominican Republic show that intervention f,for
22the protection of nationals” may not be a dead letter.
In his delineation of the guidelines and boundaries of Mexican 
diplomacy, which under Carranza’s definition would appear to be rigid 
and of limited scope, Luis Quintanilla, noted Mexican diplomat, jurist, 
and intellectual, lists several other concepts. They show that Mexico 
has definite opinions on other, more general issues which are still 
subject to debate in international and inter-American circles.
Quintanilla says that it was Venustiano Carranza, president 
of Mexico from 1917 to 1920, who first denounced multi-lateral inter­
vention by a group of countries. He made a vigorous protest to the 
ABC powers in 1914 for their attempts to discuss and mediate Mexico’s 
internal affairs. ”. . . If intervention by one state in the affairs 
of another is a flagrant violation of the fundamental principle of
non-intervention, so also is the intervention by any group of states
21into the internal affairs of Mexico.”
21In the Constitution of 1917, Article 27 is the basis for the 
new philosophy of "Mexico for the Mexicans.” It states that original 
ownership of land and waters lies with the nation. They must be dis­
tributed according to the public good. Furthermore, direct ownership 
of the subsoil wealth lies with the nation.
22Eonning, p. 37. See Chapter III on the Dominican Republic, also.
23 .Quintanilla, La politica internacional . . ., p. 4. See also: 
Javier Eondero, "Characteristicas del nacionalismo,” Mexico: 50 anos
123
Carranza’s firm attitude against foreign military interference
may be seen as an antecedent of the Mexican refusal to permit the
24establishment of foreign military bases on her territory. In this 
respect, Carranza said that all occupation of foreign territory, even 
when animated by the most noble goals, constitutes a hostile invasion 
and a violation of sovereignty. He called for the immediate withdrawal 
of foreign troops from Mexican territory.
In 1918, he said to Congress that all internal matters of a 
country are outside the range of all international action, be it col­
lective or not, and even if it should only deal with the mere examina­
tion of these subjects. "No country should intervene in any form or
25for any reason in the internal affairs of other nations . . .1
On November 29, 19^5 9 in Matamoros, President Carranza said,
. . . The guiding ideas of the Mexican revolution are that 
. . . all countries are equal and should respect mutually their 
institutions, laws, and sovereignty; no country should intervene 
in any form or for any reason whatever in the internal affairs 
of another; all should submit themselves strictly . . .  to the 
universal principle of non-intervention; no individual should try 
to achieve a better situation than that of the citizens of the 
country where he resides, nor make o^his position as foreigner 
a title of protection and privilege.
Referring to the above guidelines, Luis Quintanilla concludes
de revolucion, p. J 0 7, in which he quotes the Informe by Venustiano 
Carranza of September 1, 1918; and Carlo de Fornaro, Carranza and 
Mexico (New York: Mitchell Kennerly, 1913), pp. 192-204~~(242 pp.)•
24 „ ^"^Castaneda, Mexico: 50 anos . . ., p. 307.
^ Ibid . , pp. 307-308.
^Cited in Quintanilla, La politica internacional . . ., p. 2,
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that Mexican diplomacy was modified by these ideas, and that, there­
after, Mexicans felt that their diplomacy should be responsible for 
watching over the general interests of civilization. He continues 
by praising Carranza’s doctrine in its espousal of the guidelines of 
modern Mexican diplomacy, which are not limited, in his opinion, to
j defense of national interests, but which pertain also to world peace
27and to the interests of humanity.
As for its participation in international conferences, Mexico 
always saw a risk that, due to United States participation, there 
might be attempts to treat with Mexico’s internal position. In spite 
of the fact that one of these meetings had goals which, in fact, 
favored Carranza’s position, the latter sustained the thesis that 
f even the simple discussion of the questions on an international level 
"would injure the independence of the Republic in a profoimd way, and 
it would set a precedent of foreign intromission for resolving internal 
problems.
Few Mexicans, if any, approve of or support the propositions 
behind the Monroe Doctrine as far as United States protection is con­
cerned. Nor do they recognize its validity in the hemisphere. They
29challenge it on legal, moral, practical, and historical grounds.
Even Porfirio Diaz attacked the doctrine. The "corollaries" gave 
Mexico even more reason for this denunciation. As Mexico saw it, "The
27'ibid., p. 3.
28Venustiano Carranza, as cited in Castaneda, Mexico: yO anos . . .,
p. 308.
29Ronning, p. 9*
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Monroe Doctrine and its corollaries were invoked . . .  to vindicate
nothing less than sixty verified interventions during fifty years in
30half a dozen Latin American countries.”
Mexicans constantly point out that although many interventions 
by the United States were carried out for "preventative” purposes, at 
other times the United States did nothing to prevent actual inter­
ventions. They point out, further, that since the doctrine is equally 
predicated on North American non-intervention in Europe, something 
which the United States has long since violated, the Doctrine itself
31has been nullified.
During the course of the Revolution and since, Mexico has 
forged a synthesis which aims at broad principles of self-determination 
non-intervention, and full international independence for the nation. 
Although common to all Latin American nations, Mexico has espoused 
these aims most fervently, and in doing so, influences others along 
the same line.
30lbid. , p. 12. See also: Appendix E, Monroe Doctrine.
^Ibid.
A PERIOD OF CHANGE IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, 1930-1946
EVENTS
During the 1930's, Mexico supported the non-intervention 
principle at the important conferences which she attended, especially 
those at Montevideo in 1933 and Buenos Aires in 1936. Jorge Castaneda 
states that in the thirties, Mexico's foreign policy reached a height 
and brilliance perhaps not equalled in her history. He says this was 
due to a favorable international climate, the "Good Neighbor" epoch, 
a consolidation of the international situation, and the advent of a 
government in Mexico with solid popular support, and a determined 
point of view on revolutionary goals.^
The Lazaro Cardenas Administration (1934-1940). The Lazaro 
Cardenas administration brought a new look both to domestic and to 
foreign policy. Foreign affairs were conducted with more consistency 
self-assurance, and vigor than before. Mexico joined the League of 
Nations and condemned German rearmament as a violation of the Ver­
sailles Treaty. When Italy went into Ethiopia, Mexico favored imposing 
sanctions against Italy. When these sanctions failed to win support, 
the delegate from Mexico, foretelling the consequences, refused to be 
a party to the failure and withdrew from the League Assembly. At the 
start of the Spanish Civil War, Mexico insisted upon the recognition
CHAPTER VI
Castaneda, Mexico; 30 anos . . p.  310.
12?
of, and adherence to, the international lav principle which distin­
guishes between a c[e jure government and a rebellious faction, allowing
2the purchase of munitions by the former.*" Finally, in 1937 and 1938* 
Mexico vocally opposed the invasions of Austria and China, demanding
3especially that measures be taken against Japan.
After leaving the League of Nations, Mexico refused to attend
the Inter-American Conference in Chile, protesting what she termed
United States policies of persecution* In return, Secretary of State
Kellogg accused Mexico of great international crimes relating to
4actions connected with her revolutione
During this period, according to Dr. Cosfo Villegas, Mexico 
"intervened” more than once in Central American politics. Opposing 
what she considered to be Yankee designs, Mexico had recalled her 
diplomatic representatives when the United States Marines invaded 
Nicaragua; but she herself permitted expeditions against the Venezue­
lan dictator, Juan Vicente Gomez, to be organized in her territory,
5thus disturbing the peace of America in the name of democracy.
In 1938, the United States demonstrated to Mexico her adherence, 
under Franklin D„ Roosevelt*s administration, to a non-interventionist
o
^See: League of Nations Document No. 155— 1936.
^Tucker, p. 187.
4Cosfo Villegas, p. 40.
Ibid. Juan Vicente Gomez was a ruthless dictator, and in 
permitting such expeditions against him, Mexico was taking a logical 
step of carrying through with hex' revolutionary philosophy although 
violating her principle of non-intervention. For information about 
Juan Vicente Gomez, see Needier, p. 233*
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policy. Under President Cardenas, Mexico had employed her doctrine 
of original ownership of the subsoil wealth to expropriate the petro­
leum properties of the nation. In the past, this would very likely 
have been sufficient cause for foreign intervention. Nevertheless, 
due in part to the "Good Neighbor11 policy of the U.S. government and 
its desire to promote hemispheric unity in the face of the Axis threat, 
the Mexican government was able to resist international pressures 
against the move.^
Jorge Castaneda attributes great importance to this expropria­
tion for Mexico!s frame of mind. In its completion of an important 
goal of the revolution, Mexico re-established !,the rule of the con­
stitutional order, which had been inoperative vis a vis the North 
7Americans. 11
New confidence was generated by the success of the expropria­
tion. It has since been converted into the symbol of the economic 
independence of the country.
The United States refrained from intervening during the process 
of expropriating the petroleum. Instead, she sent Ambassador Dwight 
Morrow as a good-will emmisary. Nevertheless, Mexico continued her 
independent foreign policy. She was the first country of the conti­
nent to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union after 
that country!s revolution. Furthermore, Mexico placed herself on the 
side of the Spanish Republicans when other countries remained "neutral11.
^Ronning, p. 39*
^Castaneda, Mexico: 50 anos . . ., p. 310-
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The relations between Mexico and the United States were rather 
disagreeable at times through 1938, although no intervention occurred. 
During all the controversies, however, the Roosevelt administration 
exhibited a policy of understanding and friendship. A short time 
later, during World War II, Mexico became an ally of the United States
The Avila Camacho Administration (1940-1946). An era of “con­
servative consolidation” in foreign relations was introduced in 1940 
under President Avila Camacho. Agreements were reached on many issues 
such as oil and agrarian expropriation claims with the United States. 
Trade treaties, monetary stabilization, and closer collaboration in 
the war effort were undertaken.
Mexico is disposed to give her total support to the cause of 
American defense . . . Conscious of our limitations, and volun­
tary and traditional pacifists, we desire to keep out all armed 
conflict. But jealous of our independence, we will omit no ef­
fort in maintaining, together with the inviolability of our ter­
ritory and the sovereignty of our institutions, the integrity of 
America and the sacred right to think and act as free men in a  ^
hemisphere in which the ideal of liberty and justice is affirmed.
The initial, fervently active period of the revolution had 
ended with President Cardenas. In 1940, with Avila Camacho*s assump­
tion of the presidency, the epoch of what has been called the "Institu 
tional Revolution11 commenced, in both foreign and domestic affairs.^
^Cosio Villegas, p. 40.
^Avila Camacho, Informe (Report to the Congress) from files 
of the Secretariat of the Presidency, Mexico D. F., 1941, p. 20.
10The name of the official government party was even changed 
from Partido de la Revolucion Mexicana (Party of the Mexican Revolu­
tion) to Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Party of the Institu­
tional Revolution).
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liIt was a period of transition. Mexico turned away from government 
by generals and began to develop her own, permanent civil bureaucracy 
and governmental tradition. This she has attempted to continue in 
foreign as well as in domestic affairs. Perhaps the war effort was 
a catalyst which caused Mexico to mature somewhat with respect to 
foreign policy. She was still, however, primarily concerned with in­
ternal affairs, and had not yet outgrown her isolationism.*^
EMERGING PRINCIPLES
The Estrada Doctrine. Mexico had been bitter before 1930 about
delays on the part of the United States in recognizing Carranza and 
 ^ 13Obregon. Since 1930, she has claimed to follow a recognition policy 
which was first stated on September 27, 1930, by Foreign Minister 
Genaro Estrada. He said that Mexico's policy, henceforth, would be 
that of "establishing, maintaining, or suspending diplomatic relations 
with other states in accordance with the circumstances, but without 
qualifying the legitimacy or the stability” of the governments. The 
statement said, furthermore, that Mexico considered the granting of 
"recognitions” to be
. an insulting practice which, besides wounding the sovereignty 
of other nations, places them in a situation so that their internal 
affairs can be qualified in some sense by other governments. . . .
**James, p. 3 6 1.
12See: James, pp. 316-359* for a good resume of the Avila
Camacho Administration.
13Ronning, p. 13.
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The Mexican government limits itself ty^maintaining or retiring, 
as it sees fit, its diplomatic agents.
The Estrada Doctrine came into being to try to put an end to 
the concept of "recognition11, since Mexico believed that recognition 
had been used as an instrument of intervention. This doctrine does 
not imply that governments must automatically conserve existing diplo­
matic relations. Every sovereign state has the right to break rela­
tions. In Luis Quintanilla’s words,
Mexico could not preserve diplomatic relations with any regime 
that was the product of a foreign intervention or which came into 
being due to a simple coup d’etat. . . . Mexico reserves the 
faculty to exercise her right of legation when it best suits her 
national interest or her international position. This is apart 
from any concept of "intervention”.
The Question of Mexico’ s Relations with Spain. Discussion of 
Mexico’s recognition policy inevitably brings to mind the question of 
her relations, or rather her lack of relations, with Spain. Mexican 
officials admit to no ambiguity, whatsoever, in their attitude on 
Spain with respect to the Estrada Doctrine. Since the final part of 
the doctrine states that a government which comes to power through 
an arbitrary takeover has no right to be treated as an authentic 
government, Mexico appears to be following the doctrine to the letter.
Mexico had experienced very cordial relations with the Spanish 
Republic. From 1931 to 1936, there was a rebirth in cultural and 
political intercourse between the two countries, based on similar
Quintanilla, La politica internacional . . ., p. 13. 
^Ibid., p. 1 5.
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ideological bases. When the Spanish Civil War began in 1936, Mexico 
took a leading position among the Latin A m e r ic a n states which sup­
ported the Republican cause. After the war, she opened her borders 
to Spanish Republican refugees and furnished the headquarters for the 
Republican government-in-exile.
On the other hand, Mexicofs relations with Franco’s Spain were 
very strained before and during World War II. She has always con­
sidered that this government was imposed upon Spain through direct 
intervention by foreign powers. She has also held that the so-called 
"non-intervention1’ policy which was followed by France, Great Britain, 
and the United States towards the two sides was illegal under inter­
national law. The policy was adhered to before Franco’s faction had 
any real hold on the country, thus placing the Republic, a recognized 
government, at a disadvantage, while the Falange was receiving aid 
from Germany and Italy. This is an unusual case in which Mexico was
firmly against non-intervention, at least as it was practiced in this
16instance.
Ramon Beteta, Mexican newspaperman and editorial writer, ex­
plains Mexico’s position as follows:
Jn the case of Spain, a country to which we gave help when 
asked, and over whose government Franco presides, we do not 
maintain relations because things have not changed since Hitler 
and Mussolini installed the only fascist regime which has sub­
sisted after the war.
George I. Blanksten, "Foreign Policy of Mexico, Chapter 9, 
in Roy C. Macridis (ed.), Foreign Policy in World Politics (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Ha11, 1959), p. 338.
17Ramon Beteta, El Dfa (August 7, 1964), p. 1.
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The case of Spain provides a good example of Mexico1s diplo­
matic independence. Her spokesmen constantly reiterate that the 
Mexican government cannot maintain official relations with the Franco 
government, since it considers the latter to be a direct product of 
military intervention in the Spanish Republic. Luis Quintanilla 
states,
. . . The outrage against the Spanish Republic was committed 
offensively and with the luxury of propaganda. Germany and Italy 
had the impudence to intervene in uniform to save Franco, and to 
destroy by military force the young and democratic^gepublic which 
had arrived to power through free elections. . . .
Commentary. Mexico’s position of non-recognition of the 
Spanish government of Francisco Franco probably does not run contrary 
to the letter of the Estrada Doctrine. The section concerning forced 
imposition of a government upon a people by foreign powers is a tech­
nicality which allows this. However, if one is to take seriously 
Mexicofs urgings that recognition not be used as an instrument of 
foreign policy, then the spirit of the Estrada Doctrine may well not 
agree with Mexico’s position on Spain.
This is a situation with no single correct answer to the prob­
lem it poses. The intent of the nation is again important. The 
Estrada Doctrine seems to be subject to interpretation and Mexico in­
terprets it according to her national interest.
Therefore, although Mexico may condemn a nation for refusing 
recognition to another government which that nation believes may have
Quintanilla, La politica internacional . . ., p. 23.
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come to power through international communist subversion or covert 
intervention, there is little real distinction between that position 
and Mexico's position on Spain. The one distinction is this— that 
Mexico refuses recognition where the foreign intervention was obvious, 
while the United States and others may refuse it where they highly 
suspect that there was covert intervention involved in a governmental 
change, be it official or unofficial intervention. This is a quali­
tative distinction which seems relatively naive in today's world.
The distinction which Mexico makes between the granting of recogni­
tion and employing the right of legation is largely one of semantics, 
not of substance. It helps Mexico as a tool of foreign policy, but 
need not be taken seriously as a real distinction, as Mexico does 
not employ it as such.
It must be admitted, however, that Mexico usually grants re­
cognition, however she may term it, with more facility than do many 
other governments. In spite of the contradictory case of Spain, the 
Estrada Doctrine may be given credit for such facility.
The Estrada Doctrine is significant in the inter-American 
system, since, at the Ninth Conference of American States at Bogota 
in 1948, Resolution XXXV declared the continuance of diplomatic rela­
tions desirable in the case of revolutionary governments. It further 
condemned political bargaining on the subject of recognition. In
Dr. Quintanilla's opinion, it is a kind of corollary to the Estrada
19Doctrine. Nevertheless, neither is wholly accepted in the hemisphere.
“^Quintanilla, La politica internacional . . ., p. 14.
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Many Mexicans believe, as Quintanilla has said, that history 
teaches that people have always found a manner of expressing their 
political will, even if it be through revolution. "Without revolu­
tions, political, social, and economic injustice could be indefinitely
20perpetuated even inside of misleading 'democratic' molds." Mexico's 
recognition policy is therefore closely related to the principle of 
self-determination of peoples, or so Mexico claims.
There is one further reservation to the Estrada Doctrine which 
has not been mentioned, but which concerns the right of revolution. 
Should a limited sector arbitrarily take power of the executive, the 
resulting regime cannot expect the international community to treat 
it as an authentic government. "To admit explicitly or implicitly
such usurpations of power would only stimulate crimes against demo-
21cracy. . . . Nothing in the Estrada Doctrine favors this."
The traditional United States doctrine of recognition also
grew out of the idea of popular sovereignty and belief in the right
of revolution. It was emphasized by many early North .American states-
90men, among them Thomas Jefferson and John Adams.
This traditional U.S. doctrine condones "recognition", but it 
states that a nation has the right to govern its internal affairs and 
to transact foreign policy through whatever organs it chooses. Only
20 ri. ^Ibid., p. 2.
21Ibid., p. 14.
22Luis Quintanilla, A Latin American Speaks (New York: Mac­
millan Co., 1943), p. 40.
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the will of the nation is essential. Later, even before the turn of 
the century, the United States began to insist upon prerequisites for 
recognition, such as the fulfillment of international obligations, 
constitutionalism, and the respect for property. Mexico has always 
opposed such prerequisites. The wide acclaim which was heaped upon 
the Estrada Doctrine by Latin Americans was due in part to the re­
sentment which they felt toward this United States recognition policy, 
which in fact did result in some intervention.^
Martin C. Needier has called the Estrada Doctrine ’’one of
Mexicofs leading contributions to the inventory of ideas of inter-
24national law in the hemisphere." It differs from the traditional 
U.S. doctrine in its idea of abolishing the policy of recognition 
altogether and merely withdrawing legations, a physical act, if the 
country does not want to deal with another government.
The Estrada Doctrine has made a possible contribution to inter­
national practice in its facilitation of the establishment of rela­
tions among countries, since it may break down some superficial 
barriers which have previously existed. It is not, however, widely
ORor exclusively employed in the hemisphere.
23Ronning, pp. 10-14.
24Needier, p. 26.
25For further discussion of the Estrada Doctrine see: (l)
Macridis, p. 335; (2) Quintanilla, La politica internacional . . 
p. 10; and (3 ) Ronning, p. 12.
CHAPTER VII
NEW POST-WAR VISTAS 
THE CHAPULTEPEC CONFERENCE
Events. For Mexico and Pan Americanism in general, the Inter- 
American Conference on the Problems of War and Peace (the Chapultepee 
Conference), held in 19^5, was an important success. Mexico felt an 
especial link to it, since it took place in Mexico City. Its two 
objectives were to consolidate forces so as to accelerate the end of 
the war and to examine the grave problems which would present them­
selves at the initiation of the peace. In the view of President 
✓
Avila Camacho, ”. . .at the Conference of Chapultepee, the solidarity 
of the states of the continent was elevated to a point of cooperation 
never before reached in the history of the inter-American system.”* 
This statement is somewhat exaggerated, since the United States did 
not attach importance to the conference equal to that of the Latin 
American nations. Nevertheless, it was certainly a very important 
milestone in inter-American cooperation.
Principles. Mexico's position at the Chapultepee Conference
2was, in Jorge Castaneda's words, an "advanced” one. This is evi­
denced by her observations on the Dumbarton Oaks Meetings prior to
* Avila Camacho, Informe, 19^6 (from the files of the Secretaria 
de la Presidencia, Palacio Nacional, Mexico City), p. 18.
2Castaneda, Mexico y el orden . . ., p. 52.
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the Chapultepec Conference, and on the Conference itself. She had 
proposed many amendments of very internationalist character to the 
charter draft. In this respect, she suggested that the General As­
sembly be given the faculties of a democratic system and that respect 
for the rights of man be established as one of the articles of the 
Charter. Furthermore, she proposed to include in the Charter a re­
quirement that all states should promise to incorporate international 
law into their respective national laws, and that every exception or 
restriction concerning the competence of the organization in cases 
of international dispute be suppressed. To accomplish the latter, 
Mexico proposed the elimination of all restrictions to the competence 
of the United Nations in international controversies so it could 
always apply one of the procedures of peaceful solution provided for
3m  the Charter, even in cases of domestic jurisdiction.
MEXICO AND THE UNITED NATIONS
In 1945, Mexico was caught up in the short-lived, optimistic 
current that prevailed in the post-war world. She had great confi­
dence in the future ability of the United Nations to preserve the 
peace. Her proposals were broad and markedly internationalist. She 
evidenced a willingness to abandon her vehement insistence upon com­
plete national sovereignty and the absolute respect for domestic 
jurisdiction regarding problems which might influence world peace.
Her hopes were set on a strong international order. It was stated
3Ibid., p. 52.
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in her "Opinions of the Secretary of Foreign Relations regarding the 
Dumbarton Oaks Project" that situations or controversies originating 
from questions of internal jurisdiction should "be forcibly within 
the competence of the United Nations or of the International Court 
of Justice if they affected world peace in any way."^
At the various conferences which were held to formulate the 
United Nations Charter, and especially at the San Francisco Confer­
ence, Mexico took a very radical position, amounting, in fact, to one 
condoning collective intervention, or meaningful steps toward world 
government. Her propositions provided that the veto would practically 
be eliminated; that the General Assembly would have greater faculties; 
that the international protection of the rights of man would remain 
guaranteed in the Charter; that the rights and duties of states would 
be defined in an obligatory appendix of the Charter; and that provi­
sion would be made for the automatic incorporation of international 
law into the national legal systems of member states.
In Mexico's opinion, it followed, therefore, that during inter­
national controversies, few restrictions of domestic jurisdiction 
should be placed on the authority of the United Nations. When these 
proposals of Mexico were rejected, "her point of view on the problem 
of the dominium reserved to the states with regard to international 
organizations had to be altered."^
1Ibid., p. 5 3. 
^Ibid., p. 5 k .
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Therefore, although some of her internationalist propositions
7were influential at the San Francisco Conference, the failure to 
adopt the crux of her suggestions (that is, giving the organization 
powers which would begin the formation of a supranational structure), 
led Mexico thereafter to revert to her former position of isolation 
in foreign affairs with a strict emphasis on non-intervention.
Dr. Cuevas Cancino has said that Mexico considers those acts 
by which one or several powers attempt to implement their own desires 
to be interventionistic. He says, however, that she believes the act 
is not one of intervention when it consists of applying the princi­
ples of the Charter to matters of universal concern, such as the 
establishment of democracy, racial justice, or self-determination.^
In his opinion, Mexico still believes that her own development 
allows her to avoid all international problems. She emphasizes this 
belief with the fact that she has not been the object of any United 
Nations discussion having to do with an international controversy.
She stresses that which she believes to be in the general interest.
For this reason, she has sometimes supported the organization's juris­
diction in some cases where the states involved have claimed domestic
10jurisdiction, although in very limited instances. Nevertheless,
7Some twenty of her twenty-eight proposals were in some way 
included in the Charter.
8Cuevas Cancino, p. 663.
Ibid.9
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on close examination, it is clear that she has not strayed far from 
her traditional policy, although emphasizing more and more the possi­
bilities of international cooperation in some fields, guided strictly 
by international law. 11
Mexico has emphasized that a government imposed upon a people 
by a foreign power is illegal and should be actively opposed by the 
international community. It is for this reason that she has continued 
to oppose Franco's government in Spain. Furthermore, Mexico has 
favored measures taken against the government of South Africa because 
of its policy of "apartheid". In such cases, Mexico recognizes the 
right of the international community to take action against a govern­
ment.
In her participation in the United Nations, Mexico has approach­
ed concrete problems with some flexibility. She usually exercises a 
restrictive interpretation of the jurisdiction of the United Nations 
when there is a conflict. Mexico is still not inclined to give com­
plete support, without stringent restrictions, to the role of inter­
national organizations regarding matters of intervention.
Jorge Castaneda states that although Mexico herself has no 
specific material objectives in relation to ther international ac­
tivity, through the United Nations she sees some possibility of achieving
It is possible that Mexico really does not recognize that 
in so many instances she is obviously following her own national 
interest when proclaiming so vehemently her adherence to objective 
principles which are "in the general interest"— principles which may 
be interpreted in more than one way.
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the goals which are common to all small and medium powers, such as 
keeping the peace, giving small nations some moderating influence, 
assuring the independence of all nations, and observing the principle 
of non-intervention in their strictly internal affairs. Furthermore, 
the United Nations emphasizes the need for and the function of inter­
national law. It can also facilitate economic development. These
12functions coincide with Mexican policy.
Dr. Cuevas Cancino expounds further on Mexico*s attitude, this 
time as it relates to collective security. He says that she does not 
understand that collective security implies individual responsibili­
ties and carries with it heavy fiscal charges, or that it can even 
require shedding the blood of her own citizens. Dr. Cuevas says that 
Mexico believes that as far as the existence of international secular 
arm is concerned, it is not necessary to go beyond the bounds of 
principles.^
A policy based on principle gives force and cohesion to Mexi­
can policy in the United Nations; but as a counterpart, it becomes 
somewhat immune to the changes which occur within the organization. 
. . . The present situation in the U.N. is different from that of 
the immediate postwar period. The danger lies, . . .  in the pos­
sibility that Mexico may overlook her interests in favor of time­
worn principles which cannot be immediately implemented. . . .
Luis Quintanilla understands in depth the dilemma facing the 
United Nations and the problems under discussion here. He recognizes 
the apparent conflict between the principle of non-intervention and
Castaneda, Mexico y el orden . . ., p. 187.
13Cuevas Cancino, p. 663.
^ Ibid. , p. 664.
the solemnly declared desire of all nations, one approved in the U.N. 
and the O.A.S., of stimulating and protecting the exercise of human 
rights.
He speaks further of Mexico’s attitude as follows:
For the Mexican revolutionaries to speak of human rights and 
democracy was the same thing. Democracy is the only form of 
government adequate to guarantee such rights. . . .  In effect, 
we donft forget that all the constitutions of America formulate 
elevated democratic principles, including the constitutions of 
Latin American countries which continue submitted to military 
dictatorships.
Mexico . . . has maintained loyally and consistently that the 
indispensible conciliation of individual interests with the col-., 
lective interest is possible without recourse to violence. . . .
Mexico participates in the United Nations as a kind of con­
science, hoping to set an example of principle which will inspire 
others. She expresses faith in collective security,^ but seems 
reluctant to implement it. A strong adherent of human rights, Mexico 
nevertheless opposes many measures which one would assume to be in 
the interest of human rights. The reasons for this ambiguity are 
not clear, but seem to rest on Mexico*s fervent attempts to conduct 
her foreign policy upon set principles which may lose touch with 
practical problems.
THE COLD WAR FORCES A REVERSAL IN MEXICO1S ATTITUDE
Since the San Francisco Conference, Mexico has manifested a
15Quintanilla, La politica internacional . . ., p. 22.
Adolfo Lopez Mateos, Address, October 14, 1959> printed in 
Voice of Mexico (Mexico City: Partido Revolucionario Institucional), 
pp. 41-47.
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strong resurgence of nationalism and an increased support for state
sovereignty. She blames this on the weakness of the United Nations
in the circumstances of the Cold War. Jorge Castaneda has said,
The realities of the Cold War, and . . . the tensions generated 
on the American continent, obliged us to return to our traditional 
position. The unconditional application of the related principles 
of non-intervention and respect for the dominium reserved to the 
states in relation to international organizations have become^he 
cornerstone of Mexican foreign policy in the post-war period.
After San Francisco, Mexico's return to her traditional posi­
tion favoring the strict observance of the rights of domestic juris­
diction was emphasized. The Rodriguez Larreta note from Uruguay 
originated during the same period, scarcely five months after the 
close of the conference. It proposed to the American states that
collective action be taken to protect democracy and human rights.
18Mexico opposed the proposals set forth in the note.
In 1946, President Avila Camacho recognized the steady ten­
dency to reduce the area of international jurisdiction of states, but 
he believed that what jurisdiction there was should not be violated.
He also stated that under the principle of non-intervention , he hoped 
that the nations of the continent would give new proof of their unity
by granting full support and recognition to the legitimate government
19of Argentina, which “eminated from the people." Mexico has always 
favored universality in continental affairs whenever feasible. At
17 ^Castaneda, Mexico: 50 anos . . ., p. 310.
18See section on Larreta note in the first part of this paper,
p. 84.
*^Avila Camacho, Informe (1946), p. 21.
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this time some nations were attempting to prevent Argentina from 
holding a full-fledged place in the inter—American system. Mexico 
supported Argentina's right to equality in the system.
MEXICO'S ADHERENCE TO THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, 1945-1958
There were a few important exceptions to Mexico's general iso­
lationist attitude after 1945. At the Conferences of San Francisco 
and Bogota, and with the creation of new international organizations, 
Mexico supported positive initiatives in the field of international 
cooperation on a long range basis.
The foreign policies of Mexico under the postwar administra­
tions present the same characteristic signs. Until the advent of the 
regime of Adolfo Lopez Mateos, in which a new mood was evidenced, 
Mexico's participation in the great general political and economic 
problems of the world was cautious and defensive. In the words of 
President Miguel Aleman (1946-1952), "Mexico, . . . due to her history, 
has been a country with few windows open to the outside. " 20 She con­
tinued to be legalistic in her conduct of foreign affairs.
President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952-1958) has said,
. . . Mexico always respects the rights of others . . . and 
tries to facilitate the means for world cooperation while defend­
ing her own independence. . . .  By orienting ourselves in this 
way, we have followed only one clear path: the path of Mexico,
the path which our tradition has paved for us. . . .We have 
always expressed in the international organizations to which we 
belong, our sincere conviction that it will only be possible to 
reach a constructive solution for the principle problems of the 
present, if all states forming these institutions will adhere to
20 .Miguel Aleman, Informe (l95l), p. 1 0.
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the postulates which in juridical matters, sustain them and which 
could be the object of an even greater amplitude and activity in 
economic and social matters.
Although she has always actively participated in the inter-
22American system, in the period from 1945 through 1958, Mexico was 
not very active in bilateral relations. The several administrations 
made few serious efforts to establish Mexico*s cultural or political 
presence in other Latin American countries. The tiny budget of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs gives evidence to this.^^
In 1945, Mexico reaffirmed her neutral doctrine of recognition 
in her relations with the triumvirate government of Guatemala in 1945 
and in the case of the new government of El Salvador.
At the Conference of Bogota in 1948, Mexico, continuing with 
her non—interventionist tradition, supported a Cuban proposition to 
recognize the right of revolution as an attribute of popular sover­
eignty in America. She based her stand on the causes of her own re­
volution in 1910, and on its trials in the face of opposing elements. 
Since that time, Mexico has held the opinion that revolutions are 
logical chapters of social evolution, and that they guarantee, in 
whatever emergency, the vital rights of the people.
Mexico gave her approval to the formation of the Organization
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, Informe (1954), p. 32.
22Howard F. Cline, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution (New York: 
Oxford University Press, I962), p. 310.
It accounted for only 1 of the national budget. (Tucker,23
p. 311.)
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of American States at Bogota. Dr. Howard F. Cline, Director of the 
Hispanic Foundation of the Library of Congress, has noted how closely 
congruent are Mexico's own principles of international politics and
those underlying the inter-American system as expressed in the O.A.S.
24Charter. She has since let it be known that she views the organi­
zation as merely a grouping of individual states, not as an entity 
with an autonomous legal personality of its own.
At the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs held in Washington in 1951 > Mexico reiterated her propositions 
of loyal collaboration with the other nations of the hemisphere in 
conformity with the Treaties of Rio and Bogota. She stipulated, 
however, that military cooperation should be the result of the free 
determination of each state, not the consequence of an automatism 
which would have introduced a fundamental change into the inter-Ameri- 
can system.
The Mexican delegation also suggested that the organs should 
not, by themselves or by having it determined by previously ratified 
instruments, adopt decisions of worldwide reach which would be out­
side the orbit of their competence.
In 1952, Mexico made proposals to the United Nations General 
Assembly to the effect that regional organizations should never sur- 
pass their respective orbits of action.
24Cline, p. 3 1 2.
25 ^Miguel Aleman, Informe (l95l), p. 10.
26 ^" Miguel Aleman, Informe (1952), p. 3 1 .
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President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines stated in the Informe of 1953.
All the activities of the government in international affairs 
have been inspired by the basic intention of envigorating the 
concept of mutual help between ng^ions, and by the basic princi­
ples of international law. . . .
In Mexico's interpretation, international law strictly limits inter­
vention.
A few years after adoption of the Rio Treaty, Mexico began to 
show concern about its applications. The treaty was conceived as a 
means for creating a common defense against foreign aggression. The 
measures of coercion laid out in the treaty were originally intended 
to help prevent armed aggression and to be instruments of collective 
security under the United Nations. Mexico now fears that they may be 
employed as means of pressure to judge or destroy governments of 
states which do not have the approval of the majority of the American 
republics. For this reason, Mexico firmly opposed the adoption of 
Resolution XCIII of the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas 
in March, 1954, which was aimed against the encroachment of inter­
national communism in the hemisphere.
Referring to the Caracas Conference in 1952*, President Ruiz 
Cortines originally stressed the importance of continental solidarity. 
With this spirit in mind, Mexico attended the conference. Taking 
into account her traditional principles and ideals, Mexico expressed 
her rejection of any act of interference by international communism 
into the hemisphere. Nevertheless, she affirmed her belief that one
^Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, Informe (1953)> P* 15*
149
of the best means for assuring democracy in America should be found
in economic progress and in social justice, not in intervention by
28anyone.
The issue raised at Caracas was that of a possible interven­
tion by the whole inter-American community into the domestic affairs
of a particular state, seemingly prohibited under Article 15 of the
29Charter of the Organization of American States. The exception to
this lies with the case in which the problem might fall under Arti-
30cle 19 of the Charter, making exception of measures adopted for the 
maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing trea- 
ties. 51
The objection raised by the Mexican delegation was that the 
terms of the Resolution left it open to an interpretation which would 
permit intervention by the American states in the domestic affairs 
of a state on the alleged ground that it was letting itself be con­
trolled by a foreign government, when in fact it was merely reorganiz­
ing its economic system. It felt that collective intervention of any 
kind was repugnant. It also raised the political question of whether
OQ
Ibid., (1954), p. 32.
29Article 15 states, "No state or group of States has the right 
to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the 
internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing prin­
ciple prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of inter­
ference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or 
against its political, economic, and cultural elements."
30Article 19 states, "Measures adopted for the maintenance of 
peace and security in accordance with existing treaties do not con­
stitute a violation of the principles set forth in Articles 15 and 17.!
31C. G. Fenwick, "Intervention at the Caracas Conference,”
AJIL (V. 48, 1954), p. 451.
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the O.A.S., acting in accordance with existing treaties, could come 
to a decision that would lead it to intervene in the domestic affairs 
of a state under the pretense of a threat to the peace that did not 
exist. It further raised the question of whether the dominance of a 
state by the international Communist movement would actually con­
stitute a threat to the independence of the American states as a group.
It might be mentioned that the Mexican delegation, and others 
as well, pointed out that the "existing treaties" referred to in the
Dulles resolution do not say a thing about collective action in sup-
33port of democracy or human rights.
Somewhat reluctantly, the Mexican delegation signed the recom­
mendations condemning extension of Communism in the Americas. As Dr. 
Howard F. Cline has pointed out, the final version differed consider­
ably from the one the United States delegation, headed by Secretary
34of State, John Foster Dulles, had hoped to have passed.
32Ibid.; see also Cline, p. 313-
33Ronning, p. 74.
34Cline, p. 314. See also U.S. Department of State, Report 
of the Delegation of the United States of America with related docu­
ments : Publication 5^92 (1955).
FOREIGN POLICY UNDER PRESIDENT ADOLFO LOPEZ MATEOS (1958-1964)
NEW INTENSITY
The administration of President Adolfo Lopez Mateos intensified 
Mexico's activity in international matters. The word "intensified" 
is very important in this respect, for although Mexico changed none 
of her principles, the effect was a very new outlook on her part, and 
a new character in the eyes of others. The new aim was to accelerate
the economic development of the country through the use of inter­
national cooperation on an appreciable scale. Naturally, with the 
intensification of international activities in general, some phases 
would perhaps be affected more than others. In this case, inter­
national cooperation was stressed more, by comparison with its former 
role, than was any other policy.
Arturo Gonzalez Cosio, presidential assistant under President 
Lopez Mateos and professor of law and politics at the National Uni­
versity of Mexico, has said that the advent of the Lopez Mateos
administration brought with it evidence of the need for Mexico to
project herself externally. The new government exhibited a rising
interest in establishing closer cultural and economic ties with other
1countries of the world, especially with the rest of Latin America.
Arturo Gonzalez Cosio, "International Policy in Mexico," from 
speech given in India in February, 1964. From copy of the author's 
manuscript, privately printed, p. 2.
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Previously, Mexicofs Latin American policy had developed mostly 
within the concepts of Pan Americanism. Some authorities imply, how­
ever, that Mexico seems to have decided that this may not have been 
sufficient.
Reality begins to impose itself in the face of a superstructure 
little suited and somewhat artificial. The Latin American Free 
Trade Association, created in i960, on the periphery of the 
Organization of American States, translates the existence of eco­
nomic interests common to and exclusively for the Latin American 
countries. It may be converted with time into^the first step 
toward an economic community of Latin America.
Thirty years of internal peace made the new, stronger, and 
more active bilateral and multilateral links with other countries 
possible. Before that, Mexicofs basic international principles of 
non-intervention and self-determination, resulting in a modified 
political isolation for the country, had remained unaltered since
1910.5
Under Lopez Mateos, treaties were negotiated directly between 
him and the leaders of other countries, diplomatic missions were given 
embassy status everywhere, and diplomatic relations were established 
with many new countries. He visited sixteen nations, something which 
would have been unheard of for previous post-revolutionary presidents. 
With the exception of short visits of a few days, none of them had
4set foot outside of Mexico during their term of office. "Thus,” 
claims Arturo Gonzalez Cosio, ’’Mexico has increased her interest in
2 ^  ^Castaneda, Mexico: 50 anos . . ., p. 312.
3There was the brief and unsuccessful exception in her inter­
nationalist position at the San Francisco Conference, as indicated 
above, p. 138.
^Adolfo Lopez Mateos, Informe (1964), p. 515.
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the problems of the world and has doubled her participation in inter-
5national organizations."
Mexico took part in the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Santiago, Chile, in 1959. The meeting 
was convoked due to tensions among some of the Latin American countries 
Mexico approved of several proposals tending to secure peace and con­
tinental friendship through the strict observance of the non-interven- 
tion principle and the exercise of representative democracy.
The Guatemalan Dispute. Mexico and Guatemala had a serious 
dispute in 1959 over an attack made by Guatemalan airplanes on Mexican 
fishing boats, ostensibly fishing in Guatemalan waters. Relations 
between the two countries were broken and nationalist sentiment was 
vigorously stimulated on both sides. Mexico stood steadfastly by her 
"irreproachable international position."^ Guatemala reacted in a 
similar vein.
In such cases, Mexico often insists upon a judicial solution, 
even where there may be doubt as to jurisdiction. One might ask 
whether a court per se always offers the best or the only solution.
Nevertheless, efforts were made for achieving a peaceful and
7moderate solution. This was accomplished six months later.
Sanctions against the Dominican Republic. In I960, Mexico
■^ Arturo Gonzalez Cosio, p. 1.
^Lopez Mateos, Informe (1959), p. 19.
7Ibid.. pp. 19-21.
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voted to apply sanctions to the Dominican Republic after it was agreed 
in the Organization of American States that the government of Rafael 
Leonidas Trujillo had interfered in Venezuelan affairs, due to its 
participation in an attempted assassination of President Betancourt. 
This will be discussed later, as it must be differentiated from 
Mexico’s actions in 1964 in refusing to apply sanctions against Cuba 
after another alleged violation of Venezuelan sovereignty. If such 
a differentiation cannot be made, then Mexico’s policies are not at 
all stable on the point of when and when not to apply sanctions and 
break relations.
The rupture of relations with the Dominican Republic came in 
the Sixth Meeting of Consultation called by Venezuela at San Jose, 
Costa Rica.
The Assembly at Costa Rica had accepted the facts gathered by 
an O.A.S. investigating team, and had collectively convicted the 
Trujillo government of complicity in the assassination attempt. All 
delegations agreed that the immediate embargo of arms and other war 
implements was requisite. This, in effect, had already been done. 
Therefore, the sanctions consisted of adding other items to the pro­
hibited list. The Conference also recommended that member states 
break diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic, thus isolating 
it diplomatically until it should cease to be a threat to the peace 
and security of the continent.
Mexico, which had long opposed the Trujillo dictatorship on 
ideological grounds, nevertheless took the lead in opposing a proposal 
by the U.S. delegation that the O.A.S. supervise free elections in the
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Dominican Republic to establish democracy. This would have given 
unprecedented authority to collective intervention. Although osten­
sibly aimed at Trujillo, it could also be applied to Cuba or any other 
nation. The United States suggestion was dropped, reflecting the 
almost universal sentiment of the Latin American nations.
Mexico broke relations with the Dominican Republic on August 
g
21, I960. At the same time, all arms shipments were suspended.
Mexico concurred. While signaling the responsibility of the Dominican 
government, she opposed, in support of the principle of non-interven- 
tion, any other measures that might be taken which could have implied 
interfering in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic, or 
which could have affected its vital interests. Nevertheless, Mexico 
broke relations in deference to her responsibilities in the inter- 
American community. Furthermore, she recognized the validity of the 
accusations against the Trujillo government.
The Seventh Meeting of Consultation. The Seventh Meeting of 
Consultation was also held in i960 at San Jose. Its object was to 
examine situations relative to the maintenance of the peace, security, 
and prosperity of the continent. "Mexico's actions in this conference 
were inspired exclusively by the traditional principles of our foreign 
policy and with the firm proposition of seeking the unity and harmony
8See: Cline, pp. 314-315-
9 ^Lopez Mateos., Informe (i960), p. 94. See also: Cline,
pp. 314-315.
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of the American republics.
The meeting produced the "Declaration of San Jose de Costa 
Ilica." Mexico voted in favor of it because she believed the declara­
tion fortified two cardinal principles on which Mexico has always 
based her international position: those of non-intervention and of
self-determination of peoples. This document condemns the interven­
tion or threat thereof by extracontinental powers into the affairs 
of the American republics, actions to which Mexico has always been 
firmly opposed.
MEXICO’S POSITION ON THE INTERNATIONAL CODIFICATION OF 
THE NON-INTERVENTION PRINCIPLE
In September of 1964, before a United Nations Commission,
Mexico had an opportunity to reiterate her position on non-intervention. 
The commission met in Mexico City to discuss the codification of inter­
national law regarding four points: the prohibition of the use of
force, the peaceful solution of conflicts, the sovereign equality of 
states, and non-intervention. Mexico was naturally very pleased to 
see these principles, all of which form important parts of her foreign
policy, recognized by the United Nations in such a way. She felt that
12their importance was thereby underscored.
^^Lopez Mateos, Informe (i960), p. 9^ *
11Ibid.. p. 95.
12 ^Jorge Castaneda, Speech, "Intervencion," El Dia (September 
4, 1964), p. 8.
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As head of his delegation, Jorge Castaneda delivered a speech 
in the name of Mexico to the Commission on September 22, 1964. It 
dealt with the "obligation of non-intervention in the internal affairs 
of states." In it, Dr. Castaneda said that intervention is the same 
as the denial of the fundamental rights of a state, of its independ­
ence, and its sovereignty. "In America," he said, "there are no 
distinctions between licit and illicit interventions."^^
The Mexican delegation implied that the right of legitimate 
defense represents an exception to the basic principle of international 
relations which prohibits the use of force. The only cause for its 
employment is defense from an armed attack, nothing else. In this
respect, Dr. Castaneda said that the Charter totally substituted
14previous international law.
He continues with the observation that the term "force" can, 
in the opinion of the delegation of Mexico, include certain forms of 
economic and political pressure. It must be noted, however, that the 
San Francisco Conference rejected a proposal that Article 2, para­
graph 4, of the Charter should include economic aggression.
Mexico's main concern at the meeting of the Codification Com­
mission was to preserve the contents of Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter in its strictest sense— that is, that legitimate de­
fense cannot be justified after any act other than armed attack. She
13Ibid.
14Ibid.
15See Appendix A, U.N. Charter.
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would like to see the absolute principle of non-intervention expanded 
to cover many situations which previously were not considered to be 
within the scope of the non-intervention question. She opposes any 
attempt to amplify or expand the list of acceptable cases in which a 
state may act concerning the affairs of other states or exercise "self- 
defense11 without it being considered as intervention. Mexico supported 
U.N. Resolution 2131 (XX).
The speech of Jorge Castaneda serves to illustrate just where 
Mexico stood under Lopez Mateos in any such meeting concerning inter­
national law. Her position has not altered since. Her concept of 
international law is very restrictive as to a nation's right of 
individual self-protection. She is sometimes willing to admit that, 
to date, her interpretation of the law is not universally accepted, 
even in international bodies.
Conclusion. Under President Lopez Mateos, therefore, Mexico 
increased her activities in the field of international cooperation.
She became more active both in bilateral relations and in international 
organizations. Nevertheless, she had reservations about resolutions 
made through these international organizations. Lopez Mateos stated 
in 1961,
The postures of countries like Mexico which desire to maintain 
their liberty of judgement, have been made more delicate and 
hazardous, exposed to being badly interpreted or badly treated 
with regard to their very foundations. . . . Mexico . . . seeks 
conciliatory solutions which make international friendship pos­
sible, . . . consecrated by the very Charter of the United Nations. 
Mexico sees a danger that the United Nations will move away from 
the principles of the Charter and not complete its goals: col­
lective security is in danger here. Mexico will maintain
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unalterable her . . . fidelity to this principle which is basic 
to modern international organization, since it is the very goal^ 
of the United Nations and the Organization of American States,
Lopez Mateos worked to increase the ‘’solidarity" among Latin 
American countries. In doing so, he maintained a firm anti-colonial
position, "championing law against political interests based uni-
17laterally on force or on the necessities of the moment." The govern­
ment intensified the establishment of special missions for more direct 
contact with groups from other countries and stressed the values of 
cultural exchange, something scarcely emphasized previously. "The 
Mexican Revolution has made possible national stability through im­
portant transformations which have created a social ideology directed
18toward goals which encourage our personal progress." The Lopez 
Mateos administration continued these transformations which affected 
Mexico!s progress. In 1961, President Lopez stated,
. . . States, above all those medium or small ones which, like 
Mexico, need peace to be able to decide the solutions for their 
problems, find themselves . . . subject to pressures and opposing 
currents, in the midst of which the necessity of pacifying the 
spirit and turning to the strict application of the law and of 
the laws of humanity is called for. . . . Mexico has worked hard 
toward this end, . . . encouraging respect for the dignity of man 
as a subject of social justice, for the liberty and independence 
of peoples, and for the . . . sovereignty of states in all at­
tributes, especially that of deciding their own internal and 
external affairs. . . . When we strive for absolute respect for 
the principle of self-determination of peoples, . . .  we don’t 
pretend that nations should convert themselves into islands, 
foreign to the realities of our world; on the contrary, we are
^Ltfpez Mateos, Informe (1961), pp. 226-22?.
j 7 Lopez Mateos, cited in A. Gonzalez Cosio, p. 8.
18T 1^Ibid.
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convinced that this principle doesn’t impede, but rather, helps 
the states to collaborate in facilitating spiritual and material 
conquests for humanity.
Finally, under Lopez Mateos, Mexico strongly emphasized three 
special subjects, i.e., the proscription of nuclear experiments, 
universal disarmament, and international cooperation for the utiliza­
tion of outer space for pacific means. She also led the campaign for 
a treaty which would make Latin America a permanent denuclearized 
zone. She had stepped out of her isolationist role.
In summary, the foreign policy of the Lopez Mateos government 
included the following important points: increased international
cooperation; respect for self-determination; respect for non-inter- 
vention; participation in the maintenance of world peace; moral 
support for those desiring independence from colonialism; increased 
cultural, technical, and commercial relationships with other countries; 
encouragement of direct contact by leaders; and encouragement of 
closer relationships among Latin American nations.
Nevertheless, one authority does not believe that Mexico had 
outgrown all of her isolationist attitudes by 1962. Referring to the 
Mexican tendency to see good in leftist movements simply because they 
are leftist, and to oppose actions taken against the government of 
Fidel Castro, Daniel James observed:
Did all this mean that Mexico was pro-Communist or pro-Castro? 
. . .  It did not. It simply meant that Mexico had not quite out­
grown certain revolutionary prejudices and shibboleths, had not 
become completely attuned to the new times and their new demands, 
and had not yet fully grasped the meaning of the most important
ig
Lopez Mateos, Informe (1961), pp. 222-223.
political phenomenon to appear since her revolution: modern
totalitarianism. . . . Mexico, that is to say, had become con­
servative in the fundamental sense of the word and in the 1960fs 
still adhered inflexibly to beliefs more apropos to the 1920's. 
She had also become, in the process, isolationist.
lie then notes that this isolationism made Mexicans unwilling 
to resolve the dichotomy between professions of high ideals and con­
flicting realities. They are reluctant to become involved in the 
problems of other nations. He speculates that the Mexicans fear 
plunging into the complex uncertainties of the cold and alien world 
outside their frontiers which might affect their internal progress.
He then grants that Mexico is definitely in the process of growing
20out of her conservatism and her isolationism. This is precisely 
what the record of the Lopez Mateos administration demonstrates.
James, pp. 420-422.20
CHAPTER IX
MEXICAN ATTITUDES ON THE QUESTION OF CUBA
The question of Cuba is illustrative of the problems which
surround Mexico's firm adherence to the principle of non-intervention.
In many cases, Mexico has stood alone in her opinions on problems
which concern Cuba. As Arturo Gonzalez Cosio expresses it, "In the
case of Cuba, as in other cases, Mexico has maintained that other
countries should practice the principle of non-intervention in the
sphere of self-determination. She has, herself, chosen to favor
1bilateral relationships."
MEXICO'S ATTITUDE ON CUBA, 1959-1963
Mexico's attitude toward Cuba since the revolution has been 
sympathetic, although moreso at first than later. She continues to 
believe that Cuba has been the victim of uncalled-for interventions 
by other countries. Mexico does not recognize that any illegal 
interventions in Latin America have been committed by Cuba. She does, 
however, say that Cuba could have been more discreet or correct in 
her activities. Mexico blames the Cubans for aggravating others un­
necessarily, but says that this is not cause for intervention.
In the opinion of most Mexican officials and intellectuals, 
ideas cannot be repressed or restricted. Consequently, if Cuba ex­
ports only ideas, then she should not be condemned for doing so.
Arturo Gonzalez Cosio, p. 12.
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Looking back, Mexico remembers adverse world reactions to her own 
revolution. She sees the Cubans repeating her own experiences to some 
extent.
THE INITIAL PERIOD OF U.S.-CUBAN ANIMOSITY
When problems began to arise between the United States and 
Cuba in early i960, Mexico made attempts to bring about solutions 
through the use of her good offices and mediation. During June, i960, 
Lopez Mateos expressed publicly the sympathy and understanding of the 
Mexican people for the "legitimate aspirations of the people of Cuba 
for political, social, and economic betterment." He said, further, 
that the unity of the American states doesn't result only from their 
juridical and political organization. "Our Republics constitute a 
family of nations formed in history and for history. . . .  In this 
family, . . . Cuba has a place of distinction in her own right." 5
When President Lopez Mateos expressed sympathy for the revolu­
tionary aspirations of the Cuban people, he clearly placed them within 
the sphere of inter-American solidarity. He said, "Our republics 
constitute a family of nations. . . .  We must all try to maintain 
unity, peace, and concord inside of historical common causes.
President Lo'pez Mateos urged the application of the principle 
of non-intervention with respect to Cuba. But Mexico has never
2Lopez Mateos, Informe (i960), p. 95.
3Ibid.. p. 96.
^Lopez Mateos, Informe (1961), p. 228.
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suggested that this principle be observed by one group of states only, 
since she considers that the vigor of the doctrine depends upon the 
universality of its application. Cuba is expected to do her part.
The problem is that Mexico cannot recognize Cubafs actions as con- 
stituting any sort of illegal intervention.
Mexican reaction to the Cuban missle crisis. During the so- 
called "Cuban Missle Crisis" of October 1962, the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs were called informally to Washington. The gathering soon 
turned into a formal Organ of Consultation. On October 23, a resolu­
tion was adopted unanimously,^ which called for the immediate dis­
mantlement of bases, and the retirement of the projectiles and other 
offensive arms. This resolution recommended that the member-states 
take necessary individual and collective action to prevent Cuba from 
receiving this class of military equipment, even permitting, if neces­
sary, the use of armed force. Mexico voted in favor of the resolution, 
with the express stipulation that force would be used only within 
constitutional limitations. Mexico approved the agreements which 
were forthcoming between the United States and the Soviet Union.
MEXICOfS ATTITUDE REGARDING THE CUBAN ARMS CASE, 1964
Background. When another crisis arose in the Organization of
5Ibid.
^"Eighth Meeting of Consultation," Americas (Washington, D.C.: 
Pan American Union; November, 1963), p. 1.
7
Lopez Mateos, Informe (1963), p. 408.
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American States concerning Cuba, continental unity was not forthcoming. 
Mexico did not concur in the opinion of the majority, and tensions 
ran high. This problem is good proof of the deep-seated difficulties 
which are still prevalent in the inter—American system concerning 
Cuba. It also clearly illustrates Mexico's philosophy concerning the 
question.
The controversy arose due to the discovery that Cuba was pro­
viding arms to Venezuelan rebels and terrorists in Venezuelan terri­
tory. On Venezuela's initiative, the Ninth Meeting of Consultation 
of Foreign Ministers was called on November 29, 1963> in accordance 
with Article 6. The acts which that country denounced were corroborat­
ed by an Investigating Committee appointed by the Meeting. This com­
mittee confirmed that a shipment of arms to Venezuela which was 
landed surreptitiously on the coast was, indeed, Cuban. It also con­
firmed the discovery of a subversive plan to prevent the elections 
that were ultimately held on December 1, 1963. The committee said:
. . . The Republic of Venezuela has been the target of a series 
of actions sponsored and directed by the Government of Cuba, 
openly intended to subvert Venezuelan institutions and to over­
throw the democratic Government of Venezuela through terrorism, 
sabotage, assault, and guerrilla warfare.
The sanctions applied to Cuba include the following: the
breaking of diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba; the suspen­
sion of trade with Cuba except in foodstuffs, medicines, and medical 
equipment sent for humanitarian reasons; and the suspension of air 
and sea transportation and of all direct communication with Cuba.
"Ninth Meeting of Consultation," Americas (August, 1964), p.  7.
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The Cuban government was "condemned emphatically for its acts of 
aggression and of intervention against the territorial inviolability, 
the sovereignty, and the political independence of Venezuela." Bolivia, 
Chile, Uruguay, and Mexico voted against these measures.^
The Official Mexican position. Lopez Mateos delineated the 
problem from the Mexican point of view in his Informe of 1964.
In the seat of the Pan American Union in Washington . . . 
beginning July 21, the Ninth Meeting of Consultation took place.
Its object was to consider certain accusations of the Venezuelan 
government concerning acts by the Cuban government, which the 
former considered as being injurious to the sovereignty of its 
country. The accusation, presented seven months before, was 
founded on the terms of Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance. Mexico abstained from voting for the reso­
lutions twice; when the Council of the Organization of American 
States constituted itself into a Provisional Organ of Consultation, 
in order to do this thing, and when it resolved to call the Meet­
ing of Consultation. The foundation for our abstentions was, in 
both cases, that Mexico holds serious doubts as to the legality 
of judging, in the light of that treaty, the acts denounced by 
Venezuela.
The Ninth Meeting of Consultation decided to dictate various 
coercive measures against Cuba, among which was that of not main­
taining with its government any diplomatic relations, which, in 
fact, only four nations of America held at the time, anyway. The 
conference agreed that the right of legitimate defense, individual 
or collective, could be extended to the employment of armed force, 
even in the case that the supposed aggression did not constitute 
an armed attack.
In view, first, that the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance did 
not foresee the application of the aforementioned coercive measures 
in its Article 8, in situations of the nature of those examined 
in the Meeting of Consultation, and second, that the enlarging of 
the right of legitimate defense . . .  is incompatible with the 
dispositions of Articles 3 and 10 of the Treaty, I resolved that 
Mexico will continue her diplomatic relations with Cuba. The 
government of Mexico acts in good faith, . . . and we have de­
clared our intention to adhere to the result of a consultative
9Ibid., p. 1.
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opinion of the Court of International Justice . . ..^since we 
consider it a matter of highly juridical character.
Ambassador Vicente Sanchez Gavito was Mexico's special delegate 
to the conference. His statements are indicative of Mexico's firm 
position against these sanctions and her legal thinking on the subject.
[We have concluded] that it has not been shown that the invio­
lability or the territorial integrity or the sovereignty or the 
political independence of Venezuela have been affected in any of 
the ways described in Article 6 of the [Rio] Treaty. The latter1s 
objective . . . is principally the maintenance of a system of 
collective defense against the possibility of armed attack from 
the outside . . . The peace in Venezuela has not been altered, 
and the situation that existed there six months ago was brought 
under control by her Government— which had the primary respon­
sibility for it— and it at no time represented a threat to the 
peace of the Hemisphere. . . . Therefore, it seems evident that 
the Organ of Consultation is not called upon to adopt measures 
"to assist the victim of the aggression" or for the common defense 
and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent.
It follows even less that the breaking of diplomatic and con­
sular relations with Cuba should figure among these measures. As 
is well known, only four of our countries maintain diplomatic 
relations with the Cuban Government. It would be completely 
irregular and even contrary to the concept of the juridical equal­
ity of states if measures were adopted here that^jffected only a 
minimal part of the members of the Organization.
Mexico's basic argument, then, was as follows: The peace and
internal security of Venezuela had not been altered. Proof of this 
is that it was the government of President Romulo Betancourt which 
first denounced the act, and many months later, another government, 
that of Raul Leoni, continued the denunciation, after an election had 
been successfully held. The conclusion is that the situations previewed
10Lopez Mateos, Informe (1963) from collection Seis Informes 
de gobierno (Palacio Nacional, Mexico City: Secretaria de la Presi- 
dencia), pp. 513-514.
11"Ninth Meeting of Consultation," Americas, p. 10.
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in Article 6 of the Rio Treaty were not present in this case.
Mexico does not accept collective intervention of any sort, 
but only "collective self-defense", which is different. She will 
also not accept what she considers a false interpretation of the Rio 
Treaty. If one or more of the contracting parties insists on vio­
lating the Treaty, Mexico will object and will not comply with the
12resultant violation.
A possible alternative resolution. On July 23, when it appeared 
that the necessary majority for approval of sanctions against Cuba 
might not be forthcoming, the United States and Brazil joined in pro­
posing a project for a resolution which would not require sanctions 
to be instituted against Cuba, but which would serve as a warning to 
that country. It would still result in the acceptance of Venezuela's 
accusations, something which Mexico opposed.
The alternate resolution provided for the following: the
condemnation of aggression against the sovereignty or political in­
dependence of any of the American States, and reiteration of the firm 
position to assure mutual defense on the basis of the O.A.S. Charter 
and the Rio Treaty. The acts of subversion directed against the 
Venezuelan government by the government of Cuba, through sabotage,
12 ^Dia (July 27, 1964), p. 5- The rather extensive use of 
the newspaper, El Dia, which will be noted in this section, is due to 
the paper’s policy of reprinting speeches and documents extensively.
It must be noted, however, that the editorial slant of the paper is 
definitely leftist, although it is not a communist paper. It often 
expresses an anti-American attitude and reflects a very nationalistic 
point of view. Nevertheless, it does give other points of view a 
hearing.
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arms shipments and guerrilla warfare, would be classified as an ag­
gression which doesn’t constitute an armed attack as stipulated in 
Article 6 of the Hio Treaty.
Should the Cuban government repeat any such subversive acts 
in the future, the alternate resolution continued to say, the Organ 
of Consultation would be called upon to decide what measures to take 
as foreseen in Articles 6 and 13. A warning would be given to the 
Cuban government that if it persisted in committing acts of subversion 
against other American states, the member states would take the steps 
they considered appropriate, in accordance with paragraph 3 of the 
second resolution of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation, for their 
individual or collective defense, and would cooperate to augment 
their capacity to stop menaces or acts of aggression, or other dan­
gers to the peace and security which would result from the interven­
tion in the hemisphere by Sino-Soviet powers, in accord with the 
obligations established in treaties and agreements.^
Mexico did not approve of this resolution, either. It was 
set aside when it became clear that a stronger measure could be passed.
Mexican publie opinion. In Mexico, this controversy caused 
intense emotions to arise in support of Mexico’s position. She was 
the only country which ultimately refused to comply with the decisions 
of the meeting. In the expressions of support for the Mexican govern­
ment’s stand, many of the other sentiments which are prevalent in
13E1 Dia (July 24, 1964), p. 1 .
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Mexico regarding foreign affairs, came to the fore.
Newspapers and officials of the government instituted a massive 
propaganda effort to generate the support of Mexican public opinion. 
Official statements, as well, reflected intense emotional reactions. 
Among the larger periodicals, only Excelsior supported the position 
taken by the majority in the O.A.S. and urged Mexico1s compliance 
with it.
One Mexican used the opportunity to challenge United States 
"interventions11 in the past. Writer Angel Guerra said,
. . . Wasn’t it an act of multilateral intervention ten years 
ago which John Foster Dulles managed to achieve against the 
legitimate government of Guatemala? Is it possible to deny, in 
the light of the texts which define intervention, that Cuba has 
been the victim of incessant acts of intervention on the part of 
the government of the United States? Isn’t it true that other 
Hispanic American governments have committed similar acts, al­
though less vigorous and numerous, against the Cuban government? 
The intervention of the United States in the case of Cuba has 
been frequently of military character; it has been economic and 
cultural; it has been menacing against the personality of the 
state. But this has not seemed bad to the Ilispanic-American ^  
governments which today ask for sanctions against Cuba. . . .
Ramon Beteta, editor and publisher of the newspaper Novedades, 
speculated that had an O.A.S. been able to collect a sufficient num­
ber of votes against Mexico’s own revolution fifty years earlier, 
the revolution might have been destroyed. He said that it was not 
that Mexico did not want to comply with a treaty, but rather that 
said treaty was not applicable in the case in question, and that 
questions of law are not decided by votes. "The O.A.S. is not a 
judge. That which is wanted now is to destroy Castro, and to that
14E1 Dfa (July 23, 1964), p. 5.
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end Mexico cannot follow her Latin American brothers, nor her cousin, 
the United States.
An editorial in El Dia relates directly to a question discussed 
in Part I, concerning the nature of the Organization of American 
States.*^
It is clear . , . that the O.A.S., as an association of free 
states, not only cannot weaken the particular sovereignties, but 
it erects over its foundation a solid guarantee of the independ­
ence of its components. . . .  No human grouping nor any alliance 
among nations can suppose the renunciation of personality. Its 
foundation is cooperation to achieve common objectives, and this 
is perverted and denied when any faction tries to impose a parti­
cular orientation upon the group. It is with this understanding 
that Mexico forms a part of the O.A.S. . . .
Note that Mexico appears to adhere firmly to the concept that 
the O.A.S. is a mere grouping of states, not an individual legal 
entity in itself, and that it is, therefore, subject to Article 15 
of the O.A.S. Charter.
Dr. Javier Rondero, noted Mexican professor of international 
law, and former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, reveals a curious con­
ception of the legislative workings of the Organization of American 
States when he says,
Mexico respects and complies with her given word, but she has 
to reject the contention that the varying theses of a reduced 
group of individuals from the Council of the O.A.S. can arbitrarily
15Novedades (August 7, 1964), p. 1.
16See Chapter II for discussion of the subject.
17El Dia, Editorial (July 22, 1964), p. 5. This is the same 
reasoning as that given to the author concerning the same subject, 
by Lie. Arturo Gonzalez Cosio in a private conversation in September, 
1964, in Mexico City.
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dispose of her sovereignty, direct her foreign relations, and 
dispose . . .  of her army how and when they please, pretending to 
interpret, thereby, an international treaty in a way which per­
verts its nature. It is a recognized principle of international 
law that treaties are obligatory only under the terms that are 
stipulated, and that they are not obligatory when the parties 
. . . pervert the meaning, the goals, and the very nature of the 
pact. . . . Mexico's posture is that of defense of the basic 
principles of its foreign policy: non-intervention and self de­
termination of peoples. . . .
Juan Jeronomo Beltran, a leftist writer for El Dia. views the 
semantical problem of the difference between aggression and subver­
sion, as they relate to the problem, as follows:
That which was done at Punta del Este and ultimately in Wash­
ington, has been to expand the Charter and the Rio Treaty. Mexico 
has not approved these expansions through the necessary organs as 
required in our Constitution—  . . . Aggression is an act or 
series of acts whose end is that of domination of a state, its 
territory, and its population against its will, by another state 
for the latter's benefit. It is the illegitimate use of force 
by one state against another.
Subversion, on the contrary, is activity against the authori­
ties of a determined state, aided by the very nationals of that 
state; it is an activity aimed at subverting the constituted order 
and installing another. It is punishable by the public law and 
penal codes of each country. . . .  by domestic legislation.
. . . As they have identified aggression with subversion, so 
will all "castrocommunist" discontent be labeled subversion, and 
automatically be transformed into aggression . . . The Council 
of the O.A.S. may be called upon to repress it in every case 
The exclusion of Cuba is an evident violation of the (Rio) Treaty, 
since such a sanction does not exist in this instrument. . . .
It is an alteration and violation of the O.A.S. Charter and the 
Rio Treaty. . . . y
Another Mexican writer, Elias Tarquf, complains that United 
States diplomats make an art of using semantical tricks to justify
18El Dia (July 24, 1964), p. 6. 
^El Dia (August 9, 1964), p. 9.
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unjustifiable acts. He also accuses the United States of indifference 
toward international law and treaties.^ 0
In November 1964, President Lopez Mateos gave a speech to a 
Meeting of the Mexican Academy of International Law. Concerning the 
topic under discussion, he said,
. . . Our traditional policy, which sustains that only within 
the norms of law can international coexistence be built, and which 
is based on mutual respect, justice, and the rule of reason, has 
guided the acts of my government . . .  In every international 
tribunal, we have defended the right of peoples to signal their 
own road. . . .  We have also defended the belief that non-inter­
vention and self-determination are emminent juridical forms which 
could conduce us to peace. If there is inequality among men and 
states, there will never be a just peace . . .
There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Mexico's stand.
It is its correctness and reasonableness which is under question.
--fop United States point of view concerning Mexico's position. 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk explained the North American point of 
view at the opening of the Meeting of Consultation.
Our governments acted firmly against a right-wing dictator 
[i.e. Trujillo] which projected the assassination of President 
Betancourt in I960. It accorded the sanctions in a unanimous 
vote. Now, I ask, can we do less against a left-wing dictator, 
who tried to assassinate democracy in Venezuela?
In the opinion of my government . . . there is no doubt that 
the Rio Treaty clearly recognizes multiple forms of aggression
20El Dia (July 30, 1964), p. 7 .
21
Adolfo Lopez Mateos, Speech to Mexican Academy of International 
Law, reported in El Dia (November 17, 1964), p. 3 .
22No doubt the use of "assassinate" above would be included 
under the semantical trick" classification to which one Mexican 
writer objected earlier.
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and provides the effective machinery for defense against them.
. . . Terror, sabotage, and guerrilla action, as practiced by the 
international communist movement, constitute forms of aggression 
as dangerous as an armed attack. . . .
. . .  Our central task in this hemisphere is that of promoting 
progress and liberty. This is the goal of the Alliance for 
Progress. . . . Doubt means destruction. Our Charter obliges 
each country . . .  to seek and to reinforce representative demo­
cracy, without which . . . material progress is a blind under­
taking, . . . without spiritual dignity.
Faced with Mexico's intransigence and with the resulting strain­
ed emotions, Under Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs,
Thomas C. Mann, tried to smooth matters over in a dinner speech.
. . . Whatever be the problems which separate us, the ties 
that bind are much firmer . . . Mexico sees communism as the 
simple conjunction of Marxist theories, while the North American 
State Department sees communism as a menacing military force 
which we see at the very doors of our country.
Ambassador Adlai Stevenson declared on November 6, 1964, that 
in his opinion,
. . . the family of American nations will accept Cuba's return 
to the O.A.S., only if that country ceases the foreign domination 
of its territory, and also if Cuba stops intervening in the in­
ternal affairs of other states . . .
He said, however, that although lamentable, Mexico's decision was an 
exercise of her own sovereignty.
Opinions on Mexico's position from other Latin American states. 
Recognizing Mexico's importance in the hemisphere, El Tiempo of Bogota 
said, "Mexico is a factor of harmony in the Continent. . . . The
2^E1 Dfa (July 22, 1964), p. 4.
24Novedades (July 24, 1964), p. 1.
25New York Times (November 7, 1964), p. 6.
position of Mexico is deplorable in that it will alter the harmony of
26the continent. . . . 11
La Prensa of Lima criticized the position taken by Mexico in 
the following words:
The Mexican "record" of the invariable doctrine of non-inter­
vention is spent and broken and America knows it perfectly well.
. . .It is contrary to the alleged devotion of Mexico to the 
principle of non-intervention, carried to an almost absurd ex­
treme. In its eagerness to disregard an agreement overwhelmingly 
approved by the majority of the countries of the hemisphere, the 
Mexican chancellory suggests recourse to the International Court 
of Justice, where judges would "intervene" in the matter— largely 
extracontinental judges, among them the enemies of America— and 
. . .9Khere a simple majority is enough to pass whatever resolu­
tion. '
What La Prensa was saying, in effect, was that Mexico was re­
fusing to recognize the realities and exigencies of power politics 
which determine the relationships among states to such a large extent. 
Mexico would like to believe that the International Court of Justice 
is a strong and objective body which is above politics. That most 
other nations do not agree with this position is indicated by the 
fact that few matters of truly great political significance or of 
national security are brought before the court. They consider the 
court to be very weak and pusillanimous.
All the nations of the hemisphere, with the exception of Mexico, 
Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia, voted in favor of the resolutions. Many 
of these countries were critical of Mexico’s refusal to comply with
El Tiempo, Bogota, Colombia (August 1, 1964), p. 12.
La Prensa, Lima, Peru (August 3> 1964), p. 1 .27
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the majority decision.
Dr. Alberto Herrera, the Foreign Minister of Guatemala, pin­
pointed the crux of the problem regarding Mexico's position on the 
O.A.S. resolution against Cuba.
Mexico will violate the Rio Treaty if she does not act upon 
the resolutions accorded by the O.A.S. regarding Cuba. All the 
member states of the O.A.S. are obliged to comply with the major­
ity decisions. The resolutions decided upon in no way interfere 
with Mexico's sovereignty because they are based upon a treaty 
freely ratified by the Mexican government. The International 
Court of JusticeQdoes not have jurisdiction for interpretation of 
the Rio Treaty.
Therefore, while it may be a matter of interpretation of the 
Rio Treaty, that interpretation was not for Mexico to make, but rather
for the majority under the conditions specified. The majority made
the decision and Mexico refused to comply.
The Chilean government, for example, disagreed with the intent
of the sanctions and it voted against the resolution. Nevertheless, 
when the vote was taken, Chile recognized the authority of the major­
ity in this case and complied. That she would continue to do so was 
uncertain, but she did comply on this occasion.
Chile's opinions coincided with those of Mexico, to a great 
extent, regarding the resolution and its employment in the case in 
question. Foreign Minister Julio Philippe Izquierdo expressed Chilean 
sentiments as follows:
28
$ee: El Siglo, Bogota, Colombia (August 1, 1964); El Espec- 
tador, Quito, Ecuador (August 1, 1964); El Dia (August 9, 1964), p. 9; 
Americas (August, 1964), PP. 7-10.
*^E1 Dfa (August 9» 1964), p. 9-
177
. . . The Chilean government . . . believes . . . that the
group of measures in Article 8 of the Treaty . . .  are not the
suitable ones. Already many American countries, exercising their 
sovereign faculty, have unilaterally adopted measures that are 
now proposed as collective ones. It would seem just that those 
countries which, like Chile, have not taken them, should continue 
to have the necgssary freedom to determine the convenience of 
adopting them.
Radomiro Tomic, Chilean Ambassador to the United States, ex­
plained that Chile would not unilaterally initiate a movement to re­
establish diplomatic relations with Cuba, but that in his opinion, 
the issue did need to be examined. He said further that the Chilean
government would have to establish diplomatic and commercial rela­
tions with the "socialist countries".
Relations are from state to state, not from state to doctrine. 
Chile does not help anyone by mutilating her relations and by 
denying that communist governments exist. We will . . . have_ 
relations with countries, without ideological discrimination. 51
This appears to be both a partial affirmation of the Mexican 
Estrada Doctrine and of Mexico's position on the Cuban issue under 
discussion.
OBSERVATIONS
It is this writer's opinion that many of Mexico's protestations 
concerning the O.A.S. decision to apply sanctions to Cuba and to re­
quire that all members of the O.A.S. break relations with that country, 
appear in part to be rationalizations. "She doth try too hard, and 
she doth protest too loudly." It is like the child explaining all the
30Americas (August 1964), p. 9.
31Radomiro Tomic, as quoted in El Dia (November 7 , 1964), p. 1.
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reasons why he did not make up his bed, when the truth is simply that 
he did not want to.
Several questions come to mind when pondering Mexico's reactions 
on this subject. First, how can legalistically-minded Mexico accept 
such a unilateral interpretation of the law, just because she dis­
agrees with the result? In doing so, she opposed the legal decisions 
of an organization which she joined freely and in good faith. Second­
ly » even granting that ”that which happened in Venezuela occurs every 
few days” in Latin America, what can the objection be to doing some­
thing about one of the causes?
Furthermore, some of the charges made by Mexicans need to be 
answered, to clear up misconceptions. On page 171, Javier Rondero 
questions the right of lfa reduced group of individuals from the Coun­
cil of the O.A.S.,f to ’’arbitrarily” decide questions relating to 
Mexican sovereignty and foreign relations. In fact, the representa­
tives from each state have the authority to act in the name of their 
constituents. In doing so, they follow the dictates of the Charter. 
Mexico is either a party to the O.A.S. Charter and the Rio Treaty or 
she is not. It is a simple matter.
It does not seem to occur to the Mexicans who so sharply
criticized the honest intentions of the representatives of other
Latin American countries at the meetings, that perhaps these other
32nations felt a real fear of Castro. In a voting system, the pur­
pose of discussion prior to a ballot is precisely to try to convince
32See: El Dxa (July 27, 1964), p. 1 .
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those opposing one's own point of view to change their minds. If such 
persuasion is used, there is no reason to charge sinister implications.
The O.A.S. operates under such a voting system. Granted, pressures
were no doubt applied to urge delegates to change their votes, but 
this is an inevitable preliminary to a voting process.
The observation by La Prensa of Lima, that the International 
Court of Justice could "intervene" by a simple majority in matters of 
vital importance to hemispheric security, is a very important point, 
one which Mexicans, in general, have ignored.
By deriding the O.A.S. decision and the United States govern­
ment which led the fight for its adoption, Mexico's refusal to do 
what she did not want to do appeared more justified in the eyes of 
many who became influenced emotionally. Nevertheless, it would seem 
that a treaty commitment by the Mexican government is subject to its 
own interpretation and convenience, even after the treaty is signed.
If the government does not agree with the interpretation of the major­
ity, even if such interpretations are legally binding in the statute 
and the Mexican government agreed to such beforehand, it will inter­
pret the meaning out of it, if necessary.
Such a tactic is always a possibility when treaties are signed.
But the Mexicans appear to particularly adept at such rationalizations, 
basing their arguments on what they consider or claim to be legal 
considerations.
In this case, carrying Mexico's traditional reasoning and gen­
eral international legal logic through to their obvious conclusions, 
Mexico's refusal to comply with the majority in this case signified
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breaking her bonds to the Rfo Treaty. Furthermore, the correct step 
would have been for Mexico to withdraw from the O.A.S. since she did 
refuse to comply with what a two-thirds majority legally decided was 
necessary to implement the collective security provisions of the 
Charter and the Rfo Treaty. Since no one wanted Mexico's withdrawal, 
however, the matter was not pressed.
CONCLUSION
In this case, there was possibly more than one valid point of 
view. The determinant may be the ideological orientation of the na­
tions involved and that which each desires for the hemisphere. At 
times, Mexico seems resigned to giving in to subversive pressures 
concerning the rest of the continent, rather than endure the probable 
l°ng years of countering the subversive elements wherever they should 
decide to appear, and the implied instability and violence that in­
evitably will occur.
It is doubtful, however, in the opinion of Daniel Cosio Villegas, 
that Mexican officialdom will ever allow a pro-Castro movement to 
cause its ouster without a struggle, or submit Mexico to any foreign 
hegemony. In the name of the Revolution, it will defend itself if 
necessary, just as Venezuela and others have had to do. He says, in 
fact, that although Mexico may think that "castrocommunism" could be 
suitable for other parts of Latin America, she herself is very con­
tent with her own revolution and does not need Communism. He states 
that, should there seem to be a real threat by "castrocommunism" in 
Mexico, or any other movement derived from the exterior for that
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matter, the Mexican government will certainly not look the other way. 33 
The problem is that while Mexico might be able to prevent such a take­
over in her own country, other, weaker countries cannot do so without 
outside help.
The Cuban arms case was more complicated, however, since in 
that situation differing ideologies definitely came into play. Legal 
rules were called upon in support of each. Finally, the issue was 
resolved in Mexico's favor since no one was willing to sacrifice or 
damage the inter-American system further over it. Sanctions were 
applied, but Mexico was not pressed to comply, since she obviously 
would have had to leave the system if that had been done.
33Cosfo Villegas, p. 148.
CHAPTER X
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
MEXICAN PHILOSOPHY AND ATTITUDES IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Although Mexico is proud of her independent and unattached 
role in the Cold War, it may be suggested that geographical circum­
stances have aided her in this fortunate position. Although she has 
suffered interventions at the hands of the United States and European 
powers in the past, her proximity to the United States and her posi­
tion of being somewhat set off from Europe and Asia, as is all of 
Latin America, have allowed her to practice her policies of non­
intervention and semi-isolationism without having to suffer conse­
quences, as would Turkey or Greece, for example.
Mexico’s basic aspirations are common to most small powers. 
These aspirations are those of universal peace, economic progress, 
and the preservation of the independence of the smaller powers. To 
achieve these aims, Mexico seeks the application of the principle of 
non-intervention for individual countries and for international organi 
zations as well. She rigidly stresses the idea of the respect for 
the domestic jurisdiction of nations and emphasizes the function of 
law as a criterion for resolving international questions. Her philoso 
phy is that adherence to a doctrine advocating the sovereign equality 
of states requires a normative universal order which applies itself 
objectively to all states. She believes that a political solution 
admits the action of factors which reflect to a greater extent the
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inequality among states.'1’
Mexico is to be applauded for attempting to carry on her foreign 
policy on the basis of firm, legal and moral principles. Many nations 
have claimed to do so, although usually they have not. Mexico is not 
always successful herself, but, like others, she is reluctant to admit
Mexico seems to have taken much of the diplomatic rhetoric at 
face value and tries to live up to the principles and legal norms 
which have been spoken of so often in governmental circles. That it 
is in her national interest to do so cannot be denied. She has been 
fortunate in having leaders who have seen the benefit of insisting 
upon independence of action in the long run, although perhaps it has 
meant sacrificing momentary financial or political gains. Neverthe­
less, there could occur conditions which might induce Mexico to sacri­
fice her principle of non-intervention for some other principle. She 
has often, however, been critical of others for following their in­
terests instead of ’’accepted principles of international law.”
1erhaps Mexico to date has been very fortunate in having many 
of her interests coincide with what she considers these principles to 
be. In the case of the Cuban sanctions in 1964, 2 Mexico's interests 
did not run according to the principles as seen by the rest of the 
American states, so Mexico in effect changed these principles as they 
applied to her, as she saw fit, until they coincided with policy as
See: Castafieda, Mexico y el orden . . . , p .  201. 
^See: Chapter IX.
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she wished to practice it. Mexicans would deny this, but this writer 
believes the contention to be valid.
It is doubtful that Mexico could easily change her traditional
foreign policy. It would be an extremely difficult transition. Very 
often she feels called upon to pronounce principles which allow her 
to stay out of world conflicts which others have felt it their re­
sponsibility to enter.
In spite of the foregoing, Mexico maintains a stringent anti­
colonial position. She encourages immediate independence almost 
everywhere, believing that the people of a country can solve their 
problems better than anyone else. This policy is backed up by Mexico’s 
"traditions and historical reasonings."^
Mexico expects full respect from other nations and attempts to
reciprocate in kind. She believes that no matter how powerful a
nation may be, it is not capable of imposing itself on a nation which 
desires to be free. Therefore, no intervention for any reason is 
justifiable. Mexico, in her strict autonomous foreign policy, is in 
many ways separated from the Western European tradition in aims, 
principles, and policies. She does not condone the arms race or the
3As Jorge Castaneda has said, there is relatively little dis­
cussion in depth in Mexico on the various aspects of principles and 
policies relating to international affairs. Consequently, the strong, 
one-sided, governmental propaganda effort to "educate" the Mexican 
people in this field might have a difficult time reversing itself.
It is probable, also, that Mexican diplomats would find it difficult 
to make a reversal in their thought processes concerning their foreign 
policy. See Castaneda, Mexico y el orden » . ., p. 1 3.
4Gonzalez Cosfo, p. 8.
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anti-communist position of the United States, which she considers 
unnecessarily rigid.
196l, when Guatemala accused Mexico in the Organization of 
American States of harboring mercenaries, Mexico called for an inves­
tigation. She denied that her territory was permitted to be utilized 
for the traffic of arms destined to foment subversion in other coun­
tries, or for organizing expeditions against other governments.
There is speculation, however, that indeed the Mexican terri­
tory is used for traffic in propaganda and subversive personnel.
Since hers is the only Latin American country which has direct com­
munication with Cuba, it is not unlikely that many communist agents 
use Mexico as a thoroughfare to the rest of Latin America.
CONCLUSIONS
Problems. As Dr. Francisco Cuevas Cancino has implied,^ the 
non-intervention principle is a negative one. He says that its use 
has, in effect, meant actual non-leadership on the part of Mexico in 
foreign affairs. Nevertheless, except in a few cases, Mexico has 
been firm in her adherence to the doctrine. This firmness implies a 
kind of leadership, even if it be negative.^
Dr. Cuevas Cancino has stated, furthermore, that,
5
Cuevas Cancino, "Mexico", in Black and Thompson, pp. 649-650.
6Ibid., p. 651.
7Actually, the Mexicans have often reiterated that they do not 
wish to lead Latin America, but merely to participate in the system 
as an equal partner.
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Mexico continues to depend upon a spiritual interpretation of 
history. Her diplomats portray a conscious and voluntary contempt 
for those material things which shape and influence international 
relations. They assume that they can separate the nation's con­
victions from the requirements of her development. . . . There is 
insistence on the necessity of speaking about peace in a world 
which denies coexistence, about disarmament . . .  in the midst 
of a gigantic arms race, when even the majority of Latin A m e r ic a n  
nations are heavily armed. . . .
He says that since details do not form a part of Mexico's 
personality, they receive relatively little attention. For this rea­
son, the logical implementation of the principles supported by Mexico 
has sometimes been ignored.
According to Dr. Cuevas, furthermore, ,fThe fixed goal of 
independent Mexico has been to develop as a Western c o u n t r y . I n  
the meantime, outside of a few exceptions in international organiza­
tions, she has adhered rigidly to lines of foreign policy which are 
not very flexible. "Mexico . . . has not mixed the needs of the peo­
ple with the direction of her international conduct. 1,10
The idea of "dignity and firmness" in foreign policy are 
continually alluded to in official speeches. 11 Mexican officials 
seem to believe that it is enough to rely on these tw~o maxims; they 
recognize few demanding ties to the great struggles of the world.
Mexico prefers to contribute to international affairs the benefit of
Cuevas Cancino, in Black and Thompson, p. 652.
^Ibid., p. 650.
10Ibid., p. 658.
11
See any of the presidential Informes presented to the Mexi­
can Congress on September 1 of each year.
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her good example. This scorning of material interests is one of the 
distinctive characteristics of Mexico's foreign policy. She separates 
what her ideal position should be in the eyes of the world from the 
benefits which a policy linked more closely to the world of today 
might give her. Other, less isolated, nations try constantly to 
solicit aid from the opposing power blocs. In Dr. Cuevas' opinion, 
Mexico continues to insist upon alienating her international conduct 
from the needs of her people.
It is a stand determined by tradition. It is a stand which 
Mexico interprets as being in the best interests of her people in the 
long run.
Observations. Mexicans believe that their adherence to the 
policy of non-intervention is the most propitious method of ensuring 
independence, self-determination, and economic and social progress 
for Latin America. This is largely due to her historical experience. 
She dislikes hegemony on the part of any nation.
Nevertheless, neither adherence to international law alone, 
nor to the doctrine of absolute non-intervention, both of which 
Mexico encourages, seem to be enough to prevent more successful ef­
forts at interference by foreign powers in Latin America. This is 
because subversive agitators and many communist governments do not 
conform to traditional or to inter-American international law, unless 
it be merely to gain some advantage.
Cuevas Cancino, in Black and Thompson, p. 634.
188
Recognizing the fact that Mexico does not see a threat by 
communism per se to the independence and well-being of Latin America, 
it is difficult to reason with Mexico that she should oppose such 
influence. Isidro Fabela*s statement that "No one is ever hurt by 
words or ideologies" has influenced many Mexicans. 1 "5 She therefore 
tends to give subversive elements the benefit of the doubt when faced 
with the possibility of counter-subversive action on the part of 
legitimate governments. Such actions are more easily identified and 
labeled than is subversion itself, and Mexico often tends to oppose 
the more obvious danger rather than the more serious one. Furthermore, 
she does not seem to recognize that these so-called "ideologies" are 
but tools in the hands of very powerful national states.
The United States has felt it her responsibility to try to 
counter Communist—bloc activities in the Americas, since she is the 
only country with enough power and funds to aid other countries in 
this problem. She has been directly involved in counter—subversive 
activities while aiding other governments.
This high—lights two different points of view. Mexico believes 
that the people of a country will eventually choose the government 
they most want (through revolution if necessary), if left alone by 
other countries. The United States, on the other hand, denies the 
simplicity of the notion and its validity, since propaganda and sub­
versive and terrorist techniques, have been refined to the point of 
preventing free choice, especially in under-developed areas; and, the
Isidro Fabela, Intervencion. p. 94.11
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it is relatively strong internally, its appreciation of the necessi­
ties of counter-subversion seems to be limited. Its policy is not 
conducive to teaching Mexico much about this through secondary or 
actual experience during the last decade. Mexico must remember that 
the Cuban Revolution is a phenomenon of less than ten years. Policies 
formulated prior to that time may need to be reevaluated, although 
not necessarily changed.
Mexico's policies are in harmony with one of the dominant 
trends in the continent, namely that of trying to achieve greater 
exactitude and scope for the principle of non-intervention. She ex­
presses a desire to protect the economic and social rights of man. 
Nevertheless, due to the third trend mentioned at the beginning of 
this paper, that of the refinement of subversion techniques and their 
intensified use by foreign powers in the Western Hemisphere, Mexico's 
insistence on non-intervention does seem to be affecting the achieve­
ment of the second goal, namely the protection and guarantee of human 
rights.
PART III 
CONCLUSION
chapter XI
CONCLUSION
It cannot be denied that the principle of non-intervention has 
had great import on the American continent, whether in theory, in 
practice, or as a moral force. To most Latin Americans, non-inter­
vention is a law which must not be violated. They also consider it 
a moral standard which prevails even in cases of violations of the 
democratic principle or of human rights.
The matter is not clear-cut, however, due to the fact that 
there are many definitions of intervention and no one of them is ac­
ceptable to all. Furthermore, there is also a question as to the 
legality of intervention, individual or collective, under specified 
conditions. Nevertheless, given a broad prohibition of intervention, 
several questions remain.
What, for instance, are nations to do about others which do 
not recognize or abide by international law? Harlan Cleveland, U.S. 
Under-Secretary of State, has observed,
The great problem facing the world is indirect aggression.
. . . Cuba, Laos, and others are the marchlands of mutual inter­
vention. We have friends and enemies in each. . . . Yet in aid­
ing or opposing one we too often find ourselves caught in a 
conceptual traffic jam ci'eated by our inherited concepts of inter­
national law^while Communist guerrillas rush past in the fast 
outside lane.
This is an unfortunate truth, one which many idealists refuse to
Harlan Cleveland, Speech before the Chancellors Dinner, Syra­
cuse University, U.S. Department of State Bulletin (Vol. LXIV, No. 
145, May 7, 1961), p. 858.
192
recognize.
Adlai Stevenson noted in a General Assembly debate on Cuba, 
that the United Nations is designed to preserve and defend the terri­
torial integrity and political independence of its members.
We have dealt with the problem of preventing armies from march­
ing across borders, but what of political independence? . . .
The free nations of the world cannot permit politica^ conquest 
any more than they can tolerate military aggression.
Is the United Nations capable of protecting the political independence
of its members? To date, this seems doubtful.
Thirdly, doesnft the continually expanding fabric of common 
interest among nations make interferences inevitable? Much that 
occurs in one nation affects other nations directly or indirectly. 
Where is the dividing line, in such cases, between interference and 
intervention? As one authority has said, n. . . It is often diffi­
cult to draw a precise line between delations1 and 1 conditions1 in 
3other countries. 11
In this context, a Latin American writer, Manuel Lopez Rey, 
has noted, "Reality shows . . . that the internal and external poli­
cies of a country are more and more influenced, even subordinated, 
to an internal or regional situation which affects the concept and 
the exercise of national sovereignty." His opinion is that the dif­
ference between the roles played by large and small powers has 
diminished. As a consequence, he observes that national policies
2Adlai Stevenson as quoted by Harlan Cleveland, U.S. Department 
of State Bulletin (Vol. LXIV, No. 145, May 7, 1961), p. 861.
3Edward G. Miller, Jr., "A Fresh Look at the Inter-American 
Community," Foreign Affairs (July 1955), p. 634.
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rarely can be articulated today from a purely national point of view 
and secondly, that political instability, born of pure national in­
terests, affects both national life and the formulation of effective 
international policies. In fact, the existence of the international 
community of nations imposes an interdependence on nations.^
As early as 1936, during the Spanish Civil War, the Spanish 
Republican Foreign Minister complained to the League of Nations, "It 
is becoming more and more difficult to draw a clear line between what
is the internal affair of a nation and what may be regarded as a
nmatter of international concern."
Speaking of mutual involvement, another Latin American, Luis 
Quintanilla of Mexico, said in 1943,
Inter-Americanism implies not only feelings, . . . but specific 
commitments. Inter—Americanism . . . makes it impossible for any 
of us to ignore the fate of our neighbors . . . and gives us 
specific instructions on what to do if something happens to 
those neighbors . It is thus a continental blow to disorderly 
laissez faire internationalism. . . . Whether in the national or 
the international field, human progress may be defined as the 
transition from the illusion of independence to the necessity of 
interdependence. . . . The^test of America lies in its ability 
to democratize life. . . .
That the non-intervention doctrine may in fact be outdated is 
noted by Harlan Cleveland.
My concern with international organizations is their potential 
for action. . . . Perhaps they alone offer breakthrough possibilities
Manuel Lopez Rey, "Panorama de la situacion y politica inter- 
nacional," Politica (Vol. Ill, No. 27; Venezuela, October 1963), p. 13.
5
League of Nations, Official Journal (Annex 1628, January 1937),
p. 35.
^Quintanilla, A Latin American Speaks, p. 240.
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in rethinking the old doctrine of non-intervention in the domes­
tic affairs of other nations. This doctrine has been the self- 
denying ordinance under which the democracies have labored through­
out the twentieth century, an unenforced Sullivan's Law that 
disarms the householder but never bothers the burgler.
In other words, he sees collective intervention as being a 
possible solution for the concern which develops due to problems 
arising from mutual international involvement in mutual problems. 
Although he favors applying the same rules to all, he notes realisti­
cally that a double standard is applied to most of the real problems 
in the real world.
And finally, Carlos Lacerda of Brazil emphasizes inter-American 
mutual involvement as follows:
. . . Within certain reasonable margins to respect ancient 
concepts of the sovereignty of nations, it is necessary to recog­
nize that peace and war, prosperity and poverty, education and 
ignorance are phenomena to be treateg on a worldwide scale, or 
at least in continental proportions.
At the same time, it has been generally recognized, and af­
firmed by the United Nations, that governments are under a legal 
obligation not to intervene unilaterally by engaging in propaganda, 
official utterances, or legal action with the intent or likelihood 
of inciting sedition or revolt against the government of another
state. The present obligation to respect the territory of others
9includes the obligations to abstain from and prevent aggression,
^Cleveland, p. 860.
8Carlos Lacerda, "A Federation of the Americas,” Speech of 
March 20, 1962, Vital Speeches (Vol. XXVIII, 1961-62), p. 430.
9See Appendices A and B, U.N. and O.A.S. Charters.
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subversive intervention,"*^ and other injurious activities. The last 
arises, according to Quincy Wright, from the general principle of Sic 
utere tuo ut non alienum laedas £So use your own as to riot injure 
others].^
Wright also observes that subversive intervention and aggres­
sion should be kept distinct, "because the remedies are different." 
[Note that Mexico and Chile have continually emphasized this point.] 
Wright continues,
Subversive intervention is difficult to define because the 
propaganda, infiltration, and subversion which it utilizes seem 
to be protected by the recognized human rights of freedom of 
opinion and freedom of communication across national boundaries.
Furthermore, he believes, probably correctly, that the right 
of revolution would be impeded by a rule which forbade all outside 
communication, travel, trade, and financial aid to the revolutionaries.
Successful revolutions have usually depended on some outside contacts 
and assistance." Finally, Wright notes that if subversive inter­
vention succeeds in bringing about a revolution and the setting up 
of a de facto government, international law permits, if it does not 
require, the recognition of that government after it has become firmly 
established through acquiescence of the people.^
10,„ , „ bee Appendix J, Resolution 2131 (XX).
11Quincy Wright, "Is Discussion Intervention?", AJIL, LIV 
(I960), p. 528. ----
12 Ibid.. Here Wright notes the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, Article 19.
13Ibid., p. 530.
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It seems important, therefore, that international law define
subversive intervention clearly. It needs to be distinguished from
permissible international communication, trade, travel, and financial
assistance on the one hand, and from aggression against which the
use of armed force is permissible on the other.
14United Nations Resolution 2131 takes a big step in this 
direction, but that it has been entirely successful is doubtful. 
Propaganda, infiltration of foreign governments or organizations, 
commercial controls, and other actions by a government intended to 
incite aggression or sedition are illegal. Nevertheless, these things 
continue to occur, under the excuse of upholding the ’’right of revolu­
tion" or some other apology. Sometimes they occur with no apologies 
or excuses given, or with very transparent ones at best.
Again one comes to the distinction, mentioned in Chapter I, 
between juridical intervention and political intervention. It has 
been acknowledged that most types of intervention are illegal. 
Politically, however, foreign governments, diplomats, or their agents 
can incite sedition or revolution in another country and in doing so, 
break no actual law except the one which prohibits such incitement. 
Since the guilty party is usually difficult to identify categorically, 
or to prove guilty, the law is ineffective and may be impossible to 
invoke. Thus, we arrive at political intervention.
The Havana Tricontinental Conference was overtly aimed at in­
citing revolutions throughout Latin America and the rest of the world.
14 / xSee Appendix J, Resolution 2131 (XX).
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It is an example of both juridical and political intervention. It 
openly endorsed subversive intervention, yet little has been done by 
the nations of the free world to meet the Tricontinental challenge.
The O.A.S* merely passed a resolution, which at the most, symbolized 
continental unity and recognition of the threat. Little of practical 
value will probably come of it. At the United Nations, the O.A.S. 
resolution was scornfully answered by Fidel Castro, then forgotten.
Given the determination of the Communist powers to cause the 
overthrow of any governments not of their system, given the fact 
that the United States1 national interest compels her to oppose the 
Communist aims in whatever ways she can, and given the fact that many, 
if not most, Latin Americans oppose these aims, it is conceivable 
that the principle of non-intervention is insufficient for protecting 
the continent. The Communists use the principle but do not abide by
it when it does not suit their interests.
It is doubtful that the United States can afford to do less 
for her national interest, even if this might mean intervention in 
certain cases. She might, of course, attempt to intervene political­
ly before resorting to overt illegal intervention. Nonetheless, it
15must be kept in mind that, as was noted earlier in this paper, 
government officials will not only be concerned with what the law is 
and with its interpretation, but will be concerned equally with 
whether or not the law should be observed in a given instance. They
will sometimes believe that it is wise or reasonable to break the law.
*^See page 18.
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Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach have noted that,
• . . the present posture of world politics is scarcely favor­
able to the development of, or reliance upon, universal legal 
rules. All systems of law tend to break down in crisis situa­
tions. In such situations, there is major provocation to act1 / 
politically with little deference to preexisting rules. . . .
In many respects, the Cold War has presented the United States with
just this type of crisis situation, in that her national security is
severely threatened, as is the security of the non—communist parts
of the continent. The problem is that even in a crisis, she must
try to view her national interest from a long range as well as a short
run standpoint. Where intervention fits in and how purely politically
beneficial a decision is in the long run is always questionable.
The United States demonstrated such a political decision when 
she unilaterally sent troops into the Dominican Republic in 1965. 
Nevertheless, she rapidly demonstrated, as well, her preference for 
collective intervention under the auspices of the O.A.S. She recog­
nized that collective intervention was more legal under American 
international law. In fact, the United States was largely responsible 
for the formation of the O.A.S. peace force in that situation.
In spite of the realities which the nations of the continent 
must face due to Communist ambitions and subversion, the principle 
of non-intervention does have importance in the Americas. In the 
first place, the fact that it is considered important by most Latin 
Americans places an inhibition upon a state which would openly and 
indiscriminately intervene in another’s affairs. The widespread U.S.
Kaplan and Katzenbach, The Political Foundations . . ., p. 6.
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interventions in Central America and the Caribbean during the early 
part of this century probably will not, for example, be repeated.
Another connected factor is the Latin American need to adhere 
to some ideology, some principles, which could serve them as emotional 
guides. Latin Americans are very idealistically motivated.1  ^ The 
ideology encompassing firm adherence to “self-determination and non- 
intervention1’ is one emotional diplomatic staple; that of Communism 
is another, as a’e democracy, capitalism, and others on varying levels. 
Some have a stronger hold during one epoch than do others. Today, 
Communism is a powerful challenger to democratic ideals in Latin 
America.
That Latin Americans often appear to adhere rigidly to the 
doctrine of non-intervention in the face of cold logic may be a mani­
festation of the strong emotional adherence by Latin Americans to a 
favorite principle or ideology. It is this writer’s belief that, 
with this fact in mind, the United States should gradually but firmly 
make known her intention to recognize in practical terms that the 
principle of non-intervention may be more limited than heretofore 
admitted as it relates to collective intervention by the O.A.S. Since 
any attempt to effectively restrict subversive intervention through 
purely legal channels would also interfere with the right of revolu­
tion and other freedoms, another strategy for countering Communist
17James L. Busey, MThe United States and the Political Crisis 
of the Hemisphere," Speech presented to the Southwestern Political 
Science Association, April 7-9, 1956; New Orleans, La. (Privately 
printed), pp. 25-26.
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subversion and plans for power must be employed.
Diplomacy, military aid, economic and technical aid, educa­
tional exchanges, and many of the other classic methods for winning 
and aiding friends in Latin America are good but are not enough. 
Often, in fact, they have helped to perpetuate systems which are as 
oppressive as any Communist government would be. At any rate, some­
thing more is needed.
Since the Communist nations fully intend to continue their 
infiltration and subversion in Latin America, they must be countered 
on their own terms. They must be harassed as they harass others.
What is needed as a very important supplement to the above is a 
strategy which would combine non-intervention and national and inter­
regional security.
Democracy cannot be imposed or forced upon a people. The best 
that can be done is to provide a climate where it can be tried and 
where, hopefully, governments can be changed when necessary.
It is not inconceivable that the O.A.S. can be responsible for 
providing this climate as it has done in the Dominican Republic. 
Intervention occurred there, but it was to benefit the Dominican 
people. It was this that Mexico, Chile, and Uruguay chose to ignore. 
They preferred anything which might have occurred rather than see 
their sacred cow called "non-intervention" be compromised. But this 
writer believes that the collective intervention which took place by 
the O.A.S. Peace Force was preferable to another Communist takeover. 
It was also preferable to continued unilateral intervention by the 
U.S., which no doubt would have continued had the O.A.S. not stepped
201
in.
Unilateral U.S. intervention is unpopular with all countries 
ol Latin America. Nevertheless, it does and will occur whenever the 
national interest of the United States requires it. How much more 
agreeable that the O.A.S. take it upon itself to protect its own 
domain, and thereby lessen the necessity for U.S. intervention!
This may be asking too much of the O.A.S. or of any such multi­
national democratic assembly which is predicated on compromise or 
weak determination for positive action. Nevertheless, were the United 
States to make known the following, perhaps the O.A.S. would respond 
to its responsibility: (l) That subversion and civil disturbance in
Latin America will be countered by the same in Cuba by U.S. (or O.A.S.) 
agents; (2) that political parties supported by outside Communist 
powers or their agents will be countered by support given to other 
worthy parties by the U.S. (or the O.A.S.); (3 ) that the U.S. (or 
the O.A.S.) will feel called upon to intervene to protect self- 
determination where it is endangered by a Communist coup d1etat or 
revolt, and will stay until free elections are held and after if 
necessary; (4) that military and economic aid will be offered through 
U.S. (or O.A.S.) offices with strings attached, which seek to ensure, 
as does the Alliance for Progress somewhat unsuccessfully, that the 
benefits accrue to the whole population, and that dictators receive 
no extra protection unless they are deemed necessary for a transi­
tional and stabilizing period in some country; (5) that the U.S. (or 
the O.A.S.) will not hamper any refugee or private para-military 
organizations which wish to menace Cuba, until Cuba restricts her
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| agents from doing the same in the rest of Latin America; (6) that 
cheap, colorful, easily obtained periodicals and pamphlets which 
I portray the O.A.S., the U.S., and general democratic points of view 
[ will be provided in great quantity by the U.S. (or the O.A.S.) to 
counter the Communist literature of the same sort which one finds in 
such profusion in Latin America.
In other words, the U.S. (or the O.A.S.) will commence to deal 
harshly with the Communists and will no longer apologize for whatever 
firm actions it may take. In this matter, the U.S. will announce 
her intention to act. It will announce that the O.A.S. may take the 
responsibility in these areas wherever it wishes, but that if the 
O.A.S. does not act, the U.S. will.
It is assumed that, generally, the O.A.S. member countries 
would prefer collective action to unilateral U.S. action. They might 
overcome their reluctance to accept this responsibility when the 
appreciation of the values accruing from positive action were once 
realized and when there was absolute certainty of U.S. action in 
case of O.A.S. abstention.
In whatever case, it is doubtful that the principle of non­
intervention will ever be observed absolutely in the hemisphere by 
any side. Since it was first considered there has been debate over 
what it encompassed and over what exceptions to it were legal or 
permissible. Now, while the debate continues, there are those who 
either ignore the principle or skirt it, aiming to achieve the over­
throw of the very legal system which encompasses the non-intervention 
principle. That the principle should be employed as a means for
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bringing about its own demise and the demise of other principles which 
it was designed to protect, such as human rights and self-determina- 
tion, is absurd.
Mexico’s adherence to the above principles offers her apparent 
security in her foreign policy. It is comforting to adhere to an 
ideology or to principles which appear to stand firm in the face of 
all adverse international situations. Nevertheless, Mexico’s guiding 
principles may be dangerous to her in the long run, if viewed as 
panaceas for international action, something which many Mexicans do. 
While Mexico castigates the United States and others for "interven­
tion, ” ignoring many of the interventions of the Communist bloc 
nations and their agents, the wrath of international public opinion 
is turned against Mexico’s friends in the West. Consequently, one 
of the Communist goals relating to world public opinion is satisfied 
by a member of the O.A.S, itself.
Mexico believes that the results of non-intervention would be 
the lesser of several known evils. The validity of her assumption 
is questionable, as is her foresight in ignoring the unknowns.
Just as the prohibition laws were unenforceable in the United 
States in the 1920’s, so may the law of non-intervention be unenforce­
able internationally in the 1960’s. As a consequence, one-sided 
adherence to the law puts that side in jeapordy. The free world 
might better recognize the impossibility of enforcing an absolute 
principle of non-intervention and announce its intention to intervene 
equally when others do if it so desires.
It is doubtful that non-intervention can ever attain absolute
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practical legal acceptance in the Americas. It might be an admirable 
goal to strive for were the stakes not so high. The debate over the 
subtleties of interpretation will no doubt continue, while factual 
interventions occur in practice. The national security of the United 
States and the Latin American nations require this.
It may be speculated that the attempt to make non-intervention 
an absolute legal prohibition is going farther than any of the earlier 
adherents of non-intervention had believed necessary or beneficial, 
even past the limits of reality. Until there is some central inter­
national authority capable of enforcing absolute non-intervention by 
one state in the affairs of another, it will remain unenforceable.
By the time a central authority has the power to enforce non-inter­
vention, the states will already have given up a great deal of their 
sovereignty. Such a relinquishment would probably give to the central 
authority areas of sovereignty which interventionary actions violate 
today. Consequently, much of the problem will have been eliminated 
anyway.
Realistically, nations should perhaps recognize non-interven- 
tion as a moral law, not a legal one. Nations should leave others 
alone whenever possible. They certainly should not attempt to cause 
the overthrow of a foreign government.
Nevertheless, the reasons why these things occur are well- 
known and numerous. Self-interest plays a big part. Attempting to 
make all intervention illegal creates an impossible situation, since 
any law strict enough to curb all intervention (assuming it could be 
enforced) would necessarily curb other freedoms as well. Therefore,
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seeing non-intervention as a moral invective seems to be a more real­
istic viewpoint.
Whether the O.A.S, will accept more actual responsibility for 
countering and preventing Communist subversion and terrorism is still 
questionable. It seems likely, however, that should the U.S. recog­
nize, respect, and act upon the Latin American need for ideological 
justification in diplomacy, that a positive counter-subversion pro­
gram comprising positive action could perhaps win the confidence of 
many Latin Americans. Throughout their early history they have 
tended to respect strength. Many more seem to be beginning to re­
spect responsibility. Perhaps both could be combined in such a 
positive program. However, it would have to respect non-intervention 
in internal affairs strictly in times of internal peace while con­
tinuing to realize inter-American mutual responsibility for provision 
of a favorable continental environment, conducive to peaceful civil 
progress.
It appears that the non-intervention principle has an important 
place in the diplomacy of the Americas, as either a moral or a legal 
standard. But to expect, as Mexico does, that nations will or should 
follow it "to show a good example if nothing else" when others are 
violating it to the detriment of the security of the continent or of 
the nations which comprise it, is an assumption too naive to be of 
any but theoretical value in the practical world of international 
affairs.
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Appendix A
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
(excerpts)
We the peoples of the United Nations determined
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice 
m  our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and
ol nations large and small, and
to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obli­
gations arising from treaties and other sources of international law 
can be maintained, and
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom,
and for these ends
to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as 
good neighbors, and
to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security 
and J'
to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of 
methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common 
interest, and
to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic 
and social advancement of all peoples,
have resolved to combining our efforts to accomplish these aims.
CHAPTER I PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES 
Article 1
The purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that 
end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of
219
aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by 
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes 
or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on re­
spect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen univer­
sal peace;
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving interna­
tional problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian 
character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights 
and for fundamental freedoms for all. . . .
Article 2
The Organization and its members, in pursuit of the purposes 
stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following 
principles.
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign 
equality of all its Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights 
and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith
the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by 
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, 
and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner incon­
sistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize 
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the Charter, but 
this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII.
CHAPTER IV THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
FUNCTIONS AND POWERS
_
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Article 11
2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating 
to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before 
it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, 
or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accord­
ance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 
12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the 
state or states concerned or the Security Council or to both. . . .
Article 13
1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make re­
commendations for the purpose of:
a. promoting international cooperation in the political 
field and encouraging the progressive development of international 
law and its codification;
b. promoting international cooperation in the economic, 
social, cultural, educational and health fields, and assisting in
the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all with­
out distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
Article 14
Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly 
may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, 
regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general 
welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations 
resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter 
setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
CHAPTER V THE SECURITY COUNCIL
FUNCTIONS AND POWERS 
Article 24
1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the 
United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,
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and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility, 
the Security Council acts on their behalf.
CHAPTER VI PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Article 33
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is 
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, 
shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, media­
tion, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to 
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their 
own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call 
upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.
Article 34
The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situa­
tion which might lead to international friction or give rise to a 
dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute 
or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international 
peace and security.
Article 35
1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, 
or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the 
attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.
Article 36
1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the 
nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, 
recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any 
procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been 
adopted by the parties.
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security 
Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should,
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as a general rule, be referred by the parties to the International 
Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of 
the Court.
Article 38
Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the 
Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, 
make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settle­
ment of the dispute.
CHAPTER VII ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES 
OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION
Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and 
shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken 
in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore inter­
national peace and security.
Article 41
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving 
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its de­
cisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to 
apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interrup­
tion of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, 
radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplo­
matic relations.
Article 51
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right 
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council 
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right 
of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council 
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of 
the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time
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such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.
CHAPTER VIII REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Article 52
1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of 
regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters re­
lating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are 
appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or 
agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and 
Principles of the United Nations.
2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such 
arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort
to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional 
arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to 
the Security Council.
3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of 
pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrange­
ments or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the 
states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.
4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 
34 and 35.
Article 53
1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize 
such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under 
its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under re­
gional arrangements or by such regional agencies without the authori­
zation of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against 
any enemy state. . . .
Article 54
The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed 
of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrange­
ments or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international 
peace and security.
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CHAPTER IX INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COOPERATION
Article 55
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well­
being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among 
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self- 
determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and 
conditions of economic and social progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, 
and related problems; and international cultural and educational 
cooperation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language, or religion.
Article 56
All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action 
in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the pur­
poses set forth in Article 55.
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Appendix B
CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
(excerpts)
CHAPTER I: NATURE AND PURPOSES
Article 1
The American States establish by this Charter the international 
organization that they have developed to achieve an order of peace 
and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collabora 
tion, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity 
and their independence. Within the United Nations, the Organization 
of American States is a regional agency.
Article 4
The Organization of American States . . . proclaims the follow­
ing purposes:
a. To strengthen the peace and security of the continent
b. To prevent possible causes of difficulties and to 
ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that may arise among the 
Member States;
c. To provide for common action on the part of those 
States in the event of aggression;
d. To seek the solution of political, juridical and 
economic problems that may arise among them; and
e. To promote, by co-operative action, their economic, 
social and cultural development.
CHAPTER 11: PRINCIPLES
The American States reaffirm the following principles:
a. International law is the standard of conduct of States in 
their reciprocal relations;
d. The solidarity of the American States and the high aims 
which are sought through it require the political organization of 
those States on the basis of the effective exercise of representative 
democracy;
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e. The American States condemn war of aggression: victory
does not give rights;
f. An act of aggression against one American State is an act 
of aggression against all the other American States;
g. Social justice and social security are bases of lasting
peace;
h. Controversies of an international character arising between 
two or more American States shall be settled by peaceful procedures;
j. The American States proclaim the fundamental rights of the 
individual without distinction as to race, nationality, creed or sex;
CHAPTER III: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES
Article 6:
States are juridically equal, enjoy equal rights and equal 
capacity to exercise these rights, and have equal duties. The rights 
of each State depend not upon its power to endure the exercise thereof, 
but upon the mere fact of its existence as a person under international 
law.
Article 7?
Every American State has the duty to respect the rights enjoyed 
by every other State in accordance with international law.
Article 13:
Each State has the right to develop its cultural, political 
and economic life freely and naturally. In this free development, 
the State shall respect the rights of the individual and the princi­
ples of universal morality.
Article 15:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly 
or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external 
affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not 
only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted 
threat against the personality of the State or against its political, 
economic and cultural elements.
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Article 16:
No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of 
an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign 
will of another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind.
Article 17:
The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the 
object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures 
of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any 
grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages 
obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be re­
cognized.
Article 18:
The American States bind themselves in their international 
relations not to have recourse to the use of force, except in the
case of self-defense in accordance with existing treaties or in ful­
filment thereof.
Article 19:
Measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in 
accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a violation of 
the principles set forth in Articles 15 and 1 7.
CHAPTER IV: PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Article 20:
international disputes that may arise between American 
States shall be submitted to the peaceful procedures set forth in 
this Charter, before being referred to the Security Council of the 
United Nations.
Article 21:
The following are peaceful procedures: direct negotiation,
good offices, mediation, investigation and conciliation, judicial 
settlement, arbitration, and those which the parties to the dispute 
may especially agree upon at any time.
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CHAPTER V: COLLECTIVE SECURITY
Article 24:
Every act of aggression by a State against the territorial 
integrity or the inviolability of the territory or against the 
sovereignty or political independence of an American State shall be 
considered an act of aggression against the other American States.
Article 25:
If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the 
sovereignty or political independence of any American State should 
be affected by an armed attack or by an act of aggression that is not 
an armed attack, or by an extra-continental conflict, or by a conflict 
between two or more American States, or by any other fact or situation 
that might endanger the peace of America, the American States, in 
furtherance of the principles of continental solidarity or collective 
self-defense shall apply the measures and procedures established in 
the special treaties on the subject.
CHAPTER XVI: THE UNITED NATIONS
Article 102:
None of the provisions of this Charter shall be construed as 
impairing the rights and obligations of the Member States under the 
Charter of the United Nations.
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INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE (RIO TREATY)
Appendix C
Article 1:
The High Contracting Parties formally condemn war and under­
take in their international relations not to resort to the threat or 
the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the provisions of 
the Charter of the United Nations or of this treaty.
Article 2:
As a consequence of the principle set forth in the preceding 
article, the High Contracting Parties undertake to submit every con­
troversy which may arise between them to methods of peaceful settle­
ment and to endeavor to settle any such controversy among themselves 
by means of the procedure in force in the Inter-American System before 
referring it to the General Assembly or the Security Council of the 
United Nations.
Article 3*
1. The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack 
by any State against an American State shall be considered as an 
attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one 
of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the 
attack in the exercise of the Inherent right of individual or col­
lective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations.
2. On the request of the State or States directly attacked 
and until the decision of the Organ of Consultation of the Inter- 
American System, each one of the Contracting Parties may determine 
the immediate measures which it may individually take in fulfillment 
of the obligation contained in the preceding paragraph and in accord­
ance with the principle of continental solidarity. The Organ of 
Consultation shall meet without delay for the purpose of examining 
those measures and agreeing upon the measures of a collective character 
that should be taken.
4. Measures of self-defense provided for under this Article 
may be taken until the Security Council of the United Nations has 
taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security.
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Article 5:
The High Contracting Parties shall immediately send to the 
Security Council of the United Nations, in conformity with Articles 
51 and 54 of the Charter of the United Nations, complete information 
concerning the activities undertaken or in contemplation in the 
exercise of the right of self-defense or for the purpose of maintain­
ing inter-American peace and security.
Article 6 :
If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the 
sovereignty or political independence of any American State should 
be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an 
extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact 
or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of 
Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures 
which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the 
aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for 
the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security 
of the Continent.
Article 7 2
In the case of a conflict between two or more American States, 
without prejudice to the right of self-defense in conformity with 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, the High Contracting 
Parties, meeting in consultation shall call upon the contending 
States to suspend hostilities and restore matters to the status quo 
ante bellum, and shall take in addition all other necessary measures 
to re-establish or maintain inter-American peace and security and 
for the solution of the conflict by peaceful means. The rejection 
of the pacifying action will be considered in the determination of 
the aggressor and in the application of the measures which the con­
sultative meeting may agree upon.
Article 8 :
For the purposes of this Treaty, the Measures on which the Organ 
of Consultation may agree will comprise one or more of the following: 
recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions; breaking of diplomatic rela­
tions; breaking of consular relations; partial or complete interrup­
tion of economic relations or of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, 
telephonic, and radiotelephonic or radio telegraphic communications; 
and use of armed force.
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Article 9:
In addition to other acts which the Organ of Consultation may 
characterize as aggression, the following shall be considered as such
a. Unprovoked armed attack by a State against the ter­
ritory, the people, or the land, sea, or air forces of another State;
b. Invasion, by the armed forces of a State, of the 
territory of an American State, through the trespassing of boundaries 
demarcated in accordance with treaty, judicial decision, or arbitral 
award, or, in the absence of frontiers thus demarcated, invasion 
affecting a region which is under the effective jurisdiction of 
another State.
Article 10:
None of the provisions of this Treaty shall be construed as 
impairing the rights and obligations of the High Contracting Parties 
under the Charter of the United Nations.
Article 17:
The Organ of Consultation shall take its decisions by a vote 
of two-thirds of Signatory States which have ratified the Treaty.
Article 20:
Decisions which require the app ication of the measures speci­
fied in Article 8 shall be binding upon all the Signatory States 
which have ratified this Treaty, with the sole exception that no 
State shall be required to use armed force without its consent. . .
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Appendix D
IMPORTANT CONFERENCES AND MEETINGS CONCERNING THE AMERICAN SYSTEM
First International Conference of American States, October 2, 1889, 
Washington D.C. Attendance: All the American republics then
extant except the Dominican Republic.
Major agenda items: Discussion of problems of mutual interest,
such as peace, trade, and communications.
Outcomes: Formation of the International Union of American
Republics and the ’’Bureau of the American Republics."
Second International Conference of American States, October 22, 1901; 
Mexico City, Mexico. Attendance: All 19 American republics.
Agenda: Discussion of international legal questions, argitra-
tion procedures, and problems of hemispheric peace.
Outcomes: Protocol of adhesion to "Hague Convention for Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes," and Treaty of Arbitra­
tion for Pecuniary Claims.
Third International Conference of American States, July 2 1, 1906; Rio 
de Janeiro, Brazil. Attendance: 19 American republics, ex­
cepting Haiti and Venezuela.
Agenda: Consideration of problem of forcible collection of
debts. Discussion of Drago and Calvo doctrines.
Outcomes: Decision to take the question of forcible collection
of debts to the 2nd Hague Conference. Decison to set up a 
Commission of jurists to draft codes of public international 
law. Convention on International Law.
Fourth International Conference of American States, July 12, 1910;
Buenos Aires, Argentina. Attendance: 20— all the republics
except Bolivia.
Age 11 da: Consideration of various economic and cultural matters.
Outcomes: The Treaty on Arbitration was made of indefinite
duration; it applied Hague Tribunal arbitration rather than 
regional international law. The name of the "Bureau" was 
changed to "Pan American Union."
Meeting of American Institute of International Law, 1916; Washington
D.C.
Agenda: International law discussions.
Outcomes: Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Nations
adopted as a basis for American international law. Stressed 
sovereign independence and equality of every nation.
Pan American Scientific Congress, 1912; Washington D.C.
Outcome: President Woodrow Wilson proposed a Pan American Pact
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for a mutual guaranty of the political independence and terri­
torial integrity of all the republics of the New World.
Fifth International Conference of American States, March 2 5, 1923;
Santiago, Chile. Attendance: 18— all republics except Bolivia
Mexico, and Peru.
Agenda: Discussion of reorganization of the Pan American Union
for the purpose of reducing U.S. dominance. Discussions of 
possible modifications of Monroe Doctrine.
Outcomes: "Treaty to Avoid or Prevent Conflicts Between Ameri­
can States." (Gondra Treaty)
Inter-American Conference of Jurists, 1927; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
Agenda: Codification of international law, with attention to
non-intervention principle.
Outcome: Recommended that 12 projects for codification be
adopted at Sixth Inter—American Conference in 1928, among 
which was included Project II, Article 3: "No state has a
right to interfere in the internal affairs of another."
Sixth International Conference of American States, January 1 6, 1928; 
Havana, Cuba; Attendance: 21——all American republics.
Agenda: Latin American delegates anxious to secure condemna­
tion of U.S. intervention in the Caribbean.
Outcome: "Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the
Event of Civil Strife." (Designed to prevent use of other 
American countries as bases for launching revolutionary activ­
ity.) Decision on non-intervention postponed until later, due 
to U.S. opposition.
International Conference of American States on Conciliation and Arbi­
tration, December 10, 1928; Washington D.C. Attendance: 20—
all republics except Argentina.
Agenda: Problem of arbitration and conciliation of disputes.
Outcomes: General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation.
General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration. Was condemned 
as instrument of national policy, and obligatory arbitration 
of disputes ol a justiciable nature provided for.
Seventh International Conference of American States, December 3 , 1933; 
Montevideo, Uruguay; Attendance: 20— all republics except
Costa Rica.
Agenda: Problem of U.S. dominance and intervention.
Outcomes: "Convention on Rights and Duties of States." Laid
more emphasis on "rights" than on "duties". Triumph for Latin 
American jurisprudence on issues such as recognition, equality, 
non-intervention, the Calvo doctrine and others. The United 
States voted for the Convention, but reserved its rights "by 
the law of nations as generally recognized."
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Inter—American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, December 1 , 
1936; Buenos Aires, Argentina. Attendance; 21— all American 
republics.
Agenda: Security of the hemisphere and the principle of non­
intervention. Met on suggestion of Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
Outcomes: "Declaration of principles of Inter-American soli­
darity and cooperation." Provided for joint consultation in 
event of a threat to the hemisphere. Also, "Additional proto­
col relative to non-intervention." American republics adhered 
to principle of non-intervention, U.S. without reservations.
Eighth International Conference of American States, December 9, 1938; 
Lima, Peru. Attendance: all 21 republics.
Agenda; Considerations of hemispheric security.
Outcomes: "Declaration of the principles of the solidarity
of America." Provided for pacific settlement and illegality 
of force as instrument in national or international affairs”. 
"Declaration of Lima," reaffirmation of continental solidarity 
against all outside intervention. Established the meeting of 
consultation of foreign ministers.
First Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, September 23, 1939; 
Panama City; after start of World War II.
Agenda: Consideration of means for maintenance of neutrality
of the hemisphere.
Outcomes: "Declaration of Panama." General declaration of
neutrality.
Second Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, July 21, 1940; 
Havana, Cuba; after fall of France.
Agenda: Discussion of European possessions in the hemisphere
and danger of their possible transfer to other non-American 
powers.
Outcome: "Act of Havana" and "Convention of Havana," concern­
ing provisional administration of European colonies. Resolu­
tion XV: any attempt by a non—American state against sovereignty
or independence of an American state to be considered attack 
on all. Provided for mutual consultation.
Third Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers; January 15, 1942;
Rio de Janeiro; after Pearl Harbor.
Agenda: Determination of attitude to be adopted by American
republics in the face of attack by a non-American power upon 
an American state and subsequent declaration of war by Germany 
and Italy.
Outcomes: Resolution to break relations with Axis powers.
Establish Inter-American Defense Board. Spirit of continental 
solidarity evident. Promise that New World would not abandon 
the Latin American principle of non-intervention.
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Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace (Chapultepee
Conference); February 21, 19^5; Mexico City. Attendance: all
republics except Argentina.
Agendat Consideration of possible postwar problems.
Outcomes: f,Act of Chapul tepee. n Dealt with acts or threats
of aggression against any American republic.
Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace and Security
(Conference of Rio de Janeiro), August 15, 1947; Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil. Attendance: 20— all republics except Nicaragua.
Agenda: Consideration of proposals for a treaty of mutual
defense of the hemisphere.
Outcomes: "Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance’1
(Rio Treaty)• Provides for regional defense under Article 51 
of the United Nations Charter, allowing for individual and 
collective self-defense.
Ninth International Conference of American States, March 30, 1948; 
Bogota, Colombia. Attendance: All 21 republics.
Agenda: Discussion of means to strengthen the inter-American
system, and to promote inter-American economic consideration. 
Consideration of juridical and political matters.
Outcome: Charter of the Organization of American States adopted.
It is the political, juridical, and economic constitution of 
New World. Also adopted ’’American Treaty on Pacific Settlement” 
(Pact of Bogota), and ’’American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man.1
Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, March 26, 1951; 
Washington D.C.; after Korea.
Agenda: Consideration of problems of communism and hemispheric
security.
Outcome: Recommendation that each republic examine its re­
sources to determine what steps it could take to contribute 
to collective defense of the continent. Recommendation that 
governments examine their laws with view to adopting changes 
considered necessary for prevention of subversive activities 
of communists.
Tenth International Conference of American States, March 1, 1954;
Caracas, Venezuela. Attendance: 20— all republics except
Costa Rica.
Agenda: Consideration of hemispheric policy respecting the
intervention of communism into the Americas. Guatemalan case. 
Outcome: ’’Declaration of solidarity for the preservation of
the political integrity of the Americas against the interven­
tion of international communism.” American states declare 
themselves openly against any Soviet aggression and censored 
all communist activity in the Hemisphere.
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Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, August 12, 1959; 
Santiago, Chile; after April-June disturbances in Caribbean. 
Agenda: Consideration of problems of unrest in Caribbean.
Discussion of problems of democracy and human rights in Latin 
America.
Outcomes: "Declaration of Santiago” concerning assignment of
principles of democracy and respect for human rights. Special 
temporary power to Inter-American Peace Committee to investi­
gate cases of invasions by foreign based rebels.
Sixth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, August 16, I960; 
San Jose, Costa Rica.
Agenda: Action to be taken against the Dominican Republic for
its acts of aggression against the government of Venezuela. 
Outcome: Resolutions— condemning acts of intervention and
aggression against Venezuela and imposing sanctions in accord­
ance with Article 8 of the Rio Treaty, i.e. severing diplomatic 
relations and partially severing economic relations.
Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, August 28, i960; 
San Jose, Costa Rica.
Agenda: Threat of extracontinental intervention in hemisphere
affairs; peace and stability in the Caribbean.
Outcome: "Declaration of San Jose" which (l) condemns . . .
intervention or the threat of intervention, even when condi­
tional, by an extracontinental power in the affairs of the 
American Republics. . . . (3) reaffirms the principle of non­
intervention. . . . (5) proclaims that all member states of 
the regional organization are under obligation to submit to 
the discipline of the inter-American system. . . .
Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, January 22, 1962; 
Punta del Este, Uruguay; following missile crisis.
Agenda: Threats to the peace and to the political independence
of the American states from intervention of extracontinental 
powers. Measures "to eradicate the profound evils of economic 
and social underdevelopment."
Outcome: Resolutions: I. . . . principles of communism in­
compatible with the principles of the inter-American system. 
. . .  V. Adoption of the Alliance for Progress0 . . . VI. 
Exclusion of Cuba from participation in the inter-American 
system. . . . Other resolutions were passed reaffirming non­
intervention and recommending free elections.
Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, July 21, 1964; 
Washington D.C.
Agenda: Action to be taken against the Cuban government for
acts of intervention and aggression affecting the territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of Venezuela, as well as the opera­
tion of its democratic institutions.
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Outcome: Cuban government condemned for acts of aggression
and intervention; adopted measures against Cuban government 
consisting of breaking of diplomatic relations by all American 
governments, suspension of trade except for humanitarian rea­
sons, and suspension of all sea transportation except that 
needed for humanitarian reasons; warned the Cuban government 
of the right of self-defense in either individual or collective 
form possessed by any O.A.S. member to the extent of resorting 
to armed force.
Second Special Inter-American Conference, November 17, 1963; Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil.
Agenda: Consider reorganization of the O.A.S. structure.
Outcomes: Proposals for modernization made, to be decided
upon at future meeting.
Third Special Conference of American States, August 29, 1966; Buenos 
Aires, Argentina.
Agenda: Undertake specific reorganization of the structure
of the O.A.S.
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Appendix E
THE ORIGINAL MONROE DOCTRINE 
CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE OF DECEMBER 2, 1823
It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a 
great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the 
condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to 
be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be 
remarked that the result has been so far very different from what was 
then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe, with which 
we have so much intercourse and from which we derive our origin, we 
have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens 
of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor 
of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the 
Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to 
themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with 
our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or 
seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our 
defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity 
more immediately connected, and by causes x<rhich must be obvious to 
all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the 
allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of 
America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their 
respective Governments; and to the defense of our own, which has been 
achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by 
the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we 
have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We 
owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing 
between the United States and those powers to declare that we should 
consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any 
portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With 
the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have 
not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who 
have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose inde­
pendence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, 
acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of 
oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, 
by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation 
of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war 
between those new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality 
at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and 
shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in 
the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall 
make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indis­
pensable to their security.
The late events in Spain and Portugal shew that Europe is still 
unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced 
than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any 
principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in 
the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition 
may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all 
independent powers whose governments differ from theirs are interested 
even those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States 
Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage 
of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, 
nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the 
internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government 
de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly 
relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, 
and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every 
power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to those 
continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different.
It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political 
system to any portion of either continent without endangering our 
peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren 
if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is 
equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposi­
tion in any form with indifference. If we look to the comparative 
strength and resources of Spain and those new Governments, and their 
distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never sub­
due them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave 
the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue 
the same course.
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Appendix F
SPEECHES IN LEAGUE OF NATIONS RELATING TO 
SPANISH NON-INTERVENTION POLICY
League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 155, 
Records of the Seventeenth Ordinary Session, Text of the Debates of 
the Plenary Meetings. In this is contained a speech by M. Julio 
Alvarez del Vayo, Spanish Republican Ambassador to the League of 
Nations, given on September 25, 1936. pp. 47-50.
Collective security— how many illusions have in the last few 
years been born of that magic formula, only to be turned into bitter 
disappointments. The formula is in itself perfect . . . The complete 
application of the formula of collective security would thus mean an 
end to war.
It was too good to be true! Recent events, the bitter memory 
of which still darkens international life, have brought to light 
these obstacles to the organization of collective security envisaged 
on such lines . . .
(Will war in the future) continue to take its classic form? 
Reality shows that this is no longer the case and it will never again 
be the case. The war of the future . . . will, in fact, be a conflict, 
a collision, a clash in the drama of history, between two ideologies, 
two mentalitites, two different conceptions of life . . .  p. 48.
. . . Obviously, a system of collective security, if it is to 
restore confidence to the peoples, must, before all, protect states 
against the risk of internal rebellions which are supported from 
outside . . .  p. 49.
The policy of non-intervention! . . . Who among you could fail 
to understand why it is that we, the men responsible for the future 
of Apain . . . (and the) Spanish people, . . . must perforce regard 
so-called non-intervention as a policy of intervention detrimental 
to the constitutional and responsible government? Who . . . could 
fail to recognize that we cannot allow ourselves to be placed on the 
same footing as those who, breaking their solemn oath to the Republic, 
have risen in arms to destroy the constitutional liberty of our 
country?
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. . . The legal monstrosity of the formula of non-intervention 
is manifest . . . From the juridical point of view, non-intervention, 
as applied to Spain, represents an innovation in the traditional rules 
of international law, for it means withholding means of action from 
a lawful government.
(is it really "non-intervention"?) Non-intervention should 
consist wholly in ignoring the internal situation of a country and 
in retaining the full juridical and practical validity of the commer­
cial agreements previously concluded. We would accept a strict policy 
of non-intervention . . . But when the normal commercial relations 
with Spain are suddenly interrupted, when the export of war material 
to the lawful Government suddenly stops, when contracts . . . are 
cancelled, then we must affirm once again that this policy of non­
intervention has been applied solely to the detriment of the lawful 
government and, consequently, to the advantage of the rebels, pp. 49-50.
League of Nations, Official Journal, Records of the Seventeenth Ses­
sion; speech by Sr. Narcisso Bassols, Chief Delegate of the United 
States of Mexico, September 26, 1936.
Mr. Bassols charges that the League of Nations is unable to 
carry out its first and most decisive obligation— namely to maintain 
the integrity and independence of all its member states. He stresses 
the need for the overhaul and revision of the League's principles and 
methods of procedure.
The refusal of legitimate means of defense to a government 
attacked on its own territory is called unjust. The legal abyss 
separating a government from a group of rebels is stressed.
"These considerations lead the Mexican delegation to point 
out in no vague terms the gravity of the present situation. We all 
agree that the progress achieved in international law comes essential­
ly from the decision to remove from the plane of political contingency, 
. . . certain aspects of international relations, and to transfer 
them to a higher and more civilized plane.
"In taking this stand upon a firm legal basis and upon its 
understanding of the problem confronting the Spanish government—  
Mexico having suffered so frequently from the scourge of unjust 
military dictatorships— my Government has, from the outset of the 
conflict, pursued a policy of material cooperation with the legitimate 
Spanish Government. . . .
"The policy, carried out by my Government in the full exercise 
of its sovereignty, needs no defense, international law provides an 
abundant justification for it. . . . "
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Speech by M. Alvarez del Vayo, September 27, 1937, to League of Na­
tions Ordinary Session, in Official Journal (1937), p. 53.
Notes speech by Spanish Prime Minister in Special Supplement 
No. 169, p. 58.
The Prime Minister made the following proposals:
1. That the German and Italian aggression be recognized
as such.
2. That, consequently, the League examine . . . the
means by which that aggression could be brought to an end.
3. That full rights once more be given to the Spanish
Government freely to acquire all the war material it should consider 
necessary.
4. That the non-Spanish combatants be withdrawn from 
Spanish territory.
5. That the measures to be adopted for security in the
Mediterranean be extended to Spain, and that Spain be granted her
legitimate share in them.
League of Nations, Monthly Summary. (Geneva: League of Nations, 
December 1936), p. 365.
Extraordinary Session held from December 10 through 12 on an 
appeal of the Spanish government.
Great Britain and France, holding to their non-intervention 
policy, were desirous that the indiscriminate supply of arms would 
not spread beyond Spain, or that no more would enter Spain.
"The United Kingdom held that strict application of the non­
intervention policy must play an essential part in limiting and 
shortening the war. . . .1
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Appendix G
APPLICATIONS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY 
OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE 1948-1964
1948-49 Costa Rica and Nicaragua, called by Costa Rica. Reason;
Costa Rica alleged that its territory had been invaded by 
armed forces proceeding from Nicaragua. Action taken or 
results: Signature of a Pact of Amity between the two
governments on February 21, 1949, in the presence of the 
Council of the O.A.S. The Pact entered into force on July
15, 1949.
1950 Haiti and Dominican Republic (Case A) and Haiti, Dominican
Republic, and Cuba (Case B). Requested by Haiti and later 
Dominican Republic. Reason: Haiti charged that the Domini­
can Republic threatened to use force and the Dominican Re­
public cited various acts that threatened the sovereignty 
and political independence of the Dominican State. Action 
taken or results: Initiative by the Council of the O.A.S.
acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation to perfect 
inter—American instruments, such as the Havana Convention 
of 1928 on the Duties and Rights of States in the EVent of 
Civil Strife, and negotiations by the Investigating Commit­
tee of the Council carried out on the site.
1954 Guatemalan situation. Requested by Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Dominican Republic, Honduras, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, 
and the United States. Reason: Intervention by the inter­
national communist movement in Guatemala. Action: The
convocation of the Organ of Consultation was cancelled in 
view of the change of government that took place shortly 
after it had been made.
1955 Costa Rica and Nicaragua. Costa Rica requested. Reason:
Facts similar to those which motivated the request for 
application of the Treaty in 1948. Action or results: 
Agreement between both countries in compliance with Article 
IV of the Pact of Amity of 1949, and Agreement on the func­
tioning of the Commission of Investigation and Conciliation 
established in accordance with the Pact of Bogota (both 
signed in the presence of the Council of the O.A.S.).
1957 Honduras and Nicaragua. Requested by Honduras and later
Nicaragua. Reason: Honduras charged violations of its
territory and Nicaragua made similar charges (area in dispute). 
Action or results: Agreement of July 21, 1957, signed in
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the presence of the Council of the O.A.S., by which the par­
ties agreed to take the matter before the International Court 
of Justice. The border in dispute was later demarcated in 
accordance with the decision of the Court and, at the request 
of both parties, with the collaboration of the Inter—American 
Peace Committee.
1959 Panama. Panama requested but for the first time no accusa­
tion was made against another state. Reason: Invasion of
Panama by foreign elements proceeding from Cuba. Action or 
results: Initiative by the Council of the O.A.S. acting
provisionally as Organ of Consultation and negotiations 
carried out by the Investigating Committee of the Council 
on the site, with the approval of the Government of Panama, 
to obtain the unconditional surrender of the invaders and 
the deposit of their arms.
1959 Nicaragua. Nicaragua requested, but made no accusation
against another state. Reason: Invasion of Nicaragua, by
air, by nationals of various countries proceeding from 
Costa Rica and threat of invasion by land and sea. Action 
or results: Initiative by the Council of the O.A.S. acting
provisionally as Organ of Consultation and negotiations 
carried out on the site by the Committee appointed by said 
Organ to collect additional information regarding the situa­
tion that had motivated the complaint.
1960 Venezuela and Dominican Republic. Venezuela requested.
Reason: Attempt against the life of the Venezuelan Chief
of State, Romulo Betancourt. Action or results: Sending
of an Investigating Committee by the Council of the O.A.S. 
acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation and holding
of the Sixth Meeting of Consultation in San Jose, Costa Rica. 
Measures were taken against the Government of the Dominican 
Republic and later were extended by the Council. Said 
measures were lifted by the Council in January 1964.
1-J61—62 Cuban situation. Colombia requested. Reason: Considera­
tion of the threats to the peace and political independence 
of the American states and the possible measures to be 
adopted for the maintenance of peace and security, in case 
said threats or certain acts occurred. Action or results: 
Exclusion of the present Government of Cuba from participa­
tion in the Inter-American System and other measures adopted 
by the Eighth Meeting of Consultation, Punta del Este, Uruguay. 
1962.
1962 Cuban situation. United States requested. Reason: Estab­
lishment on Cuban territory, by extracontinental powers, of 
offensive weapons with nuclear capability. Action or results:
245
Measures taken by the Member States, based on the resolution 
approved by the Council of the O.A.S. acting provisionally 
as Organ of Consultation, to impede the delivery to Cuba of 
offensive weapons and to cause the withdrawal from Cuba, by 
the Soviet Union, of missiles and military personnel.
1963 Dominican Republic and Haiti. Costa Rica requested and later
Haiti. Reason: Statement by the Dominican Republic that
its Embassy in Port-au-Prince was broken into by members of 
the Haitian public force and denunciation by Haiti of certain 
facts relative to an armed invasion by a group of Haitian 
exiles from Dominican territory. Action or results: Recom­
mendations to the parties by the Council of the O.A.S. acting 
provisionally as Organ of Consultation and negotiations 
carried out on the site by the Investigating Committee of 
the Council in order to solve the problem. The provisional 
action of the Council has not been cancelled.
1963-64 Venezuela and Cuba. Venezuela requested. Reason: Denun­
ciation by the Government of Venezuela of acts of interven­
tion and aggression by the Government of Cuba. Action and 
results: Sending of an Investigating Committee to the site
by the Council of the O.A.S. acting provisionally as Organ 
of Consultation and report by the Committee. This report 
was submitted to the Ninth Meeting of Consultation, Washing­
ton D.C., July 1964, and on that basis the said Meeting 
decided to apply certain measures to the present Government 
of Cuba and made a Declaration to the Cuban people.
1964 Panama and United States. Panama requested. Reason: De­
nunciation by the Government of Panama of acts of aggression 
by the United States in connection with the events that 
occurred in Panama on January 9* 10, and 11, 1964. Action 
or results: Establishment of a General Committee by the
Council of the O.A.S. acting provisionally as Organ of Con­
sultation and sending of a five-member Delegation by the 
Committee to investigate and conciliate. On April 3> 1964, 
the Representatives of both parties signed a Joint Declara­
tion that established the basis of an agreement between them.
This material was taken from Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance: Applications. Vol. I and II. Washington D.C., Pan Ameri­
can Union, 1964-65. For further information which is much more com­
plete, refer to the above document.
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Appendix G-l 
DECLARATION TO THE PEOPLE OF CUBA (pp. 186-188)
WHEREAS: 
p. 186
The Preamble to the Charter of the Organization of American 
States declares that, "the historic mission of America is to offer 
to man a land of liberty, and a favorable environment for the develop­
ment of his personality and the realization of his just aspirations”; 
and that nthe true significance of American solidarity and good 
neighborliness can only mean the consolidation on this continent, 
within the framework of democratic institutions, of a system of 
individual liberty and social justice based on respect for the essen­
tial rights of man”;
P. 187
The Charter of the Organization declares that the solidarity 
of the American States and the high purposes toward which it is dedi­
cated demand that the political organization of these states be based 
on the effective exercise of representative democracy;
The Charter also proclaims ”the fundamental rights of the 
individual” and reaffirms that the ’’education of peoples should be 
directed toward justice, freedom, and peace”;
The Declaration of Santiago, Chile, adopted by the Fifth Meeting 
of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and signed by the 
present Cuban Government, proclaimed that the faith of peoples of 
America in the effective exercise of representative democracy is the 
best vehicle for the promotion of their social and political progress 
(Resolution XCV of the Tenth Inter-American Conference), while well 
planned and intensive development of the economies of the American 
countries and improvement in the standard of living of their peoples 
represent the best and firmest foundation on which the practical 
exercise of democracy and the stabilization of their institutions 
can be established;
The Ninth International Conference of American States condemned 
’’the methods of every system tending to suppress political and civil 
rights and liberties, and in particular the action of international 
communism or any other totalitarian doctrine”;
The present Government of Cuba, identifying itself with the 
principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology, has established a political, 
economic, and social system alien to the democratic and Christian 
traditions of the American family of nations and contrary to the
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principles of juridical organization upon which rest the security 
and peaceful harmonious relations of the peoples of the hemisphere;
The exclusion of the present Government of Cuba from partici­
pation in the inter-American system, by virtue of the provisions of 
Resolution VI of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, by no means signifies any intention to deny the 
Cuban people their rightful place in the community of American peoples;
The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation, in Application of the Inter- 
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,
DECLARES:
That the free peoples of the Americas are convinced that the 
inter-American system offers to the Cuban people unequaled conditions 
for the realization of their ideals of peace, liberty, and social and 
economic progress;
That the peoples belonging to the inter-American system are 
in complete sympathy with the Cuban people in all their sufferings, 
in the face of the total loss of their liberty both in the spiritual 
domain and in the social and economic field, the denial of their most 
elementary human rights, the burden of their persecutions, and the 
destruction of a legal system that was open to improvement and that 
offered the possibility of stability; and
p. 188
That, within this spirit of solidarity, the free peoples of 
America cannot and must not remain indifferent to or uninterested in 
the fate of the noble Cuban people, which is oppressed by a dictator­
ship that renounces the Christian and democratic traditions of the 
American peoples; and in consequence
EXPRESSES:
1. Its profound concern for the fate of the brother people 
of Cuba.
2. Its deepest hope that the Cuban people, strengthened by 
confidence in the solidarity with them of the other American peoples 
and governments, will be able, by their own endeavor, very soon to 
liberate themselves from the tyranny of the communist regime that 
oppresses them and to establish in that country a government freely 
elected by the will of the people that will assure respect for funda­
mental human rights.
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3* Its firm conviction that the emphatic condemnation of the 
policy of the present Cuban Government of aggression and intervention 
against Venezuela will be taken by the people of Cuba as a renewed 
stimulus lor its hope there will come to prevail in that country a 
climate of freedom that will offer to man in Cuba a favorable environ­
ment for the development of his personality and the realization of 
his just aspirations.
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Appendix H
TENTH INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE 
Caracas, Venezuela, March 1-28, 1954 
RESOLUTIONS1
XCIII
DECLARATION OF SOLIDARITY FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE POLITICAL 
INTEGRITY OF THE AMERICAN STATES AGAINST THE INTERVENTION 
OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
WHEREAS:
The American Republics at the Ninth International Conference 
of American States declared that international communism, by its anti­
democratic nature and its interventionist tendency, is incompatible 
with the concept of American freedom, and resolved to adopt within 
their respective territories the measures necessary to eradicate and 
prevent subversive activities;
The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs recognized that, in addition to adequate internal measures 
in each state, a high degree of international cooperation is required 
to eradicate the danger which the subversive activities of inter­
national communism pose for the American states; and
The aggressive character of the international communist move­
ment continues to constitute, in the context of world affairs, a 
special and immediate threat to the national institutions and the 
peace and security of the American states, and to the right of each 
state to develop its cultural, political, and economic life freely 
and naturally without intervention in its internal or external affairs 
by other states,
The Tenth Inter-American Conference
Final Act, signed March 28, 1954. Pan American Union, Congress 
and Conference Series, No. 33* AJJUL Supplement (1954).
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1
CONDEMNS:
The activities of the international communist movement as con­
stituting intervention in American affairs;
EXPRESSES:
The determination of the American states to take the necessary 
measures to protect their political independence against the inter­
vention of international communism, acting in the interests of an 
alien despotism;
REITERATES:
The faith of the peoples of America in the effective exercise 
of representative democracy as the best means to promote their social 
and political progress; and
DECLARES:
That the domination or control of the political institutions 
of any American state by the international communist movement, ex­
tending to this Hemisphere the political system of an extra-continental 
power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political 
independence of the American states, endangering the peace of America, 
and would call for a Meeting of Consultation to consider the adoption 
of appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties.
2
RECOMMENDS:
That, without prejudice to such other measures as they may 
consider desirable, special attention be given by each of the Ameri­
can governments to the following steps for the purpose of counter­
acting the subversive activities of the international communist move­
ment within their respective jurisdictions:
1. Measures to require disclosure of the identity, activities, 
and sources of funds of those who are spreading propaganda of the 
international communist movement or who travel in the interests of 
that movement, and of those who act as its agents or in its behalf; 
and
2. The exchange of information among governments to assist 
in fulfilling the purpose of the resolutions adopted by the Inter- 
American Conferences and Meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
regarding international communism.
This declaration of foreign policy made by the American Repub­
lics in relation to dangers originating outside this Hemisphere is 
designed to protect and not to impair the inalienable right of each 
American state freely to choose its own form of government and economic 
system and to live its own social and cultural life.
The Tenth Inter-American Conference
REAFFIRMS:
The fundamental principles and aims of the Charter of the Or­
ganization of American States, the American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the 
resolutions of the Organization that refer to those principles and 
aims;
REITERATES:
Recognition of the inalienable right of each American state 
to choose freely its own institutions in the effective exercise of 
representative democracy, as a means of preserving its political 
sovereignty, achieving its economic independence, and living its own 
social and cultural life, without intervention on the part of any 
state or group of states, either directly or indirectly, in its domes­
tic or external affairs, and, particularly, without the intrusion of 
any form of totalitarianism;
The conviction of the American states that one of the most 
effective means of strengthening their democratic institutions is to 
increase respect for the individual and social rights of man, without 
any discrimination, and to maintain and promote an effective policy
3
XCV
DECLARATION OF CARACAS
RENEWS:
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of economic well-being and social justice to raise the standard of 
living of their peoples;
RESOLVES:
fo unite the efforts of all the American states to apply, 
develop, and perfect the above-mentioned principles, so that they 
will form the basis of firm and solidary action designed to attain, 
within a short time, the effective realization of the representative 
democratic system, the rule of social justice and security, and the 
economic and cultural cooperation essential to the mutual well-being 
and prosperity of the peoples of the Continent; and
DECLARES:
That this resolution shall be known as the "Declaration of 
Caracas."
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2131 (XX) DECLARATION ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF INTERVENTION 
IN THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF STATES AND THE PROTECTION OF 
THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY
Appendix I
The General Assembly,
Deeply concerned at the gravity of the international situation 
and the increasing threat to universal peace due to armed interven­
tion and other direct or indirect forms of interfenrnce threatening 
the sovereign personality and the political independence of States,
Considering that the United Nations, in accordance with their 
aim to eliminate war, threats to the peace and acts of aggression, 
created an Organization, based on the sovereign equality of States, 
whose friendly relations would be based on respect for the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and on the obliga­
tion of its Members to refrain from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,
Recognizing that, in fulfilment of the principle of self- 
determination, the General Assembly, in the Declaration on the Grant­
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in 
resolution 151^ (XV) °f December i960, stated its conviction that 
all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exer­
cise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory, 
and that, by virtue of that right, they freely determine their politi­
cal status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development,
Recalling that in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
the General Assembly proclaimed that recognition of the inherent 
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world, without distinction of any kind.
Reaffirming the principle of non-intervention, proclaimed in 
the charters of the Organization of American States, the League of 
Arab States and the Organization of African Unity and affirmed at the 
conferences held at Montevideo, Buenos Aires, Chapultepee and Bogota, 
as well as in the decisions of the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, 
the First Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned 
Countries at Belgrade, in the Programme for Peace and International 
Co-operation adopted at the end of the Second Conference of Heads of 
State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at Cairo, and in the
254
declaration on subversion adopted at Accra by the Heads of State and 
Government of the African States,
Recognizing; that full observance of the principle of the non- 
interventionof States in the internal and external affairs of other 
States is essential to the fulfilment of the purposes and principles 
of the United Nations,
Considering that armed intervention is synonymous with aggres­
sion and, as such, is contrary to the basic principles on which 
peaceful international co-operation between States should be built,
Considering further that direct intervention, subversion and 
all forms of indirect intervention are contrary to these principles 
and, consequently, constitute a violation of the Charter of the United 
Nations,
Mindful that violation of the principle of non-intervention 
poses a threat to the independence, freedom and normal political, 
economic, social and cultural development of countries, particularly 
those which have freed themselves from colonialism, and can pose a 
serious threat to the maintenance of peace,
Fully aware of the imperative need to create appropriate con­
ditions which would enable all States, and in particular the develop­
ing countries, to choose without duress or coercion their own political, 
economic and social institutions,
In the light of the foregoing considerations, solemnly declares:
1. No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, 
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any 
other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms
of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the 
State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are 
condemned.
2. No State may use or encourage the use of economic, politi­
cal or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order
to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign 
rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind. Also, no State 
shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subver­
sive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent 
overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife 
in another State.
3. The use of force to deprive peoples of their national 
identity constitutes a violation of their inalienable rights and of 
the principle of non-intervention.
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Appendix J
RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE O.A.S. AT THE 
MEETING HELD ON THE AFTERNOON OF FEBRUARY 2, I966
WHEREAS:
The Ambassador, Representative of Peru, in the note of January 
19, 1966, addressed to the Vice Chairman of the Council, in his 
capacity as Acting Chairman requested on behalf of his government
. . . the convocation of a special meeting of the Council of 
the Organization, to formulate a denunciation on violation 
of the principle of nonintervention, set forth in the Charter 
of the United Nations and ratified by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations in its Resolution 2131 (XX), adopted at the 
session held last December 21;
The aforementioned convocation was seconded by the Ambassadors, 
Representative of Colombia and Venezuela, in notes dated January 23 
and 24, respectively;
At this special meeting, the Council heard statements by the 
Representatives of Peru, Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, the Dominican 
Republic, the United States, Costa Rica, Haiti, El Salvador, Ecuador, 
Argentina, Panama, Nicaragua, Honduras, Paraguay, Guatemala, Brazil, 
Mexico, Uruguay, and Chile, who expressed unanimous support of the 
denunciation by the Government of Peru;
In the city of Havana, during the first half of this past 
January, and under the official sponsorship of the Government of Cuba, 
a so-called conference of solidarity among the peoples of Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America was held, with the participation of delegates from 
the Soviet Union, Communist China, Cuba, and other states, as well 
as communist parties and groups from other countries, the final 
resolutions of which proclaimed a pledge by the participants to give 
financial, political, and military aid to communist subversive move­
ments in this hemisphere, the same as in other parts of the world;
This policy of intervention and aggression in the Western 
Hemisphere by some of the communist states constitutes a violation 
of the principle of nonintervention by one state in the internal and 
external affairs of another and of the self-determination of peoples, 
which were the object of Resolution 2131 (XX) adopted December 21,
1965, by the General Assembly of the United Nations, principles laid 
down in the Charter of the Organization of American States;
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As a result of the so-called conference of solidarity among 
the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, a permanent committee 
of twelve members was established in Havana consisting of representa­
tives of communist countries and groups of those three continents, 
as well as a special organization for the promotion of subversion 
and civil war in Latin America;
This policy of intervention and aggression endangers the peace 
and security of the Western Hemisphere; and
The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, held at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in 1962, in paragraph 1 of 
Resolution II requested the Council of the Organization of American 
States
. . .  to maintain all necessary vigilance, for the purpose of 
warning against any acts of aggression, subversion, or other 
danger to peace and security, or the preparation of such acts, 
resulting from the continued intervention of Sino-Soviet 
powers in this hemisphere, and to make recommendations to the 
governments of the member states with regard thereto,
THE COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
RESOLVES:
1. To condemn emphatically the policy of intervention and 
aggression of the communist states and other participating countries 
and groups, manifested in the discussions and decisions of the so- 
called conference of solidarity among the peoples of Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America, held in Havana during the first two weeks of 
January.
2. To denounce especially, as an act contrary to the peace 
and security of the hemisphere and in violation of the principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations and of Resolution 21J1 (XX), of 
December 21, 1965, the open participation at the aforesaid Havana 
Conference of official or officially sponsored delegations of member 
states of the United Nations that also voted in favor of the afore­
mentioned resolution.
3. To declare, in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations and Resolution 2131 (XX), of December 21, 1963, adopted by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations, and also in conformity 
with the Charter of the Organization of American States and resolu­
tions of the Inter-American Conferences and Meetings of Consultation 
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, that a state is responsible not only 
for the open use of force against another but also for giving support 
to any of the indirect forms of aggression, such as the promotion of
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civil strife in another state, or the organization of armed bands 
and the furnishing of war material or elements of combat and of money 
with offensive intentions against another.
4. To proclaim the American states1 reiterated adherence to 
the principles of nonintervention and self-determination of peoples 
set forth in the Charter of the Organization and in Resolution 2131 
(XX), of December 21, 1965, of the United Nations General Assembly.
5. To call upon the "Special Committee to Study Resolutions 
1.1 and VIII of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs” to make an urgent study and investigation of the 
deliberations, conclusions, and projections of the so-called confer­
ence of solidarity among the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America, held in Havana, and to submit a report to the Council of
the Organization along with such recommendations as it deems pertinent.
6. To request the Secretary General of the Organization of 
American States to transmit this resolution to the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations, with a request that he distribute it among 
the member states.
